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In this study, I discuss the role of mathematics in Francis Bacon’s natural 
philosophy. Bacon was one of the important figures of early modern 
philosophy and has been accepted as one of the frontier philosophers of 
modern science. The increasing role of mathematics in natural philosophy was 
an important development of this period of time, which raises the question of 
whether Bacon approved of the new role of mathematics in natural 
philosophy. The new role of mathematics in natural philosophy was mainly 
developed by astronomers such as Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler, and can be 
defined as ‘making natural philosophical claims through mathematics’. 
 
I will examine the role of mathematics in Baconian natural philosophy by 
considering the following questions:  
 
Can Bacon’s attitude towards the role of mathematics be accepted as 
Aristotelian? 
 
Were there similarities between Bacon and al–Bitruji in their ideas of how an 
astronomical model should be established? 
 
Is there any difference in Bacon’s attitude towards mathematics between his 
earlier and later works? 
 
Can we use Bacon’s approach to arithmetical quantification to refute the claim 





Was there any similarity between the attitude of Bacon and neo-Platonist 
chemical philosophers towards mathematics? 
 
Is there any relation between the non–mechanical character of Bacon’s 
philosophy and his attitude towards mathematics? 
 
Is there any relation between his matter theory and his attitude towards 
mathematics? 
 
Throughout this thesis, I emphasise that Bacon attached importance to 
applying mathematics to natural philosophy, however, was against the idea of 
making natural philosophical claims through mathematics. I argue that he had 
two fundamental commitments for being distrustful towards mathematics’ 
ability in making natural philosophical claims; his first being the consistency 
between the human mind and the course of logic and mathematics, and the 
second being the inconsistency between the course of nature (matter) and the 
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Bacon’s attitude towards the role of mathematics in natural philosophy is an 
ongoing debate among scholars. Some researchers have argued that Bacon 
neglected the role of mathematics in sciences. For example, John William 
Draper, in his A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe states: 
 
Ignorant himself of every branch of mathematics, he presumed that 
they were useless in science, but a few years before Newton achieved 
by their aid his immortal discoveries (Draper, 1875, p. 233). 
 
Another example can be given from Lynn Thorndike: 
  
He [Bacon] complained that Aristotle had mixed it [natural 
philosophy] with logic; Plato, with natural theology; and the Neo–
Platonists, with mathematics. This suggests what from the standpoint 
of modern science was his chief defect, his total disregard of 
mathematical method. He spoke of pure mathematics as, like the 
game of tennis, of no use in itself but as good exercise to cure 
intellectual defects (Thorndike, 1958, pp. 66–7).1 
 
However, there are other more recent scholars who have argued against this 
view. Graham Rees was the most important scholar, whose works has been 
important in improving our understanding of Bacon. More recently, Peter 
Urbach’s (1987), Stephen Gaukroger’s (2001), Mary Domski’s (2013) and 
                                                 




Dana Jalobeanu’s (2016b) works have extended our views regarding Bacon’s 
attitude towards mathematics’ role in natural philosophy. All of these scholars 
are in agreement that Bacon gave an auxiliary role to mathematics in natural 
inquiries, and this agreement has come about due to Bacon’s statement in the 
De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623): 
 
I have thought it better to designate Mathematics, seeing that they are 
of so much importance both in Physics and Metaphysics, and 
Mechanics and Magic, as appendices and auxiliaries to them all 
(Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 370). 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the auxiliary role of mathematics in natural 
philosophy is defined as not making natural philosophical claims through 
mathematics. Making natural philosophical claims through mathematics was 
the new role of mathematics, which was given by mathematical physicists 
such as Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler. 
 
Bacon’s attitude towards making natural philosophical claims through 
mathematics could be seen as him undervaluing the role of mathematics in 
sciences. However, for Bacon, except for his disagreement with the role of 
mathematics in making natural philosophical claims, he still believed 
mathematics was a useful and necessary application for natural philosophical 
inquiries.  I believe, therefore, that Bacon’s affirmative ideas about the 
application of mathematics in natural philosophical inquiries, and his attitude 
towards making claims of natural philosophy through mathematics should be 
cautiously separated. We must accept that Bacon’s disapproval of 
mathematics’ ability to make natural philosophical claims can be interpreted 
as his belittlement of the role of mathematics in sciences. Galileo, for example, 
argued that mathematics gives us the ability to discover the truth of nature. He 
would have believed that Bacon belittled the role of mathematics in natural 




made through mathematics. 
 
Before I summarize what I have tried to contribute to the discussions on 
Bacon and mathematics in this dissertation, let me first present a brief 
account of the works I will mention and their relation to Bacon’s views about 
mathematics and natural philosophy.2 
 
Valerius terminus: Of the interpretation of nature, which Bacon wrote in 1603, 
outlines the limits and impediments of knowledge. Bacon also covers these 
themes in his Advancement of learning and Novum organum (1620). In these 
works, he examines what we need to do to improve sciences by considering 
natural philosophy and its relationship to morality and religion. I mention 
Valerius terminus in Chapter 3 to show Bacon’s ideas about the relation 
between astronomy and natural philosophy. They are also covered in the 
Advancement of learning. The Advancement of learning, Novum organum and 
De Augmentis Scientiarum are three important books of Bacon that I mention 
throughout my thesis. 
 
In his Cogitationes de natura rerum (Thoughts on the nature of things), written 
in 1604, we see Bacon’s thoughts on atoms or matter theory. For Bacon, atoms 
(i.e. seeds) are the way to look for the principles of motion in matter, but not 
beyond matter, such as the forms of Aristotle or the mystical numbers of 
Pythagoras. It is important to understand Bacon’s attitude towards 
mathematics and logic. According to Bacon, if you look for the principles of 
motion beyond nature, then you will use logic and mathematics more than 
experiment3 in your natural philosophical method. I have discussed this work 
                                                 
  2.    For the chronology of Bacon’s works, see Peltonen (1996, pp. xiii-xv). 
  3.  For Bacon, experience and experiment have different meanings. Experience happens by 
itself, while experiments are sought out deliberately (see Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 
82, p. 131). However, in Renaissance terminology, experiment and experience have almost the 
same meaning and they had been used interchangeably. See Jardine, (1974, p. 137). For a 
discussion regarding experience and experiment in Zabarella’s and Galileo’s writings, see 




of Bacon in the second and fifth chapter of this dissertation. 
 
In 1605, Bacon published the Advancement of learning, the full title of which 
was Of Proficience and Advancement of Learning Divine and Human. In this 
book, Bacon classifies human understanding into three categories: memory, 
imagination and reason, which correspond to history, poetry and philosophy 
respectively. Bacon divided philosophy into the divine, human and natural. 
Natural philosophy has three aspects: natural history, physics and 
metaphysics. In this book, Bacon makes an important distinction between 
pure and mixed mathematics and explains the role of mathematics in natural 
philosophy, which he calls ‘auxiliary’. I have used this work of Bacon 
throughout this dissertation. 
 
Bacon also wrote his main ideas about mathematics in the revised version of 
the Advancement of learning, which is De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623). In 
these two books, he defines what pure and mixed mathematics are and what 
role they have in natural philosophy. Bacon writes that mathematics plays a 
role auxiliary to that of natural philosophy. However, it is important to further 
understand what he meant by an ‘auxiliary role’, and why he gave this role to 
mathematics. 
 
A difficult but essential text for understanding the properties of Bacon’s 
matter theory is the ancient Greek fable of Cupid and Coelum. This fable was 
placed in De sapientia veterum (The wisdom of the ancients), published in 
1609. In 1612, Bacon’s De principiis atque originibus (On principles and 
origins according to the fables of Cupid and Coelum) was also written. In this 
book, Bacon also explains his matter theory by interpreting the ancient Greek 
fable ‘Cupid and Coelum’, the same fable he discusses in the De sapientia 
veterum (The wisdom of the ancients). In his 1612 version of the fable, we can 
see that Bacon interprets it in a more detailed way. Bacon’s matter theory 






A description of the intellectual globe and Theory of the heaven were written in 
1612 and published in 1653.4 I have cited these two books to explain Bacon’s 
thoughts about the relation between astronomy and natural philosophy, 
which give us an opportunity to understand what Bacon means by the 
‘auxiliary role’ of mathematics in natural philosophy. Unlike Theory of the 
heaven, A description of the intellectual globe is about the division of human 
learning into history, poesy, and philosophy. Bacon made this division 
according to the three faculties of the mind, however, in this book, Bacon also 
discusses the relation between astronomy and natural philosophy. For Bacon, 
astronomy (as a mathematical science) should be based on physics. In Theory 
of the heaven, Bacon explains his astronomical theory by considering the 
physical statements of the heavens instead of the ‘dialectical and 
mathematical subtleties’ of the astronomers, which for him should be left 
aside. I discuss these two works of Bacon in Chapter 3. 
 
In 1620, two important works of Bacon had been published, Parasceve ad 
historiam natvralem et experimentalem (Description of a natural and 
experimental history), and Novum organum. I discuss Parasceve and Novum 
organum in the fourth chapter of my thesis, where I examine his usage of 
arithmetical quantification in natural historical works. In Parasceve, we learn 
that for Bacon, the union of physics and mathematics produces practice. We 
can also see a similar idea in Novum organum. In 1622, Bacon had written 
Abecedarium novum naturae. I used these works in the fourth chapter when 
regarding Bacon’s quantitative works. Bacon also emphasises the importance 
of mathematics to produce practice in these writings. 
 
                                                 




In Novum organum—which plays an important role in several sections of this 
dissertation — Bacon explains his new kind of inductive logic. He states that a 
natural philosopher should proceed from lower axioms to higher axioms,5 
step by step through his eliminative, inductive experimental method. Bacon 
discusses all aspects of his natural philosophy in this work, including his view 
on the role of mathematics in natural philosophy. He says in Novum organum 
that we should not use mathematics to procreate natural philosophy, that is, 
we should not make natural philosophical claims through mathematics.  
 
Now, let me summarize my arguments chapter-by-chapter in the dissertation. 
 
In Chapter 1, I outline the place of mathematics in Baconian natural 
philosophy by considering it within the place of mathematics in the 
Aristotelian schema. I explain Bacon’s views regarding the Aristotelian 
disciplinary boundary between mathematical sciences (mixed mathematics) 
                                                 
  5.  In Baconian terminology, axiom has double meaning. First, for the common principles 
which belong to several sciences, Bacon classifies this kind of axioms or principles as 
Philosophia Prima (or summary philosophy). Such as: 
“The nature of everything is best seen in its smallest portions,” is a rule in Physics 
of such force that it produced the atoms of Democritus; and yet Aristotle made 
good use of it in his Politics, where he commences his inquiry of the nature of a 
commonwealth with a family (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, pp. 337–8). 
Second, for the physical and metaphysical causes, which are material, and efficient causes for 
physics; formal, and final causes for metaphysics. We can see this in Bacon’s division of natural 
philosophy into speculative and operative parts: 
Why therefore should we not divide Natural Philosophy into two parts, the mine 
and the furnace … the Inquisition of Causes, and the Production of Effects; 
Speculative and Operative … all true and fruitful Natural Philosophy has a double 
scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments to axioms 
[causes], and descending from axioms to the invention of new experiments 
(Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 343). 
Mary Horton seems to confine axioms to forms (laws of nature or hypotheses, theories). See 
Horton, (1973, pp. 247–248). However, Bacon calls not only formal causes, but material and 
efficient causes axioms because the ladder (or double scale) includes material, efficient, and 
formal causes. 
Bacon also divides axioms into the ones which are to be determined through old (syllogistic) 
logic, and the ones which are discovered through Bacon’s new inductive logic. See Bacon 
(Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 24, p. 73). 




and natural philosophy, and I argue that in some senses, Bacon was loyal to 
the Aristotelian disciplinary boundary. 
 
In Chapter 2, I examine the reasons Bacon did not approve of the new role of 
mathematics in natural sciences. I argue that Bacon had two fundamental 
commitments to refuse the idea of making natural philosophical claims 
through mathematics. First, the consistency between the human mind and the 
course of logic and mathematics; and second, the inconsistency between the 
course of nature and the course of logic and mathematics. Bacon surmises that 
the unaided human mind cannot deal with the subtlety of matter. I will make 
further explanations about the subtlety of matter in Section 2.2. 
 
In Chapter 3, I examine the role of mathematics in Baconian natural 
philosophy through his ideas regarding astronomy. When we examine the 
history of astronomy up to the seventeenth century, I separate three different 
thoughts regarding the role of mathematics in establishing an astronomical 
theory. First, there were those who held that mathematics should only save 
the phenomena. For them, this role was enough for a geometrical explanation 
of the heavens, and it did not have to provide us with the real motions of the 
heavenly bodies. This group are called ‘instrumentalists’ by Pierre Duhem. I 
have labelled the second group mathematical realists. They believed in the 
explanatory power of mathematics in developing an astronomical theory, and 
that mathematics can provide us with the real (physical) structure of the 
heavens.  The third group argued that mathematics could not give us the real 
structure of the heavens, but saving the phenomena should not also be seen as 
enough for a geometrical (mathematical) model of the heavens. They then 
stated that a geometrical (mathematical) model should be established 
according to physics. I call the third group physical realists, and argue that 
Bacon should be accepted as a physical realist. 
 




that when we turn our attention from Bacon’s attitude towards geometrical 
abstraction to his arithmetical quantitative works, we can see Bacon was more 
affirming of mathematical methods. However, I argue that the arithmetical 
quantifications in Bacon’s natural historical works cannot be used to refute 
the argument that he did not approve of the new role of mathematics in 
natural philosophical inquiries, or that the method of geometry could be used 
to make natural philosophical claims.  
 
I have argued that there is a correlation between the use of excessive logic and 
passive matter and experimental method and active matter in the second 
chapter. Bacon shows this by comparing Democritus’ philosophy (or ancient 
wisdom) and rationalist philosophies such as Aristotle’s philosophy. In 
Chapter 5, I attempt to demonstrate a correlation between mechanical 
philosophy and passive matter, and vitalist philosophy (neo-Platonist chemical 
philosophy) and active matter. Showing this correlation will clarify Bacon’s 
attitude towards mathematics and its relation with his matter theory. 
 
In Chapter 6, I argue that, for Bacon, mathematical models such as the 
geometrical models of the heavens, are mechanics, and I call this kind of 
mechanics external mechanics. Mathematical models (external mechanics) are 
different from mathematically–oriented models of machinery (systems of 
machinery) because legitimate mathematical models must be based on the 






                                                 
  6.   What is  meant  by  a  mathematical  model  here  is  a mathematical  demonstration 
regarding  natural  phenomena.  I use this term to emphasise the difference between physical 
accounts of a natural phenomenon, which should be considered as a result of natural 










The Relation between the Mathematical Sciences and 




The role of mathematics in Francis Bacon’s natural philosophy and the reform 
he wanted to fulfil in natural philosophy strictly hinges on his reservations 
about the current philosophy of his day, which was largely based on 
Aristotelian philosophy. In this chapter, I argue that Bacon cannot be 
interpreted as someone who was hostile to the application of mathematics in 
sciences, but that he was averse to the new application of mathematics in 
sciences. What I mean by the new application of mathematics in sciences is 
mathematics that can be used to make natural philosophical claims. Even 
though Bacon violates the Aristotelian disciplinary boundary between 
mathematical sciences and natural philosophy by placing mathematical 
sciences in natural philosophy, he still separates the objects of mathematical 
sciences and natural philosophy, which, indeed, can be interpreted as having a 
loyalty to the disciplinary boundary between mathematical sciences and 
natural philosophy. When we consider this, the discussion regarding Bacon’s 
attitude towards the role of mathematics in sciences becomes clearer. 
 
In section 1.1, I will outline the reasons Aristotle separated natural philosophy 
from mathematical sciences. In section 1.2, I will discuss the various 




Bacon separates the object of mathematical sciences and natural philosophy, 
showing his loyalty to the disciplinary boundary between mathematical 
sciences and natural philosophy. In section 1.3, I will discuss Bacon’s loyalty to 
the disciplinary boundary through his anti-Copernicanism. 
 
 
1.1 The development of the distinction between 
mathematical sciences and natural philosophy 
 
 
Aristotle divides mathematics into pure mathematics and mathematical 
sciences (in Baconian terminology, ‘mixed mathematics’).7 Arithmetic and 
geometry can be given as examples of pure mathematics; and mixed 
mathematics are those mathematical sciences whose objects are natural 
phenomena, such as light for optics, celestial phenomena for astronomy, 
sound for acoustics, and spatial and dimensional attributes of bodies for 
perspective. 
 
To explain the difference between mixed and pure mathematical sciences, 
Aristotle states the following: 
 
Further clarification comes from the branches of mathematics which 
are closest to natural science (such as optics, harmonics, and 
astronomy), since they are in a sense the converse of geometry: 
where geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they 
occur in nature, optics studies mathematical lines, but as they occur 
in nature rather than as purely mathematical entities (Aristotle, 2008, 
                                                 
  7.   The term ‘mixed mathematics’ corresponds with the Aristotelian mathematical sciences, 
which was located by Aristotle as falling somewhere between pure mathematics and physics. 
Gary Brown argues that “the term ‘mixed mathematics’ can be traced back at least as far as 
Francis Bacon” (Brown, 1991, p. 81). Mathematical sciences were also called ‘middle sciences’. 




p. 37; book 2, 194a 7). 
 
It follows to ask what the difference is between mathematical sciences and 
natural philosophy? While natural philosophy examines a natural 
phenomenon by considering it in terms of matter, mathematics does not have 
the ability to do that.8 
 
Aristotle distinguishes ‘generation, or coming–to–be’ from ‘corruption, or 
alteration’, stating that the properties of the perceptible substratum of a body 
undergo change, while the imperceptible substratum of the same body 
continues to exist. Then, the object of mathematics is form (perceptible 
substratum) which undergoes change in the sense of alteration, but the 
objects of natural philosophy do not undergo change. ‘Generation, or coming–
to–be’ can only be true of the objects of natural philosophy. Aristotle says the 
following when discussing the difference between the objects of mathematics 
and natural philosophy: 
 
the bronze is now round, now a thing with corners, but remains the 
same (Aristotle, 1982, p. 14; 319b 15). 
 
This example is saying that while the shape of bronze changes, the substratum 
                                                 
  8.    John Schuster answers the question well: 
A natural philosophical account of something was an explanation in terms of 
matter and cause, but for Aristotle, mathematics could not provide that. The 
mixed mathematical sciences, such as optics, mechanics, astronomy, or music 
theory, used mathematics not to provide explanations, but instrumentally to 
present physical things and processes mathematically in ways that might be useful 
but certainly were not true to reality as defined by natural philosophical 
explanation stories of matter and cause. For example, for Aristotelians, the 
investigation of the physical nature of light would fall straightforwardly under 
natural philosophizing, an issue of invoking appropriate principles of matter and 
cause. In contrast, the mixed mathematical science of geometrical optics studied 
ray diagrams, in which geometrical lines represented rays of light, and 
phenomena such as the reflection and refraction of light were dealt with in a 
descriptive, mathematical manner. This might be useful, but it was, according to 
Aristotle, incapable of providing proper explanations, dealing with the physical 




or underlying subject does not, showing that for Aristotle, mathematics deals 
with forms.9 He further states this opinion in Posterior Analytics, saying that 
“mathematics is concerned with forms” (Aristotle, 1994, p. 21; 1:13, 79a 5–
10). 
 
According to Aristotle, geometrical shapes of natural bodies are the objects of 
mathematical sciences, but the composition of the sun and moon are what 
should be studied by natural scientists. Mathematical properties of natural 
bodies can be separated or abstracted from the world of change, that is, from 
matter; however, for a natural philosopher, an inquiry into nature should 
include both matter and form, while for a mathematician, it should include 
only mathematical properties which can be abstracted from matter.10 
 
In Posterior Analytics 1.13, Aristotle presents two types of syllogistic 
demonstration. One of them is known as ‘demonstration of the reasoned fact’, 
and the other one is ‘demonstration of the fact’.11 In Latin, the first one is 
translated as ‘demonstratio propter quid’, and the latter as ‘demonstratio 
quia’. Mancosu, when explaining the difference between them, states: “The 
former proceeds from effects to their causes, whereas the latter explains 
                                                 
  9.  It has mostly been thought that Aristotle did not believe there are perfect geometrical 
objects in the physical world. According to Aristotle, the claim that the straight line cannot 
touch the bronze sphere at a point was used by Protagoras to refute geometers. Contrary to 
general belief, Jonathan Lear argues in his Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics (1982) that 
the objects in the physical world instantiate mathematical properties. However, Theokritos 
Kouremenos argues that “de An. 403a 10–6 does not commit Aristotle to the perfect 
instantiation of geometric properties in the physical world because the two objects assumed 
to touch each other at a point in this passage are not physical, as Lear takes it, but geometric: 
consequently, de An. 403a 10–6 cannot be taken as evidence that geometric properties are 
perfectly instantiated in physical objects, from which geometric objects are abstracted” 
(Kouremenos, 2003, p. 463). In Aristotelian cosmology, perfect geometrical objects can be 
seen in the superlunar realm of the cosmos, because this part of the cosmos is composed of 
imperishable aether. 
  10.   On the objects of mathematics and physics, see also Zvi (2008, pp. 24–34). 
  11. Aristotle calls pure mathematical sciences ‘superior or higher sciences’, and mathematical 
sciences ‘subordinate sciences’. The superior sciences, such as arithmetic and geometry, can 
make reasoned fact explanations for the subordinate sciences, such as harmonics and optic. 
For example, harmonics is a subordinate science of arithmetic; mechanics is a subordinate 




effects through their causes” (Mancosu, 1999, p. 11). Aristotle argues that 
mathematics uses the first type of syllogism (demonstration of the reasoned 
fact) to perform its proofs. He states, in Posterior Analytics: 
 
Of the figures, the first is especially scientific [the first syllogistic 
figure]. The mathematical sciences carry out their demonstrations 
through it – e.g. arithmetic and geometry and optics – and so do 
almost all those sciences which inquire into the reason why. For 
deductions giving the reason why are carried out, either in general or 
for the most part and in most cases, through this figure. For this 
reason, then, it is especially scientific; for study of the reason why has 
most importance for knowledge (Aristotle, 1994, p. 22; 79a 15–25).12 
 
With regard to mathematics as syllogism, Orna Harari writes that Aristotle’s 
successors also tried to reformulate the mathematical proofs in syllogistic 
form (see Harari, 2004, p. 91). One of them was Alexander of Aphrodisias, a 
Greek commentator on Aristotle, who attempted to put mathematical proofs 
into syllogistic form. Harari also says that the most elaborate example she 
knows as an attempt to reformulate mathematical proofs into syllogistic form 
was Analyseis Geometricae Sex Librum Euclidis (1566) by Herlinus and 
Dasypodius (see Harari, 2004, p. 91, fn. 8). Jean van Heijenoort also mentions 
an Italian mathematician and logician, Giuseppe Peano (1858–1932), whose 
work, Fromulaire, “is an attempt to reduce all of mathematics to syllogisms (in 
the Aristotelian–Scholastic sense)” (Heijenoort, 1999, p. 187). Christopher 
Clavius, a mathematician and astronomer who was contemporary of Bacon, 
also tried to apply syllogistic reasoning to mathematics, as he states: 
 
“all other propositions, both Euclid’s and those of all other 
                                                 
  12.  For an argument on Aristotle’s claim regarding mathematics as syllogistic being false, see 
Jonathan Barnes’ translation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (1994, p. 162), and McKirahan 




mathematicians, can be solved in this way [syllogistic method].” But 
“mathematicians disregard this solution [by syllogism] in their 
demonstrations because proofs are quicker and easier without it.”13 
 
Rees also believes that Paracelsians “tended to equate mathematics with logic, 
and to damn both as impious instruments of the detested, heathenish 
philosophers Aristotle and Galen” (Rees, 1986, 425).14 As to Francis Bacon, he 
also argues mathematics is syllogistic. He states in his letter to Father 
Redemptus Baranzano in 1622: 
 
In the Mathematics there is no reason why it [syllogism] should not 
be employed (Bacon, Letter, SEH VII, p. 377). 
 
The following example is important to explain the difference between the 
objects of natural philosophy and mathematical sciences – whether the earth 
turns around the sun or vice versa. This question is a natural philosophical 
question because, in Aristotelian natural philosophy, every element has its 
own natural motion. The celestial bodies are made of aether, which is an 
imperishable element; and, as aether is imperishable, its natural motion is 
perfect (continual) motion, that is, circular motion. So, the earth cannot move 
around the sun because the sublunar elements are perishable elements and 
their natural motions are straightforward. Fire and air move upwards, and 
water and earth move downwards to the centre of the earth.15 As is seen, the 
motion of sublunar and superlunar bodies are related to the properties of 
their materials, and this is the reason that questions regarding the motions of 
celestial bodies are the objects of natural philosophical inquiries rather than 
astronomy as a mathematical science. So, making claims related to the 
motions of the celestial bodies by mathematicians was a violation of the 
                                                 
  13.   Quoted from Lattis (1994, p. 35). 
  14.   See also Debus (1973). 




disciplinary boundary between natural philosophy and mathematical 
sciences.16 I have given this example because it was the main matter of debate 
between mathematical physicists17 such as Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and 
natural philosophers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
 
Baconian forms are completely different from Aristotelian forms. For Bacon, 
forms are a part of metaphysics and metaphysics is a part of natural 
philosophy. I will make detailed explanations about the different meaning of 
Baconian form later (see pp. 24–5; fn. 30, 31), but for now, I want to 
emphasise that, even though Baconian forms are different than Aristotelian 
forms, Bacon also separated the objects of mathematical sciences and natural 
philosophy and argued that a mathematician cannot make natural 
philosophical claims. A mathematician should only deal with the object of 
mathematical sciences, and this means that Bacon was loyal to the disciplinary 
boundary between mathematical sciences and natural philosophy. When we 
consider the motions of the celestial bodies, Bacon also argued that the kind of 
motions celestial bodies had was a natural philosophical inquiry, but not an 
astronomical inquiry. I will talk about this in detail in Section 3.5. 
 
 




The speculative (theoretical) part of natural philosophy has three parts in 
Baconian natural philosophy: natural history, physics, and metaphysics.18 A 
                                                 
  16. For the disciplinary boundary between natural philosophy and mathematics, see 
Westman (1980). 
  17.  By mathematical–physicists, I refer to those who made claims of natural philosophy 
through mathematics. 
  18.  For detailed explanations regarding the classification of natural philosophy in Baconian 




natural inquiry begins with natural history, then proceeds to physics, and 
finally to metaphysics. 
 
 
    










                                                               Figure 1 
 
However, Bacon gave a different meaning to ‘metaphysics’ and ‘formal causes’ 
than Aristotle, and as mentioned above, he places metaphysics as a part of 
natural philosophy. According to Bacon, while physics is the inquiry into 
material and efficient causes, metaphysics examines formal and final causes. 
However, natural philosophy does not include inquiries into final causes 
because, for Bacon, even though final causes are real, they are barren and 
beyond human comprehension.19 Bacon believed nature bears God’s will, but 
it is not the business of a natural philosopher. So, we can conclude that in 
Baconian natural philosophy, in practice, metaphysics only includes inquiries 
into formal causes.20 
                                                                                                                                       
history as a foundation of true natural philosophy, see Manzo (2009); Jalobeanu (2015b) and 
(2016a). On Bacon’s natural history and testimony, see Serjeantson (1999). 
  19.   On rejection of inquiries into final causes in Baconian natural philosophy, see also Pe rez-
Ramos (1988, p. 162) and Quinton (1993, p. 160). 













Bacon did not classify pure mathematics; however, he placed mixed 
mathematics as a branch of metaphysics, and metaphysics as a part of natural 
philosophy. That is, for Bacon, mathematical sciences are a part of natural 
philosophy. 
  
The reason Bacon placed mixed mathematics as a branch of metaphysics, as 
you will see below, is that it is ‘one of the essentiall forms of things’, so it ‘is 
causatiue in Nature of a number of Effects’, that is, it has some axioms of 
nature.21 As Bacon states: 
 
Neuerthelesse there remaineth yet another part of NATVRALL 
PHILOSOPHIE, which is commonly made a principall part, and 
holdeth ranke with PHISICKE speciall and METAPHISICKE: which is 
[Mixed] Mathematicke, but I think it more agreable to the Nature of 
things, and to the light of order, to place it as a Branch of 
Metaphisicke: for the subiect of it being Quantitie, not Quantitie 
Indefinite: which is but a Relatiue, and belongeth to Philosophia Prima 
(as hath beene said,) but Quantitie determined, or proportionable, it 
appeareth to bee one of the essentiall forms of things; as that, that is 
causatiue in Nature of a number of Effects … MIXT (mathematics) 
hath for subiect some Axiomes or parts of Naturall Philosophie: and 
considereth Quantitie determined, as it is auxiliarie and incident vnto 
them (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, pp. 87–8, underlinings 
                                                                                                                                       
(1973, pp. 243–4). 
  21.   Lisa Jardine believes that the object of mathematics in Baconian natural philosophy is 
not the essential form as it is in Aristotelian philosophy. In Aristotelian schema, quantity is 
accidental attributes of bodies, not essential, and she thinks that the same idea goes for Bacon. 
She argues that the reason Bacon offered a subsidiary role for mathematics in natural 
philosophy resulted from an accidental character of quantity, see Jardine, (1974, p. 78). 
However, Bacon clearly says that, “For Quantity (which is the subject of Mathematic), when 
applied to matter, is as it were the dose of Nature, and is the cause of a number of effects in 
things natural; and therefore it must be reckoned as one of the Essential Forms of things” 






As to pure mathematics, it deals with quantity, which is completely severed 
from matter, and from axioms of natural philosophy:22 
 
To the PVRE MATHEMATICKS are those Sciences belonging, which 
handle Quantitie determinate merely seuered from any Axiomes of 
NATVRALL PHILOSOPHY: and these are two, GEOMETRY and 
ARITHMETICKE (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, p. 88).23 
 
For Bacon, ‘quantity proportionable’, which is the object of mixed 
mathematics, is a form, but it is the most abstracted form from matter 
compared to other forms which are more immersed into matter.24 As Bacon 
states: 
 
…it is true also that of all other formes (as wee vnderstand formes) it 
[quantity proportionable] is the most abstracted, and separable from 
matter and therefore most proper to Metaphisicke; which hath 
likewise beene the cause, why it hath beene better laboured, and 
enquired, then any of the other formes, which are more immersed into 
Matter. (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, p. 87, underlining added). 
                                                 
  22.   Nobuo Kawajiri argues that Bacon gave the handmaiden role to pure mathematics. See 
Kawajiri, (1979, p. 17). However, I argue that Bacon did not give any role to pure mathematics 
in natural philosophy. As Bacon states, ‘To Pure Mathematic belong those sciences which 
handle Quantity entirely severed from matter and from axioms of natural philosophy.’ So, for 
Bacon, pure mathematics does not have any axioms of natural philosophy, but mixed 
mathematics does, because he says ‘Mixed Mathematic has for its subject some axioms and 
parts of natural philosophy.’ For the full quotation, see p. 20 in this dissertation. 
  23.   In De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bacon says similar things: 
Mathematic is either Pure or Mixed. To Pure Mathematic belong those sciences 
which handle Quantity entirely severed from matter and from axioms of natural 
philosophy. These are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one handling quantity 
continued, and the other dissevered (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 370). 
  24.  Graham Rees calls these two kinds of forms ‘mathematical forms’ and ‘non-mathematical 





These arguments can be expressed below in diagrammatic form: 
 
                                        Pure Mathematics                           Mixed Mathematics                         
                                                      Quantity Indefinite                                      Quantity Proportionable 
Its object                                        It is not a form                                      It is one of the essential forms   
                                                 Fully separated from matter               The most abstracted form from matter                                         
 
Its relation with 
Natural philosophy                               (–)                                                 A part of natural philosophy            
                                                                                                                                (A branch of metaphysics) 
 
Its role in                                                   (–)                                                                    Auxiliary 
natural philosophy 
 
Sorts                                           Geometry, Arithmetic                                Perspective, Harmony, Astronomy,      
                                                                                                                               Cosmography, Architecture,                   




The diagram below shows the two parts of Baconian natural philosophy and 
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Related to the object of mixed mathematics, Nobuo Kawajiri argues that 
‘quantity proportionable’, as it was used in the Advancement of Learning, and 
‘dose of nature’, as it was used in the De Augmentis Scientiarum, have different 
meanings (see Kawajiri, 1979, p. 18). However, I argue that both ‘quantity 
proportionable’ and ‘dose of nature’ lays stress on quantity, which is 
determined in matter and both terms express the object of mixed 
mathematics. I believe we can conclude that these two terms do not have 
different meanings and that Bacon uses both these terms synonymously. 
Bacon calls both ‘quantity proportionable’ and ‘dose of nature’ one of the 
essential forms of things: 
 
For Quantity (which is the subject of Mathematic), when applied to 
matter, is as it were the dose of Nature, and is the cause of a number 
of effects in things natural; and therefore it must be reckoned as one 
of the Essential Forms of things (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, pp. 
369–70).25 
 
When Bacon says the subject of Mathematic above, he means the subject of 
mixed mathematics because, as mentioned before, only the subject of mixed 
mathematics is ‘causatiue in Nature of a number of Effects’, which means that 
mixed mathematics has some axioms of natural philosophy. As Bacon states: 
 
Mixed Mathematic has for its subject some axioms and parts of 
natural philosophy (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 371). 
 
Bacon also states: 
 
Quantitie determined, or proportionable, it appeareth to bee one of 
                                                 




the essentiall formes of things (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, p. 
87, underlinings added). 
 




1.3 Bacon’s loyalty to the Aristotelian disciplinary  
      boundary between mathematical sciences and   
      natural philosophy 
 
 
As mentioned, Bacon gave an auxiliary role to mathematics in natural 
philosophy. However, when studying the auxiliary role of mathematics in 
natural inquiries, Rees and Kawajiri argue that Bacon started to see 
mathematics’ role as an auxiliary to natural philosophy in the De Augmentis 
Scientiarum (1623).26 However, I argue we can also see the same attitude in 
Bacon’s Advancement of Learning (1605): 
 
MIXT (mathematics) hath for subiect some Axiomes or parts of 
Naturall Philosophie: and considereth Quantitie determined [the 
object of mixed mathematics], as it is auxiliarie and incident vnto 
them (see p. 17 for the full quotation). 
 
The same statement can be seen in the De Augmentis Scientiarum as follows: 
 
Mixed Mathematic has for its subject some axioms and parts of 
natural philosophy, and considers quantity [quantity determined] in 
so far as it assists to explain, demonstrate, and actuate these (Bacon, 
                                                 




De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 371).27 
 
I believe these two statements show Bacon’s attitude towards the auxiliary 
role of mathematics does not change between the Advancement of Learning 
and the De Augmentis Scientiarum.  
 
Rees present two reasons why he believes Bacon gave the auxiliary role to 
mathematics in his later work. First, Bacon developed his qualitative 
philosophy in the later stages of his life, and as a result, he holds a subsidiary 
role for mathematics in his later work, De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623). 
Second, Bacon had a special anxiety about the effect of mathematics on 
physics.28 Kawajiri argues the reason for this difference is the progress of 
mathematical physics.29 
 
Even though I believe the above statements of Bacon from his two works 
clearly show that his attitudes towards the auxiliary role of mathematics did 
not change, I do want to discuss Bacon’s anxiety about the effect of 
mathematics on physics, and how it can be seen as a reason for Bacon’s 
attitude towards the auxiliary role for mathematics. 
 
Bacon had a special anxiety about the effect of mathematics on physics, and 
the reason for this was that there were mathematicians who made natural 
philosophical claims through mathematics, such as Copernicus, Galileo and 
Kepler. He was concerned about this because he did not trust mathematics’ 
                                                 
  27. My argument concerns mixed mathematics specifically, or the role of (mixed) 
mathematics in natural philosophy. I have argued that mixed mathematics does not change 
from the Advancement of Learning to the De Augmentis Scientiarum. My concern with logic is 
limited to its role in natural philosophy. Logic may have changed, as argued in Anstey (2015), 
but Bacon’s conception of the auxiliary role of logic in natural philosophy, at least, did not 
change. We can also see this in the following words of Bacon written in the De Augmentis 
Scientiarum, ‘For it has come to pass, I know not how, that Mathematic and Logic, which ought 
to be but the handmaids of Physic.’ For the full quotation, see p. 23. 
  28.   See Rees (1985, p. 28). 




ability to discover the objects of natural philosophy. If Bacon had trust in 
mathematics’ explanatory power for the objects of natural philosophy, then he 
would not have separated the objects of mathematics and natural philosophy. 
 
For Bacon, a mathematician should not make natural philosophical claims 
through mathematics, and this shows us Bacon’s loyalty to the Aristotelian 
disciplinary boundary. If there had not been mathematicians who violated the 
disciplinary boundary, or who made natural philosophical claims through 
mathematics, Bacon would not have compelled to give an auxiliary role to 
mathematics: 
 
Which indeed I am in a manner compelled to do, by reason of the 
daintiness and pride of mathematicians, who will needs have this 
science almost domineer over Physic. For it has come to pass, I know 
not how, that Mathematic and Logic, which ought to be but the 
handmaids of Physic, nevertheless presume on the strength of the 
certainty which they possess to exercise dominion over it (Bacon, De 
augmentis, SEH IV, p. 370). 
 
In the above words, we can surmise that ‘being domineer over physics’ comes 
to mean making natural philosophical claims through mathematics. So, we can 
say that Bacon suggested a handmaid’s role for mathematics in natural 
inquiries, and this role comes to mean ‘not making natural philosophical 
claims through mathematics’. 
 
Now, I will argue that there is a correlation between the hierarchy of the 
natural axioms and the course that should be followed in natural inquiries. 
First, let’s see how Bacon defines both physical and metaphysical causes in the 
De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623) as follows: 
 




the conceit of antiquity, that Physic handles that which is most 
inherent in matter and therefore transitory, and Metaphysic that 
which is more abstracted and fixed. And again, that Physic supposes 
in nature only a being and moving and natural necessity; whereas 
Metaphysic supposes also a mind and idea … Physic inquires and 
handles the Material and Efficient Causes, Metaphysic the Formal and 
Final. 
 
Physic then comprehends causes vague, variable, and respective; but 
does not aspire to the constant (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 
346).30 
 
Let me say two things regarding the above quotes. First, for Bacon, only final 
causes, a part of metaphysics, supposes a mind and idea, not formal causes.31 
Also, as mentioned above, final causes are not the objects of natural 
                                                 
  30.  In the Advancement of Learning (1605), he states a similar idea, see Bacon (The 
Advancement, OFB IV, pp. 82–3). 
What does Bacon mean by ‘transitory’ in the above quotation? The answer was quoted by 
Bacon from Virgil as follows: 
As the same fire which makes the soft clay hard 
Makes hard wax soft (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 346). 
This quotation was translated by Fairclough as follows: “As this clay hardens, and as this wax 
melts in one and the same flame.” See Virgil (1999, Book VIII, p. 81). 
The variable or transitory nature of lower axioms (causes) means that lower axioms can have 
more than one effect. As is seen in the above example, fire is the cause of the hardening of soft 
clay, and the same fire is the cause of softening hard wax. 
As to constant and fixed axioms such as formal axioms (causes), the fixed and constant nature 
of these axioms means that they always have the same effect. Bacon gives an example in his 
Novum organum, when he inquiries into the form of heat. At the end of his inquiry, he comes 
to the conclusion through his inductive method that the form of heat is motion, which means 
that motion produces heat in every situation. So, forms or formal causes are the causes of 
motion, but in contrast to variable causes, they are fixed and constant causes of motion in 
nature. Cf. Rusu (2013, pp. 192–7). Rusu argues that Baconian form is motion. On Baconian 
forms, see also fn. 20 and 21 in this dissertation. 
  31.  Baconian formal causes cannot be considered as teleological causes. However, 
Aristotelian forms also function as efficient and final causes, which means that forms can be 
considered as teleological causes. This point is well put by Lynn Joy. See Joy (2006, p. 76). 
For how Aristotle accepts forms as the real causes of motion in matter, see Aristotle (1982, p. 




philosophers, but formal causes are. For Bacon, natural philosophers should 
only deal with material, efficient, and (immersed) formal causes. 
 
Second, for Bacon, lower axioms are variable, while general axioms (forms) 
are fixed and constant, and this is the hierarchy in nature.  
 
Now, let’s read the following words of Bacon: 
 
Nor need anyone shrink from this subtlety as something beyond 
disentangling; on the contrary, the more the investigation touches on 
simple natures, the more will all things be put out in the open and 
plain view; the matter being converted from the manifold to the 
simple, from the incommensurable to the commensurable, from the 
irrational to the computable, from the infinite and vague to the 
definite and certain, as happens in letters in writing, and notes sung 
in unison. Thus investigation of nature turns out best when physics is 
given definition by mathematics (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 
8, p. 213). 
 
When we interpret the above quotations, we can say that the course of the 
natural axioms is from the variable (manifold) nature of the lower axioms to 
the constant (simple) nature of general axioms. And, for Bacon, we should 
follow the same course and start our natural inquiry with the lower axioms, 
then we should proceed to simpler (general) axioms. 
 
As mentioned before, among formal axioms, ‘quantity determined’ is the most 
abstracted form, which means that it is the most general and simple axiom 
among formal axioms. So, the object of mixed mathematics is the most certain 
and simplest axiom, and, for Bacon, this is also the reason why ‘quantity’, the 
object of mixed mathematics, “hath beene better laboured, and enquired, then 




Advancement, OFB IV, p. 87). 
 
Now, let me explain what Bacon means, in the above quotation, by arguing 
that ‘investigation of nature turns out best when physics is given definition by 
mathematics.’ We can interpret these words in two ways. First, it refers to the 
quantification processes in natural history, so we can provide accuracy for the 
physical inquiries, and can also produce practice. As Bacon states:  
 
This is why we must get closer to the mathematics or measures and 
scales of motions, without which, well counted and weighed and 
defined, the doctrine of motions may falter and not be reliably 
translated into practice (Bacon, Abecedarium, OFB, XIII, p. 211).32 
 
Second, as you remember, Bacon discusses that there is a hierarchy among 
natural axioms, from the variable (manifold) to the fixed (simple), that is, from 
the axioms which are more immersed into matter to the axioms which are less 
immersed into matter, and the object of mathematics are the least immersed 
forms into matter or the most abstracted forms from matter. So, we should 
start our natural inquiries with the discovery of the lowest axioms, and we 
should ascend to the higher axioms. The highest axioms we can discover are 
the most abstracted forms from matter, and those axioms are the objects of 
mathematicians, not the objects of natural philosophers. Therefore, we can 
say that when Bacon says ‘investigation of nature turns out best when physics 
is given definition by mathematics’, he means the last step status of 
mathematics in a natural inquiry, which shows Bacon’s distrust of 
mathematics to discover the other axioms which are more immersed in 
matter. The discovery of the objects of mathematics (quantity) depends on the 
discovery of the more immersed axioms into matter because, in the Baconian 
inductive method, we cannot leap up to the higher axioms.  The last step 
                                                 
  32.   On quantitative approach in Baconian natural history, see also Rees (1985); Pastorino 




status of mathematics refers to the priority of the inquiries into the objects of 
natural philosophy, and this was also pointed out by Rees as the ‘priority of 
physics’ (see Rees, 1986, pp. 414–416). However, by the last step status of 
mathematics, I do not mean that mathematics cannot be applied before or 
during the discovery of the axioms of natural philosophy at all. What I mean is 
that before the discovery of the axioms of natural philosophy, we should not 
develop mathematical models regarding the natural phenomenon, such as the 
al-Bitrujian geometrical model for the motions of the celestial bodies.33 
 
We should not also fail to notice the following words of Bacon:  
 
mathematics … ought to round off natural philosophy and not 
generate or procreate it (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 96, p. 
155). 
 
By rounding off natural philosophy, Bacon also means the last step status of 
mathematics in a natural inquiry, and by saying ‘not generate or procreate 
natural philosophy’, he means that we should not try to discover the objects of 
natural philosophy through mathematics. 
 
 
1.4  Summary 
 
 
The accepted division between natural philosophy and mathematical sciences 
refers to the epistemic division between them. Making claims of natural 
philosophy by a mathematician was a violation of this division. Even though 
Bacon placed mathematical sciences in natural philosophy, he aimed to make 
his new inductive experimental method sovereign over mathematics, but not 
                                                 




to make mathematics dominant over natural philosophy.  
 
Bacon did not approve of the new role of mathematics in sciences, and the 
new role was making natural philosophical claims through mathematics. 
Bacon’s separation of the objects of mathematical sciences and natural 
philosophy shows us his loyalty to the Aristotelian disciplinary boundary 
between mathematical sciences and natural philosophy; however, Copernicus, 
Galileo, Kepler were mathematical physicists who made such claims. The 
important thing that separates these mathematical physicists from Bacon is 
their belief that natural philosophical claims could be made through premises 
of geometry. Making natural philosophical claims through mathematics was 
possible by equating the objects of mathematics and natural philosophy.34 I 
will also discuss this disciplinary boundary in the third chapter regarding its 
influence on Bacon’s view of how an astronomical theory should be 
developed. 
 
In the next section, I will discuss the two fundamental commitments Bacon 












                                                 











Two Reasons Bacon Disapproved of Making Natural 
Philosophical Claims through Mathematics 
 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the reasons why Bacon did not approve of 
making claims of natural philosophy through mathematics. I argue that he had 
two fundamental commitments which caused his disapproval. First, the 
consistency between human understanding and the course of logic and 
mathematics and second, the inconsistency between the course of nature 
(matter) and the course of logic and mathematics. I examine the first 
commitment in section 2.1, and in section 2.2, I examine the second 
commitment. In section 2.3, I discuss the relation between Bacon’s inductive 
method and the errors of the human mind. Thorough this chapter, I also 
discuss Bacon’s description of rationalist philosophy as an idolization of the 
human mind and the results of the mentioned errors of the human mind. 
 
 
2.1      Rational method, the errors of the human mind 
and the properties of matter 
 
 
2.1.1    Searching for the properties of matter beyond nature 
 




Socratics, especially Democritus, and Greek mythology. Let’s examine Bacon’s 
views on what those pre-Socratics thought about the properties of primary 
(first) matter: 
 
almost all the ancients, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, 
Heraclitus and Democritus, though differing in other respects about 
primary matter, were as one in maintaining that matter was active, 
had some form and imparted its form, and had the principle of motion 
within itself. Nor would it be possible for anyone to think otherwise, 
unless he wanted to abandon experience altogether. Thus all these 
latter [the above-mentioned pre-Socratics] submitted their minds to 
the nature of things (Bacon, On principles, OFB VI, p. 209). 
 
Bacon thought that those who did not approve of the principle of motion in 
primary matter, and of (primary) form which is united with primary matter, 
created abstract matter: 
 
This abstract matter is the matter of disputations, not of the universe. 
But one who philosophizes rightly and in an orderly manner must 
dissect nature and not abstract from it (for those who will not dissect 
it are forced to abstract), and he must wholly maintain that primary 
matter is united with the primary form, and also with the first 
principle of motion, as we find it (Bacon, On principles, OFB VI, p. 
209). 
 
He also states in his Novum organum: 
 
it happens that men do not stop abstracting from nature until they 
arrive at potential and uninformed matter (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, 





Regarding the properties of matter, that is, the principle of motion and form, 
Bacon shares the view of the above-mentioned pre-Socratics and we can see 
this in his interpretation of the fable of Cupid. Bacon interpreted Cupid (Eros) 
as primary matter, and believed this fable reveals the purest truth about 
primary matter. He argued it shows us the belief of the ancients towards the 
qualities of primary matter:35 
 
For nothing has corrupted philosophy as much as this inquiry about 
Cupid’s parents, i.e. philosophers have not accepted the principles of 
things as they are found in nature and embraced them as a positive 
doctrine and as if they were articles of experimental faith, but they 
have rather deduced them from the laws of discourse, the piddling 
conclusions of dialectic and mathematics, from common notions, and 
from suchlike excursions of the mind beyond the bounds of nature. 
Therefore a philosopher should always be telling himself that Cupid 
has no parents, in case his mind wanders off into the realms of 
emptiness; because the human intellect gets carried away with these 
high generalities, it abuses both the nature of things and itself, and 
while straining towards things further off, it falls back on things 
closer to hand (Bacon, On principles, OFB VI, pp. 199–201, underlining 
added).36 
                                                 
  35.   For Cupid as natural appetite, see Giglioni (2016b). For Cupid and its presence within 
English culture, see Kingsley-Smith (2013). 
  36.   At this juncture, I should point out that when Bacon says ‘the piddling conclusions of 
dialectic and mathematics’, he means the Pythagorean application of mathematics, because 
Pythagoras was the one who found the principles of things in numbers. This argument can be 
supported with the following words of Bacon related to the second school of Plato (neo-
Platonists) and Proclus who adopted the Pythagorean application of mathematics: 
So hath Plato intermingled his Philosophie with Theologie, and Aristotle with 
Logicke, and the second Schoole of Plato, Proclus, and the rest, with the 
Mathematiques (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, p. 30). 
Proclus “assimilated the Pythagorean view that numerical relationships revealed the 
universe’s order” see notes of M. Kiernan in Bacon (The Advancement, OFB IV, p. 231). See also 
Bacon (Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 96, p. 155). According to Rees, when Bacon says that 
Proclus and the rest intermingled their philosophy with mathematics, “the kind of 





For Bacon, the ancients believed that Cupid (primary matter) has no parents, 
and parents of primary matter refer to the principles of things found beyond 
nature. This means the ancients approved of the principles of motion in 
matter and that primary matter is united with a (primary) form. The parents 
of Cupid come to mean the properties of matter which are beyond nature. If 
the properties of matter are in matter, then we cannot talk about Cupid’s 
parents. By arguing Cupid has no parents, Bacon is stating that the properties 
of matter are in matter itself, and we should not search for them beyond 
nature. 
 
This analogy of Cupid also shows us that the ancients took the principles of 
things as they are found in matter, not beyond matter. We can say that 
searching for the principles of matter beyond matter is searching for the 
parents of Cupid or (primary) matter. For Bacon, searching for the principles 
of things beyond nature is one of the errors of the human mind: 
 
The human mind swells and cannot stay still or rest but aspires to go 
further, but in vain. It cannot therefore conceive of any end or limit to 
the world, but always compulsively hankers after something beyond 
(Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 48, p. 85, underlinings added). 
 
Then, Bacon comes to a conclusion that ‘a philosopher should always be 
telling himself that Cupid has no parents, in case his mind wanders off into the 
realms of emptiness’ (see p. 31). 
 
Taking the principles of things as they are found in matter means that matter 
itself contains those principles or properties of matter such as the principles 
                                                                                                                                       
pp. 249 ff” (Bacon, Novum, p. 529). It is known that Agrippa used the Pythagorean application 
of mathematics in his occult philosophy. For a discussion of the mystical mathematics of the 




of motion (change) and form. The principles of motion are active or vital 
forces in matter, and this notion is contrary to potential or passive matter, 
which was argued by Aristotle. 
 
We can mention here a distinction between the Aristotelian sense of matter 
(as in “prime matter”) and the “matter” of everyday experience. For example, 
the Aristotelian sense of prime matter is destitude of form while the “matter” 
of everyday experience coexists with form. 
 
Bacon criticised the matter theory of Aristotle because he believed matter 
should be conceived as active and of having some form. However, Aristotle 
conceived matter as potential or passive, and what causes the change in 
matter as not something in matter, but forms. As mentioned above, Bacon calls 
this kind of matter ‘abstract matter’. 
 
In Baconian terminology, ‘abstraction of matter’ refers to the rational method, 
and ‘dissection of nature’ refers to the experimental method. Bacon argues 
that ‘those who will not dissect it are forced to abstract’, that is, those who do 
not use an experimental method are forced to use a rational method, or logical 
and mathematical methods. And a philosopher who wants to dissect nature 
‘must wholly maintain that primary matter is united with the primary form, 
and also with the first principle of motion’ (see p. 30 in this dissertation, 
underlining added). As is seen, Bacon establishes a clear correlation between 
the approving of ‘form’ and ‘the principle of motion’ (or activity) to matter and 
the experimental method. As mentioned before, contrary to rationalists, for 
Bacon, pre-Socratics approved of activity and primary form to prime matter 
(see p. 30). Bacon also attributed form (primary form) to prime matter. 
However, Aristotle did not attribute form to prime matter, instead attributing 
it to ‘matter of everyday experience’, because he used forms to explain the 
causes of change (motion) in ‘matter of everyday experience’. For Bacon, 




forms is something which can be defined as not submitting our minds to the 
nature of things. Instead, he believed we should submit our minds to the 
nature of things, or the real causes of motion in matter; and he emphasised 
that we should find the principles of motion in matter not beyond matter such 
as (Aristotelian) forms. Bacon accepted this as the base of experimental 
philosophy (or dissecting of nature).37 
 
For Bacon, some philosophers did not accept the principles of things as they 
are found in nature, and they deduced them from the conclusions of logic and 
mathematics. For example, Bacon believed Aristotle deduced the principles 
from syllogistic logic and Pythagoras deduced those principles from 
mathematics. Pythagoras found the principles in numbers, while Aristotle 
found them in forms. According to Bacon, the forms of Aristotle and the 
numbers of Pythagoras are things that do not rest on experience.  
 
For Bacon, if a philosopher does not accept the principles of things as they are 
found in matter, it is expected that s/he will also not rest on experience when 
it comes to the method of natural philosophy, and Aristotle was one of these. 
Now, let us read the following words of Bacon to see his complaint about how 
Aristotle forsook experience: 
 
And no one should be impressed by the fact that in his books on 
Animals, in his Problems, and in other tracts of his he often deals in 
experiments. For he had made up his mind beforehand, and did not 
take experience into due account when he framed his decrees and 
axioms but, having made up his mind to suit himself, he bends 
experience to his opinions and drags it about in chains, so that in this 
respect too he is more blameworthy than his modern followers (the 
family of scholastic philosophers) who have abandoned experience 
                                                 
  37.    On Aristotelian primary matter, form and the principles of change in matter, see Bostock 




altogether (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 63, p. 101).38 
 
Bacon also says that: 
 
And again Aristotle’s school, which giveth the due to the sense in 
assertion, denieth it in practice much more than that of Plato (Bacon, 
Filium labyrinthi, SEH III, p. 504). 
 
Bacon argued there are three kinds of false philosophy; sophistical, empirical, 
and superstitious.39 He puts Aristotle in the first category, namely, sophistical, 
and says that “the most obvious example of the first family is Aristotle who 
with his dialectic corrupted natural philosophy when he fashioned the world 
from categories” (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 63, p. 99). However, by 
sophistical philosophy, Bacon actually means rationalist philosophy because, 
when he explains the errors of sophistical philosophy, he uses the term 
‘rational family’.40 
 
Then, we should ask: why did Bacon believe Aristotle was a rationalist? I can 
                                                 
  38.  In Galileo’s Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems, we can see a similar 
approach of using experience by Aristotle as follows: “Aristotle first laid the basis of his 
argument a priori, showing the necessity of the inalterability of heaven by means of natural, 
evident, and clear principles. He afterward supported the same a posteriori, by the senses and 
by the traditions of the ancients” Galilei (1967, p. 50). 
  39.   Bacon mentions empirical philosophy among false philosophies too, but by considering 
this, no one should come to a conclusion that Bacon is not an empiricist. Bacon criticises 
empirical philosophers for making a philosophy after they have done just few experiments. As 
to the errors of the supporters of superstitious philosophy, Bacon means those who mix their 
philosophy with theology and traditions. 
  40.   See Bacon (Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 62, p. 99). However, Bacon does not mean 
rationalist in the post–Kantian sense, as Alberto Vanzo states: 
Like empiricists in the modern sense, Bacon’s empirics rely on experience – not, 
however, in their reflections on the origins and sources of knowledge, but in their 
attempts to attain knowledge. They do not deny that we have innate concepts or 
substantive a priori knowledge, nor do they claim that all of our knowledge 
derives from experience. Nevertheless, they do seek scientia – understood as 
general, firmly established knowledge that can ground conclusions about, 
intervention upon, and production of particular things – within the realm of 




say that the above-mentioned answer regarding the attitude of Aristotle 
towards experience is partly correct. My claim is that the answer springs from 
the attitude of Aristotle to the properties of matter. As mentioned above, 
Bacon names Aristotle’s view of matter as abstract matter, and abstract 
matter, as you remember, is a kind of matter whose active properties (and its 
form) are isolated from it. It is a passive or potential matter. 
 
Bacon calls abstract matter the matter of disputations (see p. 30); however, to 
philosophise correctly, someone must dissect nature, but not abstract from it 
(see p. 30). As stated previously, dissection of nature refers to the 
experimental method, while abstracting from it refers to rational 
philosophies. Now, let’s see how Aristotle finds the causes of motion (change) 
in forms instead of matter itself: 
 
If, on the other hand, someone were to say that it was the matter 
which generated things on account of movement, what he said would 
be more scientific than that just described. For that which alters a 
thing, or changes its shape, is more truly the cause of generation; and 
generally we are accustomed to describe as the producer, both in the 
case of things which occur in nature and of those which result from 
skill, that thing, whatever it may be, which has to do with movement. 
Nevertheless, what these people have to say is also incorrect. For it is 
the property of matter to be acted upon and to be moved, whereas 
causing movement and acting belongs to another capacity. This is 
obviously the case with things which come to be through skill and 
those which come to be through nature: the water does not itself 
produce an animal out of itself, nor the wood a bed — it is skill which 
does this. So these people are for this reason incorrect in their 
account, and because they leave aside what is more strictly the cause; 
for they take away the essence and the form (Aristotle, 1982, p. 53; 





In Aristotelian natural philosophy, forms also function as efficient and final 
causes, which means that forms can be considered as teleological causes, and 
we know that Bacon was strictly against the intermingling of teleological 
causes with natural inquiries.41 
 
As mentioned before, Bacon argued that not taking the principles of things as 
they are found in nature causes philosophers to deduce them from the 
premises of logic and mathematics. If you do not attribute the principles of 
motion (change) to matter, you do not have a chance to rest on experience in 
your method. However, even though Plato approved of eternal action to 
matter, he made another mistake. Aristotle discusses Plato and eternal action 
in his metaphysics: 
 
This is why some have posited an eternal action, for example, 
Leucippus and Plato; for they declare that movement is eternal 
(Aristotle, 1952, p. 257, 1071b 30). 
 
The terms ‘eternal action’ and ‘eternal movement’ mean that matter has 
always been active. Bacon does not mention Plato’s name among those who 
attribute active powers (the ability of action) to matter, but he does not say 
that Plato did not think movement was eternal. Let us read Bacon’s words 
about Plato’s mistake: 
 
But it is manifest, that Plato in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had a 
wit of eleuation scituate as vpon a Cliffe, did descry, that formes were 
                                                 
  41.  Bacon says the following about the harm which is caused by intermingling final causes 
with natural inquiries:  
For the handling of finall causes mixed with the rest in Phisicall enquiries, hath 
intercepted the seuere and diligent enquirie of all real and phisicall causes, and 
giuen men the occasion, to stay vpon these satisfactorie and specious causes, to the 
great arrest and preiudice of furder discouerie (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, 




the true obiect of knowledge; but lost the real fruite of his opinion by 
considering of formes, as absolutely abstracted from Matter, & not 
confined and determined by Matter: and so turning his opinion vpon 
Theologie, wherewith all his Naturall Philosophy is infected (Bacon, 
The Advancement, OFB IV, pp. 83–4). 
 
As is seen, Bacon believed Plato’s mistake was that he did not attribute form 
to matter; remembering that when Bacon mentions the properties of primary 
matter, he also says that primary matter has some (primary) form (see pp. 
30–3). 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that, for Bacon, the rationalist philosophers did 
not approve of the principles of motion or form in (primary) matter, but they 
found them beyond nature. In doing this, they made the objects of knowledge 
fantastic, fictional principles, such as the abstracted forms of Plato or the 
numbers of Pythagoras; instead of the real principles of matter. For Bacon, 
rationalism means deducing the principles of motion from conclusions of 
dialectic and mathematics. He believed rational philosophies use excessive 
logic and mathematics instead of experiment in natural inquiries. 
 
Aristotle did not abstract forms from matter. Instead, he abstracted the 
principles of motion from matter. However, Bacon argued that even though 
Aristotle defined forms in matter, he ignored matter and its properties, which 
are the real causes of motion in matter. Instead, Aristotle approved of forms 
as the causes of motion (change) in matter. 
 
 
2.1.2      Finding rest among the general axioms 
 
 




general axioms, without being concerned sufficiently with particulars. Before 
talking about this error of the human mind, the following shows the difference 
Bacon held between his new method and the method that was in fashion in his 
day: 
 
There are and can only be two ways of investigating and discovering 
truth. The one rushes up from the sense and particulars to axioms of 
the highest generality and, from these principles and their 
indubitable truth, goes on to infer and discover middle axioms; and 
this is the way in current use. The other way draws axioms from the 
sense and particulars by climbing steadily and by degrees so that it 
reaches the ones of highest generality last of all; and this is the true 
but still untrodden way (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 19, p. 
71). 
 
Flying from particulars to axioms of the highest generality causes middle 
axioms to be deduced from those axioms. This is the method of rationalistic 
philosophy. However, Bacon also criticises experimentalists of his day for 
flying from particulars to the most general axioms, because they deduce 
general axioms from just a few experiments. Both the rationalistic method and 
the experimental method, which fly from particulars to the most general 
axioms without being concerned with particulars, have a strong connection 
with the mentioned error of the human mind, as Bacon states, “For the mind 
longs to leap up to higher generalities to find rest there; and after a short 
while scorns experience” (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 20, p. 71). 
 
If we consider rationalistic philosophy, we can say that both errors of the 
human mind resulted in putting more emphasis on logic than on experiment 
and can conclude that the method of rationalistic philosophy is the result of 
the errors of the human mind. To remove these errors, Bacon holds the 




order to prevent the mind from flying to general axioms without appealing 
enough to experiment. This precaution, he believes, will work for both the 
first and second error of the mind. In regards to the first error, which is 
looking for the properties of matter beyond nature, Bacon explicitly warns 
philosophers not to look for the parents of primary matter (Cupid), and accept 
the principles of things as they are found in nature. 
 
The above-mentioned second error of the human mind – that is, leaping up to 
general axioms without considering lower axioms sufficiently – follows the 
same course as with logic and mathematics. Bacon argues that mathematics 
satisfies the mentioned tendency of the (unaided) human mind to find rest 
among general axioms, and states: 
 
For it being plainly the nature of the human mind, certainly to the 
extreme prejudice of knowledge, to delight in the open plains (as it 
were) of generalities rather than in the woods and inclosures of 
particulars, the mathematics of all other knowledge were the 
goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite for expatiation and meditation 
(Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 370).42 
 
 
2.1.3     Mathematics as a way to attribute excessive  
               orderliness to nature 
 
 
Now, I will discuss the third error; attributing excessive orderliness to nature. 
Bacon states: 
 
The human intellect is constitutionally prone to supposing that there 
is more order and equality in things than it actually finds. For though 
                                                 




there are many things monadic in nature and quite unlike anything 
else, the intellect nevertheless counterfeits parallels, 
correspondences and relatives which do not exist. Hence the fiction 
that In the heavens everything moves in perfect circles, with spiral lines 
and dragons absolutely rejected in all but name (Bacon, Novum, OFB 
XI, Book One, §. 45, p. 83). 
 
Why were perfect circles ascribed to the movement of celestial bodies? 
Because, for Bacon, human understanding tends to suppose more orderliness 
in nature than it actually finds. Later on, in the same paragraph, Bacon states: 
 
Hence the element of fire with its orb is brought in to make up a 
quaternion with the other three which sense detects. Hence again 
people arbitrarily impose on the elements (as they call them) the 
theory that one element is ten times more or less rare than another, 
and suchlike dreams. And this nonsense holds sway not just in 
dogmas but also in simple notions (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, 
§. 45, p. 83). 
 
The element of fire makes up a square with other three elements, and the 
ratio of density of these elements is fixed at ten to one. In these examples, we 
can see that human understanding attributes excessive orderliness in nature 
and this orderliness can be defined as mathematical orderliness. The last two 
examples, in particular, which are about the element of fire and the ratio of 
density of the elements, are called mystical mathematics by Bacon, which was 
supported by Pythagoras and neo-Platonic philosophers. The first example of 
perfect circles of the motion of the celestial bodies, however, was also 
supported by some astronomers who were not Pythagoreans, such as 
Claudius Ptolemy (100–170 AD) and Copernicus. 
 




concerning the shapes of atoms, with the idea of Pythagoras: 
 
For there are two opinions, nor can there be more, with respect to 
atoms or the seeds of things; the one that of Democritus, which 
attributed to atoms inequality and configuration, and by 
configuration position; the other perhaps that of Pythagoras, which 
asserted that they were altogether equal and similar. For he who 
assigns equality to atoms necessarily places all things in numbers; but 
he who allows other attributes has the benefit of the primitive 
natures of separate atoms, besides the numbers or proportions of 
their conjunctions (Bacon, Cogitationes, SEH V, p. 422). 
 
The error of Pythagoras, for Bacon, was placing all things in numbers, and it 
was sourced from Pythagoras’ belief in the equality and similarity of atoms. If 
every atom is similar and equal to the other, nature becomes more expressible 
with mathematics; but when someone thinks that atoms have different 
shapes, he has the benefit of the primitive natures of separate atoms. 
 
As to the common fault, which all these examples share, it is their attribution 
of excessive orderliness to nature. And, this belief in excessive orderliness in 
nature is the result of an error of human understanding.  
 
I should also emphasise that the human understanding’s tendency to suppose 
the availability of more regularity in nature than it has is enhanced and 
sustained by mathematics: 
 
That the spirite of man, beeing of an equall and vnifourme substance, 
doth vsually suppose and faine in Nature a greater equalitie and 
vniformitie, than is in truth; Hence it commeth, that the 
Mathematitians cannot satisfie themselues, except they reduce the 




lynes, and laboring to be discharged of Eccentriques (Bacon, The 
Advancement, OFB IV, p. 116). 
 
Attributing excessive orderliness to nature can be defined as a belief that 
nature can be explained mathematically. However, by saying nature does not 
have a mathematical structure, Bacon does not mean we cannot apply 
mathematics to nature at all. Except for making natural philosophical claims, 
Bacon did not set bounds to mathematicians, but as stated before, this limit 




2.2     The human mind and the subtlety of matter 
 
 
The subtlety of matter refers to the inconsistency between the course of logic 
and mathematics and the course of nature. For example, Galileo believed the 
language of nature is mathematics, and the human and God’s intellect are 
equal qualitatively. The human intellect can understand nature through 
mathematics because nature (matter) is considered by Galileo to be 
constructed mathematically. However, nature is not considered by Bacon to be 
constructed mathematically. For Bacon, the way the human mind works and 
the way nature works are different because there is an inconsistency between 
the human mind and the subtlety (or obscurity) of matter. 
 
Let me make an analogy to explain the subtlety of matter. Imagine we have a 
kind of matter which consists of triangles, circles, squares and other 
mathematical figures, and that we have a filter which has mathematical figures 
on its surface, and this filter represents mathematics as a tool for natural 
inquiries. Now, when we apply the filter (mathematics) to matter, the filter will 




complicated figures, figures like stones or leaves. When we apply the same 
filter (mathematics) to this kind of matter, we will see that it will not work, 
that is, our mind will not discover the truth of nature. Bacon also mentions the 
subtlety of words, arguments, notions, and the senses; he believes that all of 
them are rude and gross in comparison to the subtlety of matter (see Bacon, 
Valerius, SEH III, p. 242). If the way the human mind and nature works was 
similar, then there would not be the subtlety of matter. 
 
Now, imagine there is another filter which refers to Bacon’s new inductive 
experimental method. When we apply that filter to matter, it will work, 
because its subtlety is thin and elegant enough in comparison to the subtlety 
of matter. We can therefore say that because the aim of natural philosophy is 
the discovery of the desires and appetites of matter (vital forces in matter, the 
causes of motion or Baconian forms), the discovery of these forces is possible 
through the inductive experimental method, and not through logic and 
mathematics. I should also emphasise that when I say matter is more elegant 
in comparison to the human mind and the senses, I do not mean thin matter 
such as pneumatic matter in Baconian terminology.43  What I mean is that the 
objects of natural philosophy cannot be discovered though logic and 
mathematics, but it can be discovered through the inductive experimental 
method, because the inductive method has the ability or it is subtle enough to 
discover the objects of natural philosophy. 
 
The following words of Bacon shows his belief that the subtlety of matter 
requires the inductive method instead of (syllogistic) logic and mathematics: 
 
I do not propose to give up syllogism altogether. Syllogism is 
incompetent for the principal things rather than useless for the 
generality. 
                                                 




In the Mathematics there is no reason why it should not be employed. 
It is the flux of matter and the inconstancy of the physical body which 
requires induction; that thereby it may be fixed, as it were, and allow 
the formation of notions well defined. (Bacon, Letter to, SEH VII, p. 
377). 
 
Bacon emphasises that the reason mathematics and syllogistic logic cannot be 
applied to matter (to discover the object of natural philosophy) is the flux of 
matter or the inconstancy of the physical body. He offers the inductive method 
for natural inquiries because it can compete with the flux of matter (the 
subtlety of matter or the obscure nature of things). These three terms refer to 
the same thing: the inconsistency between the course of logic and 
mathematics and the course of nature. As mentioned before, these vital forces 
require an inductive experimental method to be discovered. As we see in the 
above quotation, the flux of matter is the reason why we should apply 
induction instead of syllogistic logic and mathematics.  
 
Now, let me show how these three terms have the same meaning. You already 
read the flux of matter in the above quotation. Let’s also read the following 
words of Bacon to see how the term ‘obscurity of things’ has the same 
meaning with the flux of matter: 
 
The intellect without direction and help is an unequal thing and 
simply not up to the job of mastering the obscurity of things (Bacon, 
Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 21, p. 73, underlining added). 
 
As is seen, Bacon argues that the obscurity of things cannot be mastered by 
the intellect which is destitute of direction and help; and by direction and help 
Bacon means the inductive experimental method. Now, let’s read further in 





In no way can it come about that axioms established by 
argumentation can contribute to the discovery of new works, for the 
subtlety of nature far surpasses the subtleties of argumentation. But 
axioms abstracted from particulars in a proper and systematic way 
readily point out and specify new particulars, and so render the 
sciences active (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 24, p. 73). 
 
I should emphasise that the axioms (causes) established by argumentation 
mean the axioms established by syllogistic logic and mathematics. As is seen, 
these axioms cannot contribute to the discovery of new works. Bacon’s new 
method includes two processes: ascending from experiments to axioms, and 
descending from these axioms to new experiments or new works (see Section 
2.3 for further explanations). For Bacon, the discovery of new works depends 
on the discovery of the real axioms, and the argumentation or syllogistic logic 
and mathematics cannot do this because the subtlety of nature far surpasses 
the subtleties of syllogistic logic and mathematics.  
 
So, as shown above, the obscurity of things, the flux of matter and the subtlety 
of matter refer to the same thing: the inability of logic and mathematics to 
discover the objects of natural philosophy. 
 
The point which should be emphasized is that Bacon finds compatibility 
between the human mind and logic, and states, “The unaided intellect takes 
the same way (i.e. the former) which it takes when directed by dialectic” 
(Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 20, p. 71). Now, let me requote Bacon to 
show the inconsistency between the human mind and the subtlety of matter: 
‘The intellect without direction and help is an unequal thing and simply not up 
to the job of mastering the obscurity of things.’ As is seen, the unaided intellect 
or the intellect without direction, which means the intellect without the 
proper method for natural inquiries, cannot master the obscurity of things 




unless directed by its instruments, is in accordance with dialectic, and is ill-
suited to contend with the obscurity of things. As a result, the obscurity (or 
subtlety) of things refers to the inconsistency between how the human mind 
works and how nature works; the understanding should be assisted and 
directed by its instruments to increase its ability to compete with the subtlety 
of matter. 
 
As mentioned before, for Bacon, because of the subtlety of matter, 
mathematics and logic are not useful methods for the discovery of the truth of 
nature; that is, we cannot make claims of natural philosophy through 
mathematics and logic. This does not mean, however, that mathematics is not 
useful at all. As long as a mathematician does not make natural philosophical 
claims through mathematics, Bacon does not set bounds to the application of 
mathematics to natural phenomena. However, it should not be forgotten that 
his attitude towards making natural philosophical claims through 
mathematics shows us his disapproval of the new role of mathematics in 
sciences. 
 
In conclusion, this section has attempted to show the inconsistency between 
the course of nature and the course of logic and mathematics; and the 
consistency between the human mind and the course of mathematics and 
logic. Bacon argued that the inductive experimental method is required 
because of the flux of matter (or the subtlety of matter). Logic and 
mathematics does not work well for inquiries into the axioms (causes) of 













2.3      Bacon’s inductive experimental method and the   
             errors of the human mind 
 
 
The scope of this thesis does not include a detailed discussion on Bacon’s 
inductive method, but it is important to show the reader the inductive method 
when associated with the errors of the human mind. 
 
First of all, Bacon’s new inductive method was developed by considering the 
above-mentioned errors of the human mind. For him, the real method should 
be in bonding with nature. Bonding with nature is possible by applying the 
right method to natural inquiries. The right method was designed by 
considering how to get rid of the above-mentioned errors of the human mind. 
 
We can see below how Bacon defines his new method: 
 
in dealing with the nature of things I use induction throughout, and 
that in the minor propositions as well as the major. For I consider 
induction to be that form of demonstration which upholds the sense, 
and closes with nature, and comes to the very brink of operation 
(Bacon, The great, SEH IV, pp. 24–5). 
 
Bacon’s new inductive experimental method starts with bare experiments and 
moves to the higher axioms of nature step by step. As he writes: 
 
we should hope for better things from the sciences only when we 
ascend the proper ladder by successive, uninterrupted or unbroken 




higher than the last until eventually we come to the most general. For 
the lowest axioms barely differ from naked experience (Bacon, 
Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 104, p. 161). 
 
Bacon argued that the art of logic (dialectic) “does more to entrench errors 
than to reveal the truth” (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, p. 55), because of how late it 
comes into play. The mind is already full of common notions or certain 
doctrines when logic comes to fix errors. Therefore, Bacon held that the 
human mind should be guided in every phase. He defined his plan for his new 
method as follows: 
 
Now my plan is as easy to describe as it is difficult to effect. For it is to 
establish degrees of certainty, take care of the sense by a kind of 
reduction, but to reject for the most part the work of the mind that 
follows upon sense; in fact I mean to open up and lay down a new and 
certain pathway from the perceptions of the senses themselves to the 
mind (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, p. 53). 
 
I should emphasise that Bacon uses the terms ‘method’, ‘art’, and ‘invention’ 
interchangeably.44 For Bacon, method means (inductive) logic or art of 
discovery or invention. 
 
Bacon’s new method or art for the discovery of scientific truth is defined as 
new logic when we compare it with Aristotle’s old method or syllogistic logic. 
Bacon called this new method or logic ‘interpretation of nature’, and he called 
the old logic of Aristotle ‘anticipation of nature’. Indeed, in his Advancement of 
Learning Bacon presents four subdivisions of logic: 
 
a) Art of inquiry or invention 
                                                 




b) Art of examination or judgement 
c) Art of custody or memory 
d) Art of elocution or tradition 
 
Bacon divided ‘art of inquiry or invention’ into ‘invention of art and sciences’ 
and ‘invention of arguments’. He further divided ‘invention of art and sciences’ 
into ‘experientia literata’ (learned experience)45 and ‘interpretatio naturae’ 
(interpretation of nature).46 While ‘learned experience’ is only a degree and 
rudiment of ‘interpretation of nature’, the discovery of the natural axioms 
(causes) is only possible by ‘interpretation of nature’ (see Bacon, The 
Advancement, OFB IV, p. 111). 
 
The interpretation of nature is the inductive method (logic) of Bacon, and it 
has two major steps: ascending to axioms from experiments, and descending 
to new experiments or new works from those axioms. In this new method, we 
must first prepare a complete natural history regarding the natural 
phenomena we search for. When we consider heat, for example, we should 
collect all the known instances of heat.47 Secondly, we should collect the 
negative instances. Negative instances refer to the instances which are 
destitute of heat. We should make observations and experiments to prepare 
tables for instances. We should also prepare another table (the third table) for 
the instances which include heat in a lesser or greater degree. For example, 
motion increases heat. 
 
After preparing these three tables, we can then apply Baconian induction. 
                                                 
  45.  For further reading for ‘experientia literata’, see Jardine (1990); Weeks (2008); 
Georgescu (2011); Georgescu and Giurgea (2012); Stewart (2012); Giglioni (2013b); 
Jalobeanu (2011), (2013), (2016a).  
  46.     On ‘interpretation of nature’, see Serjeantson (2014). 
  47.   Bacon explains his inductive method regarding heat in his Novum organum, see Bacon 




Baconian induction is a rejection of instances in the prepared tables which are 
not the form of heat. In his example regarding heat, Bacon found motion as the 
form of heat.48 
 
If we look at the relationship between Baconian induction and the modern 
problem of induction, however, we surmise that if there are more instances 
than those we have collected, the inductive process will not work. Bacon 
assumed it was possible to collect all instances before applying induction, but 
this seems unjustified. 
 
Consequently, Bacon likens understanding to a naked hand, and just as a 
naked hand cannot be very useful and needs instruments to be more effective, 
understanding also needs instruments to be more effective. The instruments 
of understanding, which can be defined as suggestions and cautions, are 
useful for us to see the difference between the old rationalistic method and 
the new inductive method of Bacon. The new method can be described as the 
same thing, but with the instruments of the human understanding, and it 
should take the place of the old logic (or method), which was defined by 
Bacon as the idolization of the human mind. Those who supported the old 
method, Bacon says, have neglected the instruments of the understanding by 
admiring the human mind excessively, namely, by falling into the above-
mentioned errors of the human mind. Excessive admiration of the human 
mind is the same thing as using syllogistic logic and mathematics excessively 
in natural philosophical inquiries. By saying this, I mean making natural 
philosophical claims through syllogistic logic and mathematics. In using 
syllogistic logic and mathematics more than experiment, Bacon believed that 
the scientific inquiries of those philosophers were not helpful enough to 
discover the axioms of natural philosophy. 
                                                 
  48.  For further reading for the inductive method (or logic) of Bacon, see Horton (1973); 
Hesse (1968); Vickers (1992); Malherbe (1996); McCaskey (2006). On the role of memory and 





Baconian induction is different from the rational method, and also from the 
experimental method of his day because the new method was designed by 
Bacon to get rid of the above-mentioned errors of the human mind. 
 
 
2.4      Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that Bacon criticised the method of the 
rationalists as one that, following natural tendencies of the human mind, 
relied inappropriately upon logic and mathematics instead of experimentation 
as a means of understanding nature. 
 
Bacon argued that there is a consistency between the understanding and the 
course of logic and mathematics, while the course of logic and mathematics 
are inconsistent with the course of nature. So, Bacon offered his new inductive 
experimental method as an instrument for understanding, to increase its 
subtlety to contend with the subtlety of matter.  
 
For Bacon, logic and mathematics are certain disciplines, but when it comes to 
contending with the subtlety of matter, they are not subtle enough to compete 
with the subtlety of matter. As a result, according to Bacon, we cannot 
discover the axioms of natural philosophy by applying syllogistic logic or 
mathematics to natural phenomena. 
 
The inconsistency between logic and mathematics (the human mind) and the 
course of nature (the subtlety of matter) is the reason why logic and 
mathematics, as Bacon states, ‘ought to be but the handmaids of Physics’ (see 
p. 23). Those who make natural philosophical claims through mathematics are 




can discover the truth of nature through syllogistic logic and mathematics. 
However, through Bacon’s new method, we can discover the truth of nature 
by progressing step by step, from particulars to generalities, because Bacon 
developed his new method by considering the mentioned errors of the human 
mind. 
 
Now, let me remind you how the above-mentioned three errors of the human 
mind are related to logic and mathematics: Those who fell into the first error, 
for Bacon, ‘deduced them [properties of matter] from the laws of discourse, 
the piddling conclusions of dialectic and mathematics.’ As to the second error, 
Bacon accepts that ‘the mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest 
fields to satisfy that appetite’, that is, the desire of the human mind to find rest 
among general axioms. Finally, regarding the third error, which is the human 
mind’s tendency to find more orderliness in nature than it finds, the following 
words of Bacon can express to us the role of mathematicians in it: ‘the 
Mathematitians cannot satisfie themselues, except they reduce the Motions of 
the Celestiall bodyes, to perfect Circles, reiecting spirall lynes, and laboring to 
be discharged of Eccentriques’ (see p. 42). 
 
As to the subtlety of matter, it refers to the inconsistency between the course 
of logic and mathematics and the course of nature, that is, the inability of logic 
and mathematics to discover the axioms of natural philosophy. Instead, those 
axioms require the inductive method to be discovered, because the new 
method of Bacon is subtle enough to discover these axioms. The new method 
is more subtle because it was designated by Bacon to get rid of the mentioned 















Francis Bacon: A Physical Realist 
 
 
When we examine the history of astronomy up to the seventeenth century, it 
has been argued that there were two groups of philosophers and astronomers: 
instrumentalists and realists. However, when we consider the attitudes 
towards the explanatory power of mathematics in determining astronomical 
theories, we can add a third group. The first group, instrumentalists, includes 
those who believe mathematics should only ‘save the phenomena’. I label the 
second group mathematical realists, and this includes those who think 
mathematics can provide the real motions of celestial bodies, such as 
Copernicus and Galileo. As to the third group, which includes Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes) and al–Bitruji (Alpetragius), they think mathematics cannot 
provide us with the real structure of the heavens, but in contrast to the first 
group, they emphasise there should not be any contradiction between the 
mathematical model and the physical model of the heavens. To avoid any 
contradiction between the physical and mathematical models, the third group 
holds that the mathematical model of the heavens should be designed by 
considering physics, so I call them physical realists. I argue, in this chapter, that 
Bacon can be considered as a physical realist. 
 
In section 3.1, I attempt to clarify the difference between the terms physical 
realist and mathematical realist. In section 3.2, I discuss the quarrel between 




astronomy. In section 3.3, I discuss how Bacon’s idea of the priority of physics 
is similar to al-Bitruji’s and Averroes’ ideas, and argue that Bacon can be 
placed among physical realists. In section 3.4, I discuss Rees’ argument, which 
claims Bacon had a physical model before he adopted al–Bitruji’s (12th 
century) geometrical (mathematical) model, and I argue that his claim is 
problematic. Finally, in section 3.5, I discuss Bacon’s physical arguments 
through which he explains the motions of celestial bodies. 
 
 
3.1      Physical realists vs. mathematical realists 
 
 
There was a debate in the history of astronomy (as a mathematical science) 
about its ability to provide the real motions of the heavenly bodies. When 
astronomers had tried to find an answer to explain apparent motions of the 
celestial bodies, they reached two different explanations, known as the 
eccentric and epicyclic models, which were developed by Apollonius of Perga 
(262–190 BC) and Hipparchus of Nicaea (190–120 BC). Interestingly, these 
two different geometrical models are almost equivalent in terms of their 
success in explaining the apparent motions of the celestial bodies. Geminos 
informs us of the idea of Herakleides of Pontos49, which is that “even if the 
Earth moves in a certain way and the Sun is in a certain way at rest, the 
apparent irregularity with regard to the Sun can be saved” (Geminos, 2006, p. 
254). The question to be asked then, is if two different models (eccentric and 
epicyclic models) can save the apparent irregularity, how can we decide which 
one is the real structure of the heavens? Pierre Duhem discusses this problem 
in his book titled, ‘To Save the Phenomena’, published in 1908. 
 
                                                 
  49.  Indeed, it was Aristarchos of Samos who offered Sun-centred explanation, see Geminos 




According to Duhem, all Greek astronomy is instrumentalist,50 and this 
instrumentalist tradition begins with Plato, because Simplicius, in his 
commentary on Aristotle’s De Coelo, says the following: 
 
Plato without hesitation assigned to the heavenly motions circularity, 
uniformity, and order and put forward to the mathematicians this 
problem: by making what hypotheses about uniform, circular, and 
ordered motions will it be possible to preserve the phenomena 
involving the planets? (Simplicius, 2005, p. 33; 493, 1). 
 
According to the ancients, the motions of the celestial bodies are circular and 
uniform; however, later observations revealed that there are anomalies in 
their motions. There anomalies, therefore, cannot be real, and astronomers 
should provide geometrical models to remove these anomalies. Simplicius 
believed this was the astronomers’ role, which was given to them by Plato. 
Duhem interprets this as an instrumentalist view, because those who 
supported the mentioned role for astronomers believed that the geometrical 
(mathematical) models of the heavens do not have to reflect the real structure 
of it. Indeed, for instrumentalists, geometrical (mathematical) models of the 
heavens are fictitious, made up to save appearances. However, there were 
others who thought astronomical theories could reflect the physical structure 
of the heavens, and these are named by Duhem as realists. 
 
In order to reveal the relationship between astronomy as a mathematical 
science and physics, I will discuss the debate between realists and 
instrumentalists within the context of their belief in the explanatory power of 
mathematics in determining the real motions of the celestial bodies. If we 
                                                 
  50.   Similar views about the instrumentalist interpretation of ancient Greek astronomy can 
be found in Dreyer (1906); Dijksterhuis (1964); Sambursky (1962) and Koestler (1989). 
For the falsity of the instrumentalist interpretation of the ancient Greek astronomy, see 




separate these three mentioned groups according to their belief in the 
explanatory power of mathematics for natural phenomena, their differences 
become clearer. As mentioned above, the third group of philosophers or 
astronomers hold that the mathematical model should follow the physical 
model. We cannot label the third group as instrumentalist because they do not 
find saving the appearances enough for a mathematical model. Neither can we 
call them mathematical realists, because they do not believe mathematics has 
enough explanatory power to explain the physical structure of the heavens. 
According to the third group, a geometrical (mathematical) model of the 
heavens should be based on a physical model, because mathematics does not 
have the ability to reflect the real model of the heavens, but physics (natural 
philosophy) does. This is why I call them physical realists.51 
 
What should be emphasised is that when a mathematical model and a physical 
model are in harmony, we cannot see any contradiction between these two 
models, and so we can defend the same model on both mathematical and 
physical grounds; however, this does not make the third group mathematical 
realists. For mathematical realists, the mathematical model reflects the 
physical model; however, physical realists deduce the mathematical model 
from the physical model, and this is the result of their disbelief in the 




3.2   Arabic opposition to Ptolemy 
 
 
One of the important figures of Arabic philosophy and the most important 
                                                 
  51.   James Lattis calls the third group skeptical realists, see Lattis (1994, p. 134), but I prefer 





figure among the Arabic philosophers who were against Ptolemaic astronomy 
was Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126–1198 AD). Others who opposed Ptolemy 
were Ibn al–Haytham, Ibn Bajja and Jabir ibn Aflah; however, according to 
Abdelhamid Sabra, these men should be separated from Ibn Tufayl, Averroes 
and al–Bitruji because they had only a partial criticism of Ptolemaic 
astronomy, whereas Ibn Tufayl, Averroes and al–Bitruji radically rejected it 
(see Sabra, 2002, p. 135). 
 
I will focus primarily on Averroes and al–Bitruji, as they are the more 
important figures in the critical reaction against Ptolemy. Averroes keenly 
criticised Ptolemy and demanded a new astronomy, and al–Bitruji made the 
Ptolemaic model more accordant with Aristotelian physics. 
 
Averroes was an influential philosopher in the Latin West and became famous 
in Italy in the sixteenth century. His commentaries on Aristotle were read by 
many Italian philosophers, and he became especially famous in Italy in the 
second half of the sixteenth century (see Cozzoli, 2007, p. 157). For Averroes, 
the problem was the contradiction between Ptolemy’s geometrical 
(mathematical) model of the heavens and Aristotelian physics, because 
Ptolemy assumed the existence of epicyclic and eccentric models, which is 
contrary to nature and so impossible. As mentioned above, Averroes’ objection 
to Ptolemy’s astronomical model was shown by his attitude to mathematics’ 
explanatory ability in astronomy. This leads us to ask what can astronomers 
(mathematicians) and natural philosophers provide? When we take the 
answers to this question into consideration, it becomes possible to see the 
quarrel between physics and mathematics. Averroes himself answers this 
question as follows: 
 
what the astronomer mainly gives is based only on those things that 




to give the cause why this is so.52 
 
As is seen, astronomy is not capable of giving causes, so Averroes thought that 
real astronomy should use natural philosophical principles as its foundation. 
For Averroes, the Ptolemaic model, even though it agrees with calculations, 
should be rejected because it offers the existence of epicyclic and eccentric 
models which is not physically possible. The new astronomy must be possible 
from the standpoint of physical principles, as Averroes puts it: 
 
For to assert the existence of an eccentric sphere or an epicyclic 
sphere is contrary to nature. As for the epicyclic sphere, this is not at 
all possible; for a body that moves in a circle must move about the 
center of the universe (al–kull), not aside from it … It is similarly the 
case with the eccentric sphere proposed (yada’uhu) by Ptolemy. For if 
many centers existed, we should have a multitude of heavy bodies 
outside the place of the earth, and the center would cease to be 
unique, and it would be extended and divisible. But all this is not 
possible … 
 
It may be possible to replace these two things by the spiral motions 
(al–harakät al–lawlabiyya) assumed by Aristotle in this astronomy 
(hädhihi l–hay’a) in imitation of (hikäyatan ‘an) those who came 
before him. For it appears that astronomers before Hipparchus and 
Ptolemy assumed no epicyclic or eccentric spheres. Ptolemy stated 
this in his book on Planetary Hypotheses, and he claimed that Aristotle 
and his predecessors had assumed instead spiral motions, thereby 
increasing, as he claimed, the number of motions … But when people 
came to believe that this [new] astronomy was simpler and easier for 
[explaining] the revolutions (‘awd al–harakät) now recorded in 
                                                 




Ptolemy’s book, they neglected the ancient astronomy until it became 
so obsolete that people are not now able to understand what Aristotle 
says in this place [in the Metaphysics] about those [ancient] people. 
 
We should therefore embark on a new search for this ancient 
astronomy, for it is the true astronomy that is possible from the 
standpoint of physical principles. It is in my view based on the motion 
of one and the same sphere about one center and different poles, 
which may be two or more in accordance with the phenomena. For 
such motions can give rise to the acceleration, retardation, accession, 
and recession [iqbäl wa idbär] of a planet, and other motions for 
which Ptolemy failed to produce an arrangement [hay’a]. Such 
motions would also be the approaching and receding of a planet, as in 
the case of the moon. In my youth [fi shabäbi] I had hoped to 
accomplish this investigation, but now in my old age [fi shaykhûkhati] 
I have despaired of that, having been impeded by obstacles. But let 
this discourse spur someone else to inquire into these matters 
[further]. For nothing of the [true] science of astronomy exists in our 
time, the astronomy of our time being only in agreement with 
calculations [al–husbän] and not with what exists.53 
 
Averroes spent his life trying to establish an astronomical hypothesis that is 
possible from the standpoint of physical principles because he believed that 
unless guided by physics, astronomy could easily go off track. He ran out of 
time to achieve his aim but hoped someone else would achieve his mission, 
and it was eventually carried out by al–Bitruji, known in the Latin West as 
Alpetragius. 
 
Al–Bitruji is the most important figure of the Arabic opposition against 
                                                 




Ptolemy because he did what Averroes hoped to do during his life, which was 
develop a new astronomy based on Aristotelian physics. In his book, The 
Principles of Astronomy, he makes a new hypothesis about the motions of the 
celestial bodies by using concentric spheres instead of the eccentrics and 
epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomy.54 What al–Bitruji did with this new 
astronomy was a revision of Eudoxus’ homocentric models.55 
 
As a member of the Andalusian school, al–Bitruji was averse to the 
mathematical character of Ptolemaic astronomy, but in comparison to others 
from this school of thought, he was the only one who established a new 
astronomical model based on Aristotelian physics. Like Averroes, al–Bitruji 
believed that an astronomical model should be established on the principles 
derived from physics.56 He explained his goal to explain the physical principles 
which account for the motions of celestial bodies as follows: 
 
Indeed, the remainder of my life would not possibly suffice for this 
project. The goal of these remarks was (to explain) the quality of the 
truly necessary motion (which underlies) the many diverse motions 
and to expose astronomical principles [physical principles] by which 
it is possible to account for the motions of the heavens (al–Bitruji, 
1971, p. 154). 
 
We can also see Bacon’s belief evidenced in the name of one of his treatises, 
                                                 
  54.    For al–Bitruji’s explanations about Ptolemy’s model, see al–Bitruji (1971, p. 61). 
  55.    As Mohammed Abattouy puts it: “with the innovation that the inclinations of the axes of 
the planetary spheres were made variable, the movement of each sphere being governed by 
that of its pole, which described a small epicycle in the neighbourhood of the pole of the 
equator” Abattouy (2012, p. 194). 
  56.   The idea of the priority of physics in establishing an astronomical theory can also be 
found among the Averroist philosophers who lived in Italy in the sixteenth century, such as 
Agostino Nifo, Alessandro Achillini, Girolamo Fracastoro, Agostino Nifo and the most famous 
one, Alessandro Piccolomini. They argued that mathematics cannot provide us with the real 
motions of the celestial bodies, see Jardine (1988, pp. 231–2); Lattis (1994, pp. 34–6, 109–10) 




‘The Theory of the Planets Proved by Physical Arguments’ (see Duhem, 1969, p. 
32). Al–Bitruji believed astronomical models should be led by physics; 
otherwise, an astronomer can only be a mathematician who establishes 
fictional models of planetary trajectory. So, like Averroes, al–Bitruji’s attitude 
towards mathematical astronomy shows his belief in mathematics’ inability to 
provide the real motions of the celestial bodies. 
 
According to al–Bitruji, the celestial spheres desire to reproduce the motion of 
the prime mover, and the closer spheres to the prime mover move faster than 
those further from the prime mover (see al–Bitruji, 1971, p. 75, 77).57 
 
In conclusion, the geometrical model of al–Bitruji, which was set against the 
Ptolemaic one, was established on these kinds of qualitative physical 
arguments (see Hockey, 2007, pp. 133–4). 
 
Below, I will show how Bacon’s idea of the priority of physics in developing a 
mathematical model is similar to al–Bitruji’s and Averroes’ ideas. 
 
 
3.3     The hide of an ox: astronomy which presents  
            only the exterior part of the heavens 
 
 
In his De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bacon tries to explain the lack of natural 
philosophy in astronomy by likening it to the hide of an ox. As Bacon puts it: 
 
For in all these Natural History investigates and relates the fact, 
whereas Physic likewise examines the causes; I mean the variable 
causes, that is, the Material and Efficient. Among these parts of Physic 
                                                 
  57.   For further reading on transmission of energy from prime mover to the other celestial 




that which inquiries concerning the heavenly bodies, is altogether 
imperfect and defective, though by reason of the dignity of the subject 
it deserves special consideration. Astronomy has indeed a good 
foundation in phenomena, yet it is weak, and by no means sound; but 
astrology is in most parts without foundation even. Certainly 
astronomy offers to the human intellect a victim like that which 
Prometheus offered in deceit to Jupiter. Prometheus, in the place of a 
real ox, brought to the altar the hide of an ox of great size and beauty, 
stuffed with straw and leaves and twigs. In like manner astronomy 
presents only the exterior of the heavenly bodies (I mean the number 
of the stars, their positions, motions, and periods), as it were the hide 
of the heavens; beautiful indeed and skilfully arranged into systems; 
but the interior (namely the physical reasons) is wanting, out of 
which (with the help of astronomical hypotheses) a theory might be 
devised which would not merely satisfy the phenomena (of which 
kind many might with a little ingenuity be contrived), but which 
would set forth the substance, motion, and influence of the heavenly 
bodies as they really are ... but all the labour is spent in mathematical 
observations and demonstrations. Such demonstrations however only 
show how all these things may be ingeniously made out and 
disentangled, not how they may truly subsist in nature; and indicate 
the apparent motions only, and a system of machinery arbitrarily 
devised and arranged to produce them, not the very causes and truth 
of things. Wherefore astronomy, as it now is, is fairly enough ranked 
among the mathematical arts, not without disparagement to its 
dignity; seeing that, if it chose to maintain its proper office, it ought 
rather to be accounted as the noblest part of Physics (Bacon, De 
augmentis, SEH IV, pp. 347–9). 
 
The hide of an ox analogy says that mathematical demonstrations of the 




while physical studies, such as studies on the substance of the celestial bodies 
and the causes of their motions, are the interior part of an ox. We can also see 
from this quote that Bacon was familiar with the concept of ‘saving the 
phenomena’ because he says that ‘a theory might be devised which would not 
merely satisfy the phenomena’. In another work, Descriptio Globi Intellectualis 
(A Description of the Intellectual Globe), Bacon also explains his aim 
concerning astronomy as follows: 
 
I am nevertheless starting a far greater project; for I do not merely 
have calculations or predictions in mind, but philosophy; that is, that 
which can inform the human intellect not only about celestial motion 
and its periods but also about the substance of the heavenly bodies 
and every sort of quality, power and influx, according to natural and 
incontrovertible reasons and without the superstition and frivolity of 
traditions; and again that can discover and unfold in the very motion 
not just what saves the phenomena, but what is found in the bowels of 
nature and is actually and really true (Bacon, A description, OFB VI, p. 
111). 
 
When Bacon states that ‘not what is accordant with the phenomena’, we can 
again see his familiarity with the concept of ‘saving the phenomena’. Bacon 
does not find saving the phenomena enough for a geometrical (mathematical) 
model. He also emphasises that an astronomical theory should ‘set forth the 
substance, motion, and influence of the heavenly bodies as they really are’. So, 
this lack in astronomy for setting forth the substance of the heavenly bodies, 
their qualities and influences, and their real motions as they are found in 
nature, can only be satisfied by natural philosophy. 
 
The lack of natural philosophy in mathematical sciences was seen by Bacon as 
a major problem for the development of these sciences. Bacon complained 




from these words that Bacon believed we should not spend time in 
mathematical demonstrations regarding natural phenomena, but rather we 
should also perform natural philosophical inquiries. The important thing to 
note is that mathematical demonstrations should come after we have done 
physics, because the priority of physics was seen by Bacon as the protector for 
natural philosophy to avoid establishing incorrect models for the celestial 
motions, such as Copernican astronomy. 
 
I do not believe, however, that Bacon was against the application of geometry 
to physics, but rather he was against the application of geometry to physics to 
make natural philosophical claims through the premises of geometry, which 
was done by mathematical realists, such as Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler. 
However, al-Bitruji designated his geometrical model by considering physics. 
This difference between mathematical realists and physical realists should not 
go unnoticed. 
 
As for instrumentalists, Osiander wrote an anonymous preface for Copernicus’ 
De Revolutionibus (On the Revolutions) and claimed that astronomy could not 
provide the real motions of the celestial bodies. In his preface, Osiander 
suggests that saving the phenomena is enough for a geometrical model, and he 
argues that geometrical models do not have to reflect reality. So, we can say 
that Osiander supports the astronomer’s role as ‘saving the phenomena’. Let’s 
read some parts of his preface: 
 
Since the newness of the hypotheses of this work — which sets the 
earth in motion and puts an immovable sun at the centre of the 
universe — has already received a great deal of publicity, I have no 
doubt that certain of the savants have taken grave offense and think it 
wrong to raise any disturbance among liberal disciplines which have 
had the right set–up for a long time now. If, however, they are willing 




work has done nothing which merits blame. For it is the job of the 
astronomer to use painstaking and skilled observation in gathering 
together the history of the celestial movements, and then — since he 
cannot by any line of reasoning reach the true causes of these 
movements — to think up or construct whatever causes or 
hypotheses he pleases such that, by the assumptions of these causes, 
those same movements can be calculated from the principles of 
geometry for the past and for the future too. This artist is markedly 
outstanding in both of these respects: for it is not necessary that these 
hypotheses should be true, or even probably; but it is enough if they 
provide a calculus which fits the observations... For it is sufficiently 
clear that this art is absolutely and profoundly ignorant of the causes 
of the apparent irregular movements. And if it constructs and thinks 
up causes — and it has certainly thought up a good many — 
nevertheless it does not think them up in order to persuade anyone of 
their truth but only in order that they may provide a correct basis for 
calculation. But since for one and the same movement varying 
hypotheses are proposed from time to time, as eccentricity or epicycle 
for the movement of the sun, the astronomer much prefers to take the 
one which is easiest to grasp. Maybe the philosopher demands 
probability instead; but neither of them will grasp anything certain or 
hand it on, unless it has been divinely revealed to him. (Copernicus, 
1995, pp. 3–4). 
 
After Kepler revealed in his Astronomia Nova (New Astronomy) that the 
preface of Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus was written by Osiander, we learned 
that he tried to save Copernicus from the Church’s accusation. Osiander holds 
that astronomical hypotheses are not supposed to reflect the real model of the 
heavens. For him, if these geometrical models ensure the correct basis for 





However, Barker and Goldstein argue that Osiander’s preface to Copernicus is 
not instrumentalist. Indeed, for them, Osiander’s preface is neither 
instrumentalist nor realist, because Osiander argued that the causes of the 
celestial motions are unattainable for both astronomers and philosophers 
unless the causes are divinely revealed to them (see Barker and Goldstein, 
1998). However, I think that since Osiander argued that for an astronomer it is 
enough to choose a hypothesis which fits in best with the calculation, he 
should be accepted as an instrumentalist; Osiander’s argument regarding a 
philosopher’s disability in providing the real motions of the celestial bodies is 
beside the point. 
 
As to Copernicus, he believed the rotation of the earth around the motionless 
sun was a reality and not a mathematical fiction to save the phenomena. 
Copernicus thought that mathematics should have pre-eminence in natural 
philosophy. His emphasis on mathematics rather than physics can be seen in 
the following words: 
 
And though all these things are difficult, almost inconceivable, and 
quite contrary to the opinion of the multitude, nevertheless in what 
follows we will with God’s help make them clearer than day – at least 
for those who are not ignorant of the art of mathematics (Copernicus, 
1995, p. 24). 
 
However, for Averroes and his followers, and also for Bacon, the idea of ‘saving 
the phenomena’ cannot be accepted, because astronomical models should be 
in harmony with physical models, and the harmony between the geometrical 
(mathematical) model and physical model can be ensured by the guidance of 
natural philosophy. So, we can define Osiander’s preface as an example of the 




mathematical realist view.58 
 
Now, let’s read the following words of Bacon to see how he places importance 
on natural philosophy for the sciences: 
 
So we see Cicero the Orator complained of Socrates and his Schoole, 
that he was the first that separated Philosophy, and Rhetoricke, 
whereupon Rhetorick became an emptie & verball Art. So wee may 
see that the opinion of Copernicus touching the rotation of the earth, 
which Astronomie it self cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to 
any of the Phainomena, yet Naturall Philosophy may correct. So we 
see also that the Science of Medicine, if it be destituted & forsaken by 
Natural Philosophy, it is not much better then an Empeirical practise 
(Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, p. 93).59 
 
In this quotation, we can see that Bacon likens the separation of philosophy 
from rhetoric to the separation of philosophy from astronomy. Just as rhetoric, 
after it was separated from philosophy, became an empty verbal art, in the 
same way, lack of philosophy in astronomy caused the same thing to happen to 
astronomy. For Bacon, medicine also needs natural philosophy to abstain from 
becoming only an empirical practice. 
 
He also states: 
 
And this great mother of the sciences has, with wonderful indignity, 
                                                 
  58.  The difference between al-Bitruji (or Bacon), who I call a physical realist, and 
Copernicus, who I call a mathematical realist, is explained by Pietro D. Omodeo as follows:  
the rejection or the reaffirmation of the pre-eminence of physics over 
mathematics, and the choice between a mathematical approach to nature and a 
causal one (Omodeo, 2014, p. 85). 
For an instrumentalist interpretation of Copernicus, see Gingerich (1973). For a realist 
interpretation of Copernicus, see Gardner, (1983). 




been forced into the role of a servant, dancing attendance on the 
business of medicine and mathematics (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book 
One, §. 80, p. 127). 
 
Just as natural philosophy had been used as a servant, other sciences were 
separated from their root, and this separation led to a loss of their ability to 
grow well. Astronomy is one of these sciences, as is optics, music, a number of 
mechanical arts, and medicine (see Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 80, p. 
127). Why then does Bacon give medicine and mathematics as particular 
examples of using natural philosophy as a servant? Indeed, it is clear that by 
medicine, Bacon means Paracelsus and Paracelsians, and by mathematics, he 
means those who had used mainly mathematics but not natural philosophy in 
their natural inquiries, such as Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo. Bacon argued 
those who had been studying these mathematical sciences had neglected 
natural philosophy. 
 
Bacon believed astronomy and physics should come together to create one 
body of science: 
 
Now astronomy and philosophy ought to have arranged things so that 
astronomy would prefer hypotheses which are most useful for cutting 
short calculation, philosophy those which come closest to the truth of 
nature; and, further, that the hypotheses which astronomy uses for its 
own convenience should not be prejudicial to the truth of the matter, 
and in turn that the determinations of philosophy should be such as 
to be wholly reconcilable with the phenomena of astronomy. But at 
present the opposite happens, namely that the fictions of astronomy 
have been introduced into philosophy and have debauched it, while 
the speculations of the philosophers concerning the heavenly bodies 
please only themselves and almost desert astronomy, looking at the 




particular phenomena and their causes. Therefore since both sciences 
(as they stand now) are frivolous and perfunctory, our footing must 
be fixed altogether more firmly, and we must treat the two of them as 
one and the same and combined into a single body of science, which 
because of men’s narrow meditations and the practice of professors 
have been used to separation for so many ages (Bacon, A description, 
OFB VI, p. 135). 
 
Holding that astronomy and physics should be one body of science 
constructed out of physics and mathematics does not, however, mean that 
Bacon treats these sciences equally. To achieve a harmony between the results 
of physics and astronomy, a physical model should first be developed; then a 
mathematical model should be established on this physical ground. When this 
is done, Bacon believes there cannot be a contradiction between the physical 
model and the geometrical (mathematical) model of the heavens, and this 
shows us his unbelief in the explanatory power of mathematics in determining 
the real motions of the celestial bodies. 
 
Bacon was not against the application of mathematics in astronomy; however, 
he thought that a geometrical model should follow physics. The reason for 
this, as I mentioned above, is Bacon’s lack of confidence in mathematics’ 
explanatory power regarding the objects of natural philosophy. This is the 
main difference which should be borne in mind between mathematical 
realists, such as Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and physical realists, such as 
Bacon and the Averroists. 
 
In her ‘A natural history of the heavens: Francis Bacon’s anti-Copernicanism’, 
Jalobeanu emphasises the collection of measurements of the celestial motions 
and states: 
 




which would replace the ‘stuffed ox’ of the received mathematical 
astronomy, was based on the same project of constructing a well 
regulated and well organised data-base of phenomena, a natural 
history of the heavens (Jalobeanu, 2015a, p. 78). 
 
In this chapter, however, instead of the collection of measurements for a 
natural history of the heavens,60 I emphasise a later step in the Baconian 
schema – which comes after establishing a natural history of the heavens – 
and it is developing a physical model of the celestial motions. As to developing 
a mathematical model, it comes after developing physical model. This attitude 
of Bacon towards a mathematical model of the heavens is related to his 
attitude towards the new role for mathematics as making natural 
philosophical claims through the premises of geometry, which was indeed a 
violation of the Aristotelian disciplinary boundary between mathematical 
sciences and natural philosophy (see Chapter 1 for the disciplinary boundary). 
 
Bacon suggested establishing an astronomical theory by considering physics 
first and then developing a geometrical model to beget practice. I will discuss 
what those physical statements are in Section 3,5. However, mathematical 
realists ignore physics and apply the rules of geometry on the history of the 
observations and measurements regarding the celestial bodies to establish a 
geometrical model of the heavens, which, for them, reflects the physical model 







                                                 






3.4     Did Bacon adopt al–Bitruji’s mathematical model   
            of the heavens before he developed his physical   
            model? 
 
 
In this section, I discuss one of Rees’ claims that Bacon adopted al–Bitruji’s 
geometrical model before he developed his physical model, and that Bacon’s 
idea of the priority of physics in developing an astronomical theory was a later 
development in Bacon’s career.61 As Rees states: 
 
However, the relationship between the Baconian physical system and 
the Alpetragian kinematic principles looks very different when it is 
seen from the point of view of the system’s origins and growth. 
Indeed, Bacon adopted the Alpetragian principles at least twenty 
years before he developed the physical cosmology. In fact, Alpetragian 
geometry served as an armature about which he moulded the 
physical system. The history of the speculative system manifests a 
reversal of what Bacon subsequently held to be the proper sequential 
relationship between physical and mathematical endeavours in the 
field of natural philosophy. In the development of speculative 
philosophy, a sketchy geometrical structure preceded the physical 
flesh that was to clothe it – although Bacon was later to represent the 
geometry as a consequence of the physics (Rees, 1985, p. 30).62 
 
Rees also states: 
 
                                                 
  61.  For the similarities of Bacon’s and al-Bitruji’s astronomical models, see p. 77 in this 
dissertation. 




Paradoxically kinematics exerted a crucial influence on the shaping of 
his [Bacon] own substantive natural philosophy, an influence that 
implicitly contradicted the cardinal principle of the priority of physics 
(Rees, 1985, p. 31). 
 
First, al-Bitruji rejected epicyclic and eccentric models of Ptolemy and offered 
spiral lines for the motions of celestial bodies because of natural philosophical 
reasons, but not because of the requirement of the premises of geometry. Al-
Bitruji offered a model for the celestial motions by considering physics, then 
he developed a geometrical model which is in harmony with the physical 
model. This is what Rees failed to notice. Rees thought that the astronomical 
model of al-Bitruji regarding the celestial motions was derived from geometry, 
but indeed, it was derived from physics. What Bacon adopted from al-Bitruji 
was a physical model for the celestial motions. The geometrical model of al-
Bitruji was developed out of this physical model. For Rees, what Bacon 
adopted from al-Bitruji was the kinematic principles of al-Bitruji, that is, 
geometry; however, what Bacon adopted from al-Bitruji was a physical model. 
Bacon’s and al-Bitruji’s explanations regarding spiral lines for the motions of 
the celestial bodies and the geocentric model of the heavens were natural 
philosophical explanations. 
 
In other words, if we believe we can discover the physical model of the 
heavens through mathematics, we should be called mathematical realists. This 
leads us to ask, was al–Bitruji a mathematical realist? The answer is no. As 
mentioned above, he made an offer according to which a geometrical model of 
the heavens should be based on physical principles. So, we can say that the 
Alpetragian model for the motions of the celestial bodies was derived from the 
principles of physics. Therefore, Rees’ mistake again was ignoring al–Bitruji’s 
priority for physics in the development of an astronomical theory. We can also 
question whether Bacon was a mathematical realist. The answer is no 




heavens should be based on a physical model. This is why Bacon adopted the 
Alpetragian account of the celestial motions. Rees was surprised by the 
Baconian adoption of the Alpetragian account of the celestial motions: 
 
It is not entirely clear why Bacon was attracted to the Alpetragian 
scheme for it was not taken seriously by any of his contemporaries 
even though it was part of the small change of astronomical discourse 
in the early seventeenth century Rees (1986, pp. 422–3). 
 
As mentioned before, the Alpetragian model was derived from the principles 
of physics, and this is the reason why Bacon was attracted to the Alpetragian 
model. So, we cannot claim that in the system of Bacon, the geometrical model 
of the celestial motions preceded physical model. The following quote from 
Rees shows us that even he might be aware that his claim is problematic: 
 
However, one should perhaps not make too much of this reversal … It 
is possible that these outline principles were chosen because they 
accorded with deep–seated physical or metaphysical intuitions that 
Bacon had arrived at before 1592. It is possible that, in this sense, 
such intuitions governed his outlook throughout his career Rees 
(1986, p. 424). 
 




3.5      Bacon’s physical statements and his    
             astronomical theory 
 
 




motions of the celestial bodies with physical arguments. These physical 
arguments primarily concern the matter of the heavenly bodies. Bacon 
explained the celestial motions according to their substance because, for him, 
by considering the substance of the heavenly bodies “their motion and 
construction may be better understood” (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 173). As is 
seen, Bacon established his astronomical theory by considering physics, such 
as the substance of the heavenly bodies, and he discarded mathematical (or 
logical) subtleties (see Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 179). 
 
In his physical model, the relation between the speed of the celestial motions 
and the immobility of the Earth is explained as follows: 
 
the rapidity and speeds of the heavenly motions abate by degrees, as 
if about to end in something immovable, and that in respect of the 
poles even the heavenly bodies participate in rest; and that if 
immobility be excluded, the System comes apart and disperses. Now if 
there be any concentration and mass of the immovable nature, it 
seems that we need inquire no further to show that this is the globe of 
the Earth (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 179). 
 
Bacon claimed rest cannot be excluded from nature, and if celestial bodies are 
closer to the Earth, they are slower, because the Earth is immovable (see 
Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, pp. 181–2). If we do not consider immobility, Bacon’s 
system dissolves. The spherical, finite cosmos of Bacon requires an immutable 
centre; while the celestial region consists of a flamy substance, the Earth 
consists of tangible matter.63 Bacon explained the different motions of the 
celestial bodies with reference to their material substance: 
 
For dense and tight packing together of matter induces a tendency 
                                                 




torpid and antipathetic to motion, just as on the other hand loose 
unfolding induces a tendency ready or apt (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 
179). 
 
Accepting rest in nature requires an acceptance of motion without limit 
(perfect mobility). Like Aristotle, Bacon finds this perfect (limitless) motion in 
the circular motion of the starry heaven (see Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 181). 
 
The important thing for us is that Bacon did not rest upon mathematics when 
he enquired into the motions of the celestial bodies. He declares: 
 
Now when I explain these things [the motions of the celestial bodies], 
I shall banish to calculations and tables the fancy mathematics (that 
motions be reduced to perfect circles, either eccentric or concentric), 
and the empty talk (that the Earth is in comparison to the heaven like 
a point, not like a quantity), and many other fictitious devices of the 
astronomers (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, pp. 179–81). 
 
For Bacon, there are two kinds of heavenly motions: cosmical and mutual. Of 
the first sort of motion, Bacon writes: 
 
Now this motion seems truly cosmical and for that reason singular 
except in so far as it admits both diminutions and deviations 
according to which this motion echoes through the universe of 
movable things, and penetrates from the stellar heaven all the way to 
the bowels and insides of the Earth, not by some violent or vexatious 
compulsion, but by constant consent. Now this motion is also perfect 
and complete in the stellar heaven, both in just measure of time and 
in full restitution of place. But the further we depart from the upper 
regions, the less perfect is this motion in respect of its slowness and 




VI, p. 181). 
 
Bacon argued that the motion of opposition from west to east (which was 
attributed to the planets) is just an appearance, not a real motion. As the 
starry heaven moves faster, it leaves the planets behind, and this was assumed 
by others as a motion from west to east (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 181). The 
planets’ velocity is different, and they do not return to the same point of 
trajectory because their trajectory is not a perfect circle. Bacon argued, like al–
Bitruji, that the planets move in spiral lines (see al–Bitruji, 1971, pp. 100–4). 
Al-Bitruji calls this spiral motion idära lawlabiya (see al–Bitruji, 1971, p. 101). 
According to Bacon, admitting spiral lines for planetary motions is closest to 
sense and fact (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 183). Let me summarise the 
similarities of Bacon’s and al-Bitruji’s astronomical models as follows: 
 
 These two models are geocentric. 
 Both models are against the existence of eccentric and epicyclic 
models. 
 Both offer the idea of spiral motion for the celestial bodies. 
 Both propose that the motion of celestial bodies becomes slower 
when they get nearer to the Earth. 
 
For Bacon, these views are better than the astronomers’ views, such as, 
“Compulsion and Repugnance of motions, different polarity of the zodiac, the 
reversed order of speed and the like” (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 185). The 
astronomer’s views have nothing to do with nature of things, but “they keep 
the peace, such as it is, with the calculations” (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 185). 
Namely, astronomers’ views save the phenomena, even though they do not 
reflect reality. The faults of astronomers are expressed by Bacon as follows: 
 
Nor did the better astronomers fail to see these things, but being 




and indulgent of bad philosophy, they disdained to follow nature. But 
this imperious disposition of wise men towards nature is worse even 
than the simplicity and credulity of the crowd, if a man disdains plain 
things because they are plain. And yet it is a prodigious and very 
widespread evil that the human intellect, since it cannot be on a level 
with things, prefers to be above them (Bacon, Theory, OFB VI, p. 185). 
 
As we can see, the main reason why Bacon is against astronomers’ views is 
that they did not follow nature. The reason for this failure is intellectual. For 
Bacon, when the human wit (i.e. understanding) is not able to match nature, it 
puts itself above nature. So, Bacon believed the ideas of astronomers, such as 
perfect circles, are results of unaided intellect. According to Bacon, as quoted 
in Section 2.2, ‘The unaided intellect takes the same way (i.e. the former) 
which it takes when directed by dialectic’ (see p. 46). When human 
understanding is left alone, it ignores nature and creates ideas through logic 
and mathematics, which are beyond nature. To avoid these kinds of false ideas, 
we should follow nature when we try to develop an astronomical theory. 
 
 
3.6    Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that Bacon should be accepted as a physical 
realist along with others such as al–Bitruji, Averroes, and the aforementioned 
Italian Averroists (see fn. 56). I have argued they should be labelled physical 
realists because they held that a geometrical model of the heavens should be 
derived from physics. Those who believed their geometrical model of the 
heavens reflected the physical model should be labelled as mathematical 
realists, to divide them from physical realists. As to instrumentalists, like 
physical realists, they also did not believe mathematics could provide us with 




model saves the phenomena, it should be enough for us, even though it does 
not reflect the real motions of the celestial bodies. 
 
What al–Bitruji himself offered was, as an astronomer, establishing an 
astronomical model which is in accord with physics. Therefore, what Bacon 
adopted from al–Bitruji was an astronomical theory which was developed out 
of physics, but not out of the premises of geometry. This is an attitude which 
gives priority to physics but not mathematics. It is the same attitude which 
was shared by Bacon himself. Therefore, I call both al–Bitruji and Bacon 
physical realists. Al–Bitruji and Bacon argued that a geometrical model could 


































Rees argues that when we turn our attention from Bacon’s attitude towards 
geometrical abstraction to his arithmetical, quantitative works, we can see 
that he was more affirming of mathematical methods (see Rees, 1985, p. 31). 
Rees evaluates both the quantification process and geometrical abstraction as 
mathematical methods, which blurs Bacon’s attitude towards the application 
of mathematics in natural philosophy because the mathematical method has 
been known as a geometrical method. These two aspects of Baconian natural 
philosophy should not be compared, and those who criticise Bacon for his 
disagreement of making natural philosophical claims through the premises of 
geometry cannot be refuted through his use of arithmetical quantification or 
the collection of measurements in natural history. 
 
Section 4.1 addresses the arithmetical quantitative works of Bacon. In section 
4.2, I argue that the arithmetical quantitative works of Bacon cannot be used 
to refute the claims of those who argued that Bacon did not approve of the 
new role of mathematics in modern science. Section 4.3 will address Thomas 
Kuhn’s charge that Bacon mistrusted the entire quasi–deductive structure of 








4.1     Arithmetical quantification in Bacon’s natural  
            historical works 
 
 
Bacon attaches importance to measuring and weighing bodies or virtues of 
natural phenomena in his natural historical works. We can say that his 
quantitative approach to natural phenomena represents one side of his 
approach to mathematics. We can see some examples of this in his natural 
histories; including history of the winds, history of life and death, history of 
dense and rare, history of heavy and light, history of the sympathy and 
antipathy of things; and history of sulphur, mercury, and salt (see Bacon, 
Historia, OFB XII, p. 7). The first three of these were published, but the others 
are only short prefaces. Bacon’s Sylva Sylvarum (1626) can also be presented 
as a good example of his quantitative approach.64 
 
As to the relation between his quantitative approach in his natural historical 
works and his attitude towards mathematics, Bacon himself explains it, 
saying: 
 
In addition I demand that everything to do with natural phenomena, 
be they bodies or virtues, should (as far as possible) be set down, 
counted, weighed, measured and defined. For we are after works not 
speculations, and, indeed, a good marriage of Physics and 
Mathematics begets Practice. And for this reason we should 
investigate in detail and thoroughly record, in the History of Heavenly 
Bodies, the precise returns and distances of the planets; in the History 
of Earth and Sea, the extent of the land and how much of the surface it 
                                                 




occupies compared with the waters; in the History of Air, how much 
compression air will put up without strong resistance; in the History 
of Metals, how far one may outweigh another; and countless other 
instances of this kind. But where precise proportions are not 
available to us we must for sure fall back on rough estimates and 
comparisons, as, for instance, (if we happen to distrust the 
astronomers’ calculations of distances) that the Moon stands within 
the Earth’s shadow; that Mercury is above the Moon, and the like 
(Bacon, Parasceve, OFB XI, §. 7, pp. 465–7). 
 
Also, in his Novum organum Bacon says,  
 
Now the Operative Part has two vices and, in general, two instances 
with special rank to match them. For operation either lets you down 
or gives you too much trouble. For the most part operation lets you 
down (especially after careful investigation of natures) by inaccurate 
determination and measurement of the powers and actions of bodies. 
Now the powers and actions of bodies are circumscribed and 
measured either by point in space, moment of time, concentration of 
quantity, or ascendancy of virtue, and unless these four have been 
well and carefully weighed up, the sciences will perhaps be pretty as 
speculation, but fall flat in practice (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, 
§. 44, p. 367). 
 
As you see, for Bacon, ‘a good marriage of Physics and Mathematics begets 
Practice,’ and we should know that practice can provide to humanity Bacon’s 
dominant, prelapsarian position over nature, which was lost after the Fall. So, 
this divine goal of natural philosophy can be fulfilled through technological 
achievements, and these achievements cannot be possible without the 
speculative (theoretical) knowledge of natural philosophy. Speculative, or 




with mathematics, so the application of mathematics in natural philosophy is 
important for Bacon, as it is helpful to fulfil the goal of a natural inquiry.  
 
I should emphasise that ‘a good marriage of Physics and Mathematics begets 
Practice’ also refers to the measuring and weighing processes in natural 
history, which functions, as Jalobeanu states, as a “prerequisite to the 
emergence of a quantitative science of nature” (Jalobeanu, 2016b, p. 69). But, 
we should separate the measuring and weighing processes in his natural 
historical works from the application of geometry. The measuring and 
weighing processes in natural history come before physics, while the 
application of geometry comes after physics. By ‘application of geometry’, I 
mean developing geometrical models such as a geometrical model of the 
heavens (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6). 
 
 
4.1.1    Examples of quantification from the writings of     
              Bacon 
 
 
For Bacon, quantity of matter and its distribution in bodies is important in 
natural inquiries. It is well known that quantity of matter in the universe is 
fixed. In his Historia densi at rari, Bacon tried to explain the phenomena of 
expansion and contraction by cube and bladder experiments. To learn the 
densities of some liquids and solids, he measured their weight by applying the 
same volume for all of them. He explains one of the results of his experiment 
as follows: 
 
since the gold cube weighs one ounce and the cube of myrrh one 
pennyweight, it is evident that the bulk of myrrh compared with the 
bulk of the body of gold is as twenty to one; so that in the same space 




contrariwise that myrrh has twenty times the bulk of the same weight 
of gold (Bacon, Historia densi, OFB XIII, pp. 45–7). 
 
By using his cube experiment, Bacon was able to refute the well–known claim 
that everything in the world is composed of four elements: 
 
The opinion that sublunary things are made up of the four elements 
does not come well out of this. For the gold in the vessel weighed in at 
20 pennyweight; common earth at little more than 2; water at 1 dwt. 
and three grains; air [and] fire, much more tenuous and less 
materiate, weigh nothing at all (Bacon, Historia densi, OFB XIII, p. 49). 
 
Another example of his quantitative experimentation can be given as follows. 
Bacon takes a phial and pours certain amount of wine into it. He inserts the 
neck of the phial into the mouth of a bladder, which was prepared for this 
experiment. Then, he heats the phial and reports: 
 
Not long after that the breath of the spirit of wine rose up into the 
bladder and gradually blew it up quite strongly all round. When that 
had happened I took the glass from the fire forthwith and punctured 
the top of the bladder with a needle to let the breath out rather than 
let it revert to drops. Then I took the bladder from the phial, and with 
the scales I showed how much of that half ounce of spirit of wine had 
been lost and turned into a breath. Now by weight the loss amounted 
to not more than six pennyweights, so that the six pennyweights 
spirit of wine, which in a body did not (as I recall) fill a fortieth of a 
pint, filled a space amounting to eight pints when turned into breath 
(Bacon, Historia densi, OFB XIII, p. 69). 
 
These quantitative experiments of Bacon provided a basis for his pneumatic 




should be performed in natural historical works, which he suggests are the 
proper basis for further inquiries into nature. These natural historical works 
should be a basis for inquiries into physics. So, it can be easily seen that 
quantitative experimental works in his natural histories are not just for 
practical goals, but they provide a basis for Bacon’s theoretical inquiries.65 
 
 
4.1.2     Mathematical instances (instances of measurement) 
 
 
For the operative part of his natural philosophy, Bacon mentions seven 
instances and calls them Practical Instances. Four of them are mathematical 
instances or instances of measurement: 
 
A)  Instances of the Rod or Rule 
B)  Instances of the Course  
C)  Instances of Strife 
D)  Instances of Quantity 
 
For our inquiry, ‘instances of quantity’ are the most important; and Bacon also 
defines ‘instances of quantity’ as ‘doses of nature’, which is ‘quantity 
proportionable’. As previously mentioned, Bacon calls the object of mixed 
mathematics ‘quantity proportionable’ or ‘dose of nature’ synonymously (see 
pp. 20–1). Below, I mention these four mathematical instances to see how we 
                                                 
  65.   Rees explains this side of Bacon’s philosophy well by saying: 
There can be no doubt that he regarded the collecting of quantified data as 
essential to the successful accomplishment of his programme. He complained that 
in natural history nothing had been “duly investigated, nothing verified, nothing 
counted, weighed or measured.” In the Novum Organum he stressed the absolute 
necessity of using measuring instruments to the full in order to overcome the 
deficiencies of the senses … It is perfectly plain that in principle Bacon believed 
that quantified data should form a major part of the new natural history—not 
least because such data would help to generate a productive philosophy (Rees, 




can quantify nature by measuring and weighing bodies and virtues, which 
helps us apply further applications of mathematics to natural phenomena. 
 
A) Instances of the rod or rule 
 
Bacon places the first kind of mathematical instances (the instances of the rod 
or rule, that is, instances of range or limitation) as the twenty-first place of 
Prerogative Instances. These instances are about the powers and the motions 
of things, and they are not accidental, but fixed; not indefinite, but finite. Some 
of these powers act by visible contact such as medicines, which we cannot 
discover their virtues without touching the body. 
 
There are also powers which act at a distance, for example, amber attracts 
straws. We can observe magnetic powers when a piece of iron and a magnet 
or two magnets are approaching each other. In this example, the action 
between a piece of iron and magnet or the action between two magnets 
happen at a small distance; but the magnetic virtue which moves the needle of 
a compass operates at much more of a distance if we compare it with the 
magnetic virtue among two magnets. Bacon surmises then that the following 
magnetic powers also act at great distances: 
 
1) The power between the globe of the Earth and heavy bodies. 
 
2) The magnetic power between the globe of the moon and the waters of 
the sea. 
 
3) The magnetic power between the starry sphere and the planets. 
 






The important thing is that even with these instances of action at small or 
great distances, there is a certain limit which cannot be exceeded. This limit, 
for Bacon, “varies according to the mass or quantity of bodies, or the strength 
and weakness of virtues, or the helps and hindrances of the media, all of which 
ought to come into the reckoning and to be noted down” (Bacon, Novum, OFB 
XI, Book Two, §. 45, p. 371). Not only are the natural motions caused by 
natural powers, but because of having fixed limits, the measurements 
regarding the instances of violent motions should also be observed and 
computed, such as projectiles, guns, wheels (see Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book 
Two, §. 45, p. 371). 
 
Another kind of motion is spherical motion, which is the expansion or 
contraction of bodies. Bacon believed it is important to measure the degree of 
expansion and contraction of bodies. He observed that rare bodies allow 
contraction more than tangible bodies. To learn about these kinds of motions, 
he conducted the following experiment: 
 
I had a hollow globe made from lead, whose volume amounted to two 
wine pints, and which had sides thick enough to withstand 
considerable force. I poured water into it through a hole made for the 
purpose, and when the globe was full, I stopped the hole with molten 
lead to make the globe quite solid. Then I flattened the globe on 
opposite sides with a great hammer, whence it followed of necessity 
that, since a sphere is of all shapes the amplest, the water was driven 
into a smaller space. Then, when the hammering stopped making the 
water withdraw further, I resorted to a mill or press until the water, 
impatient of further pressure, oozed (like a fine dew) through the 
solid lead. Then I worked out how much space had been lost by 
compression, and gathered that the water had endured that much 
compression (but only when worked on with great violence) (Bacon, 





B) Instances of the course (instances of the water) 
 
While the previous instances of the rod are measurements of degrees of space, 
instances of the course, which was put in twenty–second place, are the 
measurements of the periods of time. Bacon says that he borrowed the term 
instances of water from the hourglasses of the ancients. All motions in natural 
bodies happen in a period of time; for example, celestial bodies revolve in a 
certain period of time. Ebb and flow also happen periodically. The falling of 
bodies and the expansions and compressions of bodies happen in a certain 
time frame that can be measured. Among other examples of these kind of 
instances, Bacon counts the following: 
 
when ships set sail, animals move, and missiles fly, all these are 
likewise accomplished in times which can (as far as their sums are 
concerned) be reckoned … Moreover when several artillery pieces are 
fired together, which are sometimes audible thirty miles off, people 
near the guns hear the bang sooner than those a long way off (Bacon, 
Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 46, p. 377). 
 
However, Bacon warns us that we should not only measure the time period of 
motions of bodies, but we should compare their motions. For example, when 
we compare the motion of sound and the motion of light, we can see that the 
motion of light is faster than the motion of sound because the fire of a gun can 
be seen before its sound can be heard (see Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, 
§. 46, p. 379). Bacon accepts this phenomenon as the inequality of motions, 
and gives some other examples such as how the strings of a violin seem 
doubled or tripled when they are struck by a finger; or, when we turn a ring it 
seems that it becomes a globe. The reason for this is that “visible species are 
picked up by sight more quickly than they are set aside … because new species 




§. 46, p. 379). Bacon believed that even Galileo founded his theory of ebb and 
flow upon the mentioned inequality of velocities of motion. Galileo supposed 
that the world turns faster than the flow of water, which, according to Bacon, 
is a wrong assumption. 
 
C) Instances of strife (instances of predominance) 
 
Bacon calls the twenty–fourth prerogative instance, or the third of the 
mathematical instances, instances of strife or instances of predominance. 
According to Bacon, these instances “draw attention to the ascendancy of 
virtues over each other or their submission to each other, and which of them 
is the stronger and gets the upper hand and which the weaker and goes under. 
For the motions and exertions of bodies are no less composed, decomposed 
and intermixed than the bodies themselves” (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book 
Two, §. 48, p. 383). 
 
Bacon gives ‘resistance in matter’ as an example for instances of strife. 
Resistance is a kind of virtue in matter which resists being destroyed. So, we 
can say that nothing can reduce any portion of matter. The Schoolmen denote 
this motion by an axiom, which is “two bodies cannot be in the same place”, or 
they call it motion “to prevent penetration of dimensions” (Bacon, Novum, 
OFB XI, Book Two, §. 48, p. 385). 
 
The second motion of this kind of instance is the motion of connexion. The 
Schoolmen called this motion a ‘motion to prevent a vacuum’ (see Bacon, 
Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 48, p. 385). It is a kind of resistance to the 
separation of bodies. 
 
The third motion is the motion of liberty. This motion refers to a body’s 
struggle to escape unusual pressure and to return its natural size. Bacon gives 





 The motion of water in swimming 
 The motion of air in flying 
 The motion of water in rowing 
 The motion of air in the undulations of winds 
 The motion of springs in clocks (see Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, 
§. 48, p. 385) 
 
Bacon also gives examples of the motion of bodies which escape from 
pressure. This kind of motion can be seen “in the air left in glass eggs after 
they have been sucked out, and in strings, leather, and cloth which spring back 
after stretching, unless the stretching last long enough to stay put, etc” (Bacon, 
Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 48, p. 387). This motion is evidenced not only in 
fire and air but even solid bodies such as wood, lead and iron. 
 
The fourth motion is the motion of matter. Contrary to the motion of liberty, 
which is the struggle of bodies to return to their old size after pressure, the 
motion of matter is the desire of bodies for a new dimension. For instance, 
when air is heated, it expands and longs for a new dimension, and without 
applying cold, it does not want to regain its earlier dimension. 
 
The fifth motion is the motion of continuity, that is, the self–continuity of a 
certain body. All bodies resist discontinuity, and some bodies have a stronger 
resistance than other bodies. For example, when we consider steel, we can say 
that it has a strong resistance to discontinuity. 
 
The sixth motion is the motion of gain or motion of want. When bodies are 
placed among other, hostile bodies; if these bodies find an opportunity, they 
try to unite with allied bodies. For example, paper and cloth imbibe water but 
expel air. For Bacon, electricity can be given as an example of this kind of 





For the operation of electric bodies (about which Gilbert and others 
since have turned out so many tales) is nothing other than an appetite 
of a body excited by gentle rubbing, an appetite which does not put 
up well with air but prefers another tangible body if one can be found 
close by (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 48, p. 391). 
 
The seventh motion is the motion of the greater congregation. This motion was 
named ‘natural motion’ by the Schoolmen. Bodies have a tendency to gather 
with other bodies which are of a like nature. Heavy bodies move towards the 
Earth, while light bodies move towards the heavens. 
 
The eighth motion is the motion of the lesser congregation. Homogeneous 
parts of a body have a desire to separate themselves from the heterogeneous 
parts, and both parts of a body come together with each other. For example, 
when a glass of milk is left awhile, the creamy part of it gathers on the top; and 
when we consider a glass of wine, we can see that the dregs gather in the 
bottom of the glass.  
 
The ninth motion is the motion of magnetic. Bacon thinks that magnetic 
motion might seem similar to the motion of lesser congregation, but argues 
that in fact, it is a different kind of motion. The moon raises the waters; the 
starry heaven attracts planets to their highest points of their orbits, and so we 
can see that these motions are different from both greater and lesser 
congregation. 
 
The tenth motion is the motion of flight. This motion is the opposite of the 
motion of lesser congregation. Some bodies have an antipathy to other hostile 
bodies, and they desire to flee from them and refuse to mix with them. 
 




examples of this kind of motion can be seen as follows: “flame multiples itself 
and generates new flame over vapours and oily bodies ... air multiplies itself 
and generates new air over water and watery bodies” (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, 
Book Two, §. 48, p. 401). 
 
The twelfth motion is the motion of excitation. This motion is in a similar class 
to the motion of assimilation. It is a diffusive, multiplicative, and transitive 
motion. While the motion of assimilation multiplies and transforms bodies 
and substances, the motion of excitation multiplies and transforms virtues 
only. For example, more heat causes more magnetic power and more 
putrefaction. The important thing to note is that this kind of motion is the 
form of heat, as Bacon states, 
 
this motion is especially conspicuous in heat and cold. For in heating 
the heat does not spread itself by communication of the initial heat, 
but only by Excitation of the parts of the body to that motion which is 
the form of heat, a motion of which I spoke in the First Vintage 
concerning the Form of Heat (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 48, 
p. 405). 
 
As we can see, the motion of excitation, which is one of the mathematical 
instances, is the form of heat. In Novum organum, Bacon, after an inquiry, 
concludes that motion is the form of heat (see Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book 
Two, §. 11), and again in Novum organum, we learn that one of the 
mathematical instances, motion of excitation, is the form of heat. Measuring 
this motion refers to the operative part of natural philosophy, which is a 
process defined by Bacon as descending to new experiments or works from 
axioms of physics or forms. I will discuss this in the next chapter in detail. 
 
The thirteenth motion is the motion of impression. This motion is the same 




those diffusive motions. Bacon explains the difference between the motion of 
assimilation and the motion of impression as follows: 
 
For simple motion of Assimilation transforms the bodies themselves 
such that if you take away the initial mover, it makes no difference to 
the effects that follow (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 48, p. 
405). 
 
As an example, when we consider magnetised iron, even though we move the 
magnet, iron continues to magnetise other metals. However, when we 
consider the motion of impression, according to Bacon, it depends on the 
mover. For example, when we take the magnet away from a non–magnetised 
piece of iron, the effect of the magnet on iron ceases in a stroke. This motion 
can be seen in three things: in percussions of sound, in rays of light, and in 
magnetism. When we take away light, vision is gone; when we take away 
percussion, the sound dies away, and when we take the magnet away, the iron 
drops. 
 
The fourteenth motion is the motion of configuration or position. This motion 
is not about the desire of union or separation of bodies, but about the desire of 
position and collocation of bodies with reference to other bodies. For example, 
the heavens revolve from east to west rather than from west to east, and we 
do not know the reason for it, but there must be a cause for it. Bacon thinks 
that there are certain positions and configuration of parts in bodies that cause 
these kinds of motions, and without knowing these configurations, it is 
impossible to manage and to control these bodies. 
 
The fifteenth motion is the motion of transition. This motion refers to the 
promotion or prevention of virtues of bodies through their medium. While 
one medium fits to light, another medium might fit to magnetic virtues. For 




wood does not; or the medium of wood does not fit to light, but the medium of 
water or glass does. 
 
The sixteenth motion is the royal or political motion. This motion refers to 
motions caused by the predominant parts of bodies over other parts. The 
predominant parts of bodies may regulate the other parts of bodies; they may 
force them to separate or unite or move, so we can say that Bacon likens the 
position of predominant parts of bodies over other parts to a sort of 
government. When we consider quicksilver and vitriol, for example, the 
thicker parts are the predominant parts of them. 
 
The seventeenth motion is the spontaneous motion of rotation. This motion is 
the motion of the heavens and the heavenly bodies. When we consider the 
Earth, the motion of missiles and arrows are defined Bacon as the motion of 
liberty, and I should emphasise that as Bacon thought the Earth stands still, 
we can say this motion is related to astronomy. Bacon holds there are nine 
differences regarding this motion, which are caused from the following 
properties: 
 
the first relates to the centres that bodies move round; the second to 
the poles which they move on; the third to the circumference or 
confines according as they lie distant from the centre; the fourth to 
their speed according as they rotate faster or slower; the fifth to their 
consecutions, as from east to west or west to east; the sixth to their 
divergence from a perfect circle by spirals nearer to or further from 
the centre; the seventh to their divergence from a perfect circle by 
spirals nearer to or further from their poles; the eighth to the smaller 
or greater distances of their spirals from each other; the ninth and 
last to the variability of their poles if they are mobile, though the 
variability has nothing to do with rotation unless it moves in a circle 





The eighteenth motion is the motion of trepidation. This motion is indeed an 
astronomical motion. It is “a backward and forward motion of the equinoctial 
points” (Brummelen, 2014, p. 116). However, Bacon does not attach much 
credit to this claim as it is understood by astronomers. For Bacon, “Now this 
motion is a kind of life imprisonment, i.e. where bodies not altogether well 
situated in terms of their nature and yet not absolutely uncomfortable, are all 
aquiver and fretful, neither content with their lot nor daring to change it” 
(Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 48, p. 411). The motion of the heart and 
pulses of the animals can be given as examples of this kind of motion. 
 
The nineteenth motion is the motion of repose or the motion of aversion to 
move. This motion is the reason why the Earth stands still, but its extremities 
move towards the centre. Bacon argued that bodies which have considerable 
density abhor motion. If these bodies are forced to move, they have the desire 
to recover their position and not to move any further. 
 
D) Instances of quantity (doses of nature) 
 
The twenty–third of the prerogative instances, and the third of the 
mathematical instances, are the instances of quantity.66 Bacon explains he 
borrowed the term ‘doses of nature’ from medicine. Instances of quantity or 
‘doses of nature’ are important, because, as we saw in the first chapter (see 
pp. 20–1), that ‘dose of nature’ or ‘quantity determined’ is the object of mixed 
mathematics, which was also placed by Bacon as a branch of metaphysics. 
Bacon defines ‘instances of quantity’ or ‘doses of nature’ as follows: 
                                                 
  66.   Bacon also discusses measure of quantity in his Abecedarium novum naturae, but it 
seems that his explanations regarding mathematical instances in Novum organum are more 
comprehensive. However, his attitude towards the quantification process in natural history 
seems similar to Novum organum because he says, “This is why we must get closer to the 
mathematics or measures and scales of motions, without which, well counted and weighed 
and defined, the doctrine of motions may falter and not be reliably translated into practice” 





These are the ones which measure virtues according to the Quantum 
of bodies, and show what the Quantum of a Body does to influence the 
Mode of the Virtue. Now in the first place there are certain virtues 
which subsist only in Cosmic Quantity, i.e. in a Quantity acting in 
consent with the configuration and structure of the universe … In the 
second place, practically all particular virtues work by a body’s Much 
or Little” (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 47, pp. 381–3). 
 
For the first virtues mentioned above, which exist in cosmical quantity, Bacon 
gives the following examples: “The Earth stands still but its parts fall. The 
waters of the sea ebb and flow, but those of rivers do not do it at all other than 
when the sea comes in” (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 47, p. 383). 
 
For the second virtues, we can say that a large quantity of water corrupts 
slowly, while small quantities of water quickly. When we consider casks, 
which can have a larger quantity of wine and beer in them than bottles, these 
liquids ripen more quickly than they do in bottles. Also, we can see that a large 
quantity of magnets can draw more iron than a small quantity. 
 
Next, Bacon talks about freely falling bodies, and says that the Aristotelian 
idea that a bullet whose weight is two ounces falls two times more quickly 
than a bullet whose weight is an ounce is false, and that the real measures of 
freely falling bodies must be searched through experiment, “not from 
likelihoods or conjectures” (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 47, p. 383). 
Bacon also thought that all effects which are caused by a ‘dose of nature’, that 
is, one of the essential forms, must be observed and recorded. 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Bacon says that ‘dose of nature’ or ‘quantity 
proportionable’ is the object of mixed mathematics, which is a branch of 




part of natural philosophy, and natural philosophy also has an operative part 
which includes magic and mechanics. Bacon thinks that mathematical 
instances are among practical instances, which are pre–eminently useful for 
the operative part of natural philosophy (see Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book 
Two, §. 44, p. 367). The instances have three roles in the operative part of 
natural philosophy: pointing out, measuring, and facilitating. The role of 
mathematical instances is measuring; they measure practice. But, even though 
these instances are mostly useful for the operative part of philosophy, they 
are also useful for the speculative part, as the causes which should be inquired 
into for the speculative part are supposed to be based on the result of natural 
histories. All inquiries into instances are natural historical works.  
 
To recap, Bacon says that all effects which are caused by a ‘dose of nature’ 
must be set down. But, in his speculative (theoretical) part of natural 
philosophy, the object of mixed mathematics, that is, ‘dose of nature’ is placed 
as one of the essential forms of natural bodies — ‘dose of nature’ is also the 
cause of many effects in nature. Therefore, in natural history, the effects 
should be measured and observed. The quantitative data of the effects can be 
used for the operative and theoretical parts of natural philosophy. 
Mathematics can also be used as an assistant in the discovery of the axioms. 
As Bacon states: 
 
For many parts of nature can neither be invented with sufficient 
subtlety, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor 
accommodated to use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and 
intervention of Mathematic: of which sort are Perspective, Music, 
Astronomy, Cosmography, Architecture, Machinery, and some others 
(Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 371). 
 
So, because the object of mixed mathematics, which is ‘quantity determined’ 




from pure mathematics and is a part of natural philosophy. Bacon holds that 
mixed mathematics should be an assistant to natural philosophy because 
mixed mathematics, as mentioned above, ‘considers quantity in so far as it 
assists to explain, demonstrate, and actuate these (i.e. axioms of natural 
philosophy)’ (see p. 21). 
 
Bacon holds that some natural philosophical demonstrations are impossible 
without the help of mathematics. However, I should point out that the main 
method for a natural inquiry is still the Baconian experimental inductive 
method. More than this, we can say that Bacon does not accept mathematical 
sciences as sciences which are distinct from natural philosophy. By accepting 
mixed mathematics as a branch of mathematics, Bacon made those sciences a 
part of physics (natural philosophy), leading us to conclude that every 
mathematical science becomes a part of natural philosophy in Baconian 
schema. 
 
However, we can still say that in some sciences, mathematics can have more 
of a role to play than in others, but as an assistant to the rightful method. This 
means that mathematics cannot be applied to deduce axioms of natural 
philosophy; it can only be used as an assistant to the experimental method. 
However, when we consider the four mathematical instances, just one of them 
is defined by Bacon as ‘dose of nature’, that is, the object of mixed 
mathematics. We may ask, therefore, does the object of mixed mathematics 
include only the instances of quantity (dose of nature)? According to Bacon, 
the answer is yes, because he only holds that ‘quantity determined’ (i.e. ‘dose 
of nature’) is the object of mixed mathematics. However, when we consider 
the instances of the course, we can give the revolving period of the celestial 
bodies as an example, and it is clear the revolutions of celestial bodies should 
also be calculated. So, if we accept that the object of mixed mathematics is 
only the instances of quantity, then how can we explain the instances of the 




should be measured and weighed, why did Bacon only hold ‘dose of nature’ or 
‘quantity determined’ as an object of mixed mathematics? 
 
Bacon did not give a clear answer to this question, but I believe the reason he 
placed ‘dose of nature’ as an object of mixed mathematics is that he wanted to 
find a physical, concrete reason to place mathematical sciences in natural 
philosophy. Recall Bacon stated that even though ‘dose of nature’ is the most 
abstracted form, it is not fully separated from matter, and it is indeed one of 
the essential forms of matter. Therefore, we can conclude that Bacon chose 
only ‘instances of quantity’ or ‘doses of nature’ as the objects of mixed 
mathematics to place mathematical sciences as parts of natural philosophy 
because ‘doses of nature’ is determined in matter. However, we should not 
forget that all four mathematical instances can and should be measured and 
weighed to prevent sciences from falling flat in practice. 
 
 
4.2     Can we use Bacon’s arithmetical quantitative   
            works to refute the argument that he denied the    
            new role of mathematics in the sciences? 
 
 
According to Rees, if we consider Bacon’s quantitative works in his natural 
histories, we can see that his application of arithmetical quantification “will 
finally destroy the notion that he was somehow congenitally innumerate or 
implicitly hostile to mathematical methods” (Rees, 1985, p. 31).67 In the first 
chapter, I gave some examples of those who criticised Bacon’s attitude 
towards mathematics. Some of them criticise Bacon for not appreciating the 
                                                 
  67.   Rees also says that “it is rash to assume that Bacon was entirely ignorant of mathematics 
or that one can pretend that mathematics need not figure in modern historical accounts of his 
work. The validity of these conclusions seems all the stronger when another aspect of the 
question is examined, when one turns from Bacon’s attitude to geometrical abstraction to the 




new role of mathematics in sciences, and what they mean by the new role is 
geometrical abstraction, not arithmetical quantification. 
 
As mentioned before, there are also other researchers who wrongly believed 
that Bacon belittled mathematics. Some of Bacon’s writings indeed may cause 
others to think that he belittled the application of mathematics in sciences, for 
example, his words regarding pure mathematics: 
 
In the Mathematicks, I can report noe deficience, except it be that 
men doe not sufficiently vnderstand the excellent vse of the pure 
Mathematicks, in that they doe remedie and cure many defects in the 
Wit, and Faculties Intellectuall. For, if the wit bee too dull, they 
sharpen it: if too wandring, they fix it: if to inherent in the sense, they 
abstract it. So that, as Tennis is a game of noe vse in itselfe, but of 
great vse, in respect it maketh a quicke Eye, and a bodie readie to put 
itselfe into all Postures: So in the Mathematickes, that vse which is 
collateral and interuenient, is no lesse worthy, then that which is 
principall and intended (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, p. 88). 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the part of mathematics that was given a 
role in natural inquiries is mixed mathematics, not pure mathematics (see pp. 
17–8). Also, Bacon places mixed mathematics as a branch of metaphysics 
because the objects of mixed mathematics, that is, ‘quantity proportionable’, is 
one of the essential forms of natural bodies. However, it seems that because 
Bacon thought that pure mathematics was useful to cure the defects of the 
intellectual faculties of the human being, some researchers concluded that he 
belittled the application of mathematics in sciences. 
 
The handmaid role Bacon gave to mathematics for natural philosophical 
inquiries is another reason researchers could conclude he belittled 




subsidiary role of mathematics in natural philosophical inquiries, refers to 
Bacon’s belief that mathematics should not be used to discover the objects of 
natural philosophy. 
 
Now, let us examine the development of the term mathematical (geometrical) 
abstraction. Mathematical abstraction means, in an Aristotelian sense, “the 
merely mental existence of mathematical objects” (Mueller, 1970, p. 157). As 
Aristotle states: 
 
So geometry, though its subject matters happen to be sensible, does 
not deal with them as sensible beings, and the mathematical sciences 
are therefore not sciences of sensible things; but neither are they 
therefore sciences of things that are separate from sensible things. So 
there are many traits that things have because they are what they are: 
a living being has the peculiar attributes of being female or male, yet 
there is no female or male being separate from living beings; thus, 
there are peculiar attributes that things have when taken only as 
lengths or as planes (Aristotle, 1952, p. 275; 1078a, 1–10). 
 
In the fourteenth century, certain mathematicians such as Thomas 
Bradwardine, Richard Swineshead, and Nicole Oresme extended the 
application of mathematics in natural philosophy by representing qualities 
geometrically, which can also be defined as mathematical abstraction. For 
example, Oresme (1323–1382) wrote an important book called Treatise on the 
Configuration of Qualities and Motions discussing the intention and remission 
of forms and qualities. What Oresme did was give a quantitative character to 
intentions and remission of qualities. He symbolised variable qualities as 
geometrical figures, and he found the geometrical proof of the mean speed 
theorem (see Grant, 2007, p. 212). Oresme expressed the change in time with 
horizontal lines, and variable velocity with vertical lines. This kind of 




change of velocity through time geometrically.68 Different types of velocity 
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Figure 4  
 
Crosby states that Oresme and other members of Merton College “prefigured 
Kepler and Galileo with their glorification of geometry” (Crosby, 1997, p. 110). 
One of the titles of the works of Nicole Oresme shows the role of geometry in 
his natural inquiries, which is ‘The Geometry of Qualities and Motions’ (see 
Crosby, 1997, p. 110). 
 
                                                 




The role of geometry in natural philosophy had increased, and in the dawn of 
modern science, mathematicians (astronomers) began to make natural 
philosophical claims through the premises of geometry; that is, they rejected 
the accepted Aristotelian disciplinary boundary between mathematical 
sciences and natural philosophy (see Chapter 1). Copernicus blames 
Peripatetics for falling into error through ignorance of geometry (see 
Copernicus, 1995, p. 10). Newton named the new inquirers of nature as 
‘geometrical philosophers’ or ‘philosophical geometers’ and states, “I 
therefore urge geometers to investigate nature more rigorously, and those 
devoted to natural science to learn geometry first” (Newton, 2010, p. 87). In 
his letter to Marin Mersenne, René Descartes states that “my entire physics is 
nothing but geometry” (Descartes, 1997, p. 119). Mark Peterson summarises 
the situation well by saying that “all geometry became, potentially at least, a 
metaphor for nature, promising that nature could be understood as geometry 
could be understood” (Peterson, 2011, p. 28). 
 
Galileo’s words also show us a similar belief in geometry: 
 
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands 
continually open to our gaze, but the book cannot be understood 
unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the 
letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of 
mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other 
geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to 
understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a 
dark labyrinth (Galilei, 1957, pp. 237–8). 
 
After mathematicians, such as Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler, had begun to 
make natural philosophical claims through mathematics (geometry), we can 
say that mathematical or geometrical abstraction also came to mean making 




neo-Platonic Paracelsians’ attitude towards mathematical abstraction; they 
accepted mathematical abstraction as the logical method of Scholastics (see 
also Chapter 5). When Rees mentions geometrical abstraction, he also meant 
making natural philosophical claims through mathematics (see Rees, 1985, 
31).  
 
Mathematical abstraction is also known as the mathematization of nature or 
natural philosophy, and the mathematization of nature should not be 
confused with the quantification process in natural history. Quantification is a 
process to collect quantified data before the application of more advanced 
mathematics. Mathematization of nature, however, refers to a belief that 
nature can be understood as geometry can be understood, that is, the course 
of nature and the course of geometry are the same. Edmund Husserl explains 
Galileo’s mathematization of nature as follows: “nature itself is idealized under 
the guidance of the new mathematics; nature itself becomes — to express it in 
a modern way — a mathematical manifold” (Husserl, 1970, p. 23).69 
 
For Bacon, as mentioned before, the mathematization of nature is the result of 
the desire of mathematicians who want to be dominant over natural 
philosophy. But I should also reemphasise that I do not claim that Bacon was 
against the application of mathematics to natural inquiries. I can make 
Bacon’s position clear regarding the application of mathematics to natural 
phenomena as follows: Bacon accepted the application of geometry to natural 
phenomena as long as one does not make natural philosophical claims 
through mathematics. As you remember, this is because Bacon separated the 
objects of mathematical sciences and natural philosophy (see Chapter 1). 
 
Bacon explicitly says that mathematics can be applied to both the theoretical 
and operative parts of natural philosophy as an auxiliary to them. What I want 
                                                 




to emphasise is that the quantitative works of Bacon for natural history and 
his approach to the new role of mathematics should not be mistaken for each 
other. 
 
As mentioned earlier, quantification is a necessary process to have quantified 
data to apply mathematics. By arguing “there is a great difference between 
Bacon the natural historian and Bacon the cosmologist” (Rees, 1985, p. 32), 
Rees shows us that he believes the attitude of Bacon towards the role of 
mathematics in natural philosophy is different in his natural historical works 
(arithmetical quantification) than in his astronomical works (mathematical 
abstraction), but this is not true. Indeed, quantification includes cosmological 
studies too, such as histories of astronomical observations.70 By holding ‘a 
great difference between Bacon the natural historian and Bacon the 
cosmologist’, I believe Rees causes confusion, and he gives an impression that 
Bacon has different attitudes towards mathematical methods in his cosmology 
than in his natural history.  
 
Arithmetical quantification and mathematical abstraction are not two 
different approaches to the application of mathematics in natural philosophy, 
but the former is a necessary process for the latter. The main question is what 
Bacon’s attitude towards mathematical abstraction or the application of 
geometry to natural phenomena was. If we do not make natural philosophical 
claims through geometry, but only develop a model which saves the 
phenomena and, at the same time, is in accord with physics, then we can say 




                                                 
  70.  As Bacon states: “And for this reason we should investigate in detail and thoroughly 
record, in the History of Heavenly Bodies, the precise returns and distances of the planets” 






4.3     Do the arithmetical quantitative works of Bacon   
            call his distrust of the entire quasi–deductive    
            structure of mathematical sciences into   
            question? 
 
 
In his ‘Mathematical vs. Experimental traditions in the development of 
physical science’, Kuhn makes a distinction between Baconian experimental 
sciences and mathematical sciences: 
 
If Baconianism contributed little to the development of the classical 
sciences [mathematical sciences], it did give rise to a large number of 
scientific fields, often with their roots in prior crafts. The study of 
magnetism, which derived its early data from prior experience with 
the mariner’s compass, is a case in point. Electricity was spawned by 
efforts to find the relation of the magnet’s attraction for iron to that of 
rubbed amber for chaff. Both these fields, furthermore, were 
dependent for their subsequent development upon the elaboration of 
new, more powerful, and more refined instruments. They are typical 
new Baconian sciences. Very nearly the same generalization applies 
to the study of heat (Kuhn, 1976, pp. 14–5). 
 
Apart from Baconian sciences, Kuhn holds that there are other sciences that 
cannot be classified as Baconian. These include astronomy, harmonics, 
mathematics, optics and statistics. Kuhn calls these classical sciences. The 
important property classical sciences share is that they are mathematical.71 
                                                 
  71.   Kuhn says that, “Practiced by a single group and participating in a shared mathematical 
tradition, astronomy, harmonics, mathematics, optics, and statics are therefore grouped 
together here as the classical physical sciences or, more simply, as the classical sciences” 




Kuhn explains why Bacon was against the mathematical nature of classical 
sciences. He writes: 
 
Bacon himself was distrustful, not only of mathematics, but of the 
entire quasi–deductive structure of classical science. Those critics 
who ridicule him for failing to recognize the best science of his day 
have missed the point. He did not reject Copernicanism because he 
preferred the Ptolemaic system. Rather, he rejected both because he 
thought that no system so complex, abstract, and mathematical could 
contribute to either the understanding or the control of nature. His 
followers in the experimental tradition, though they accepted 
Copernican cosmology, seldom even attempted to acquire the 
mathematical skill and sophistication required to understand or 
pursue the classical science. (Kuhn, 1976, pp. 16–7). 
 
As mentioned in the third chapter, Bacon complained that the mathematical 
sciences of his day had a lack of physics or natural philosophy, and what 
mathematicians of his day had done in these classical (mathematical) sciences 
was only mathematical demonstrations. For Bacon, those mathematicians 
ignored natural philosophy (see Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 348). 
Therefore, Bacon did not deny mathematical sciences, or what Kuhn called 
classical sciences; he only denied the method of mathematical sciences of his 
day, which were destitute of natural philosophy. 
 
What Kuhn has ignored is that even though Bacon rejects making natural 
philosophical claims through mathematics, he gives a role to mathematics as 
an auxiliary to his experimental method. Further, Bacon says that “for as 
Physic advances farther and farther every day and develops new axioms, it 
will require fresh assistance from Mathematic in many things, and so the parts 




p. 371).72 So, we can say that Bacon did not make a severe distinction between 
some sciences as experimental and others as mathematical. And we should 
not forget that the concept of mathematical sciences (mixed mathematics) 
was a common idea in Bacon’s day, and as mentioned before, by placing 
mathematical sciences in natural philosophy, Bacon took a revolutionary step 
which refutes Kuhn’s claim. 
 
Bacon did not deny the application of mathematics to natural phenomena, but 
he denied making claims of natural philosophy through mathematics, which 
had been done by some mathematicians such as Copernicus and Galileo. 
Therefore, we cannot say that Bacon made a distinction between 
mathematical sciences and empirical sciences as Kuhn suggested. However, 
Bacon denied the mathematical or geometrical abstraction for two reasons: 
first, he did not accept making claims of natural philosophy through 
mathematics; and second, he complained of the ignorance of physics (natural 
philosophy) by mathematicians who were concentrating only on 
mathematical demonstrations. 
 
As it is stated well by Pastorino, the arithmetical quantification of Bacon in his 
natural historical works is a precondition for the possible employment of 
mathematics, and so it definitely calls into question the Kuhnian dichotomy 
between mathematical and experimental sciences.73 However, we should not 
                                                 
  72.   These words of Bacon show us that even though he puts mixed mathematical sciences in 
natural philosophy, he still makes a distinction between mathematical sciences and natural 
philosophy (see Chapter 1). 
  73.    As Pastorino states: 
It is then possible that Bacon’s program of data quantification for natural histories 
was also preliminary to the use of mathematics as envisaged in De Augmentis. In 
fact, mathematics can fully operate only on experimental results that are suitably 
organized in quantitative form: in this case, quantification of data is a 
precondition not just for operation, but for the possible employment of 
mathematics—and these two aims possibly overlap, or are indeed identical. Bacon 
never fully elaborated these points, and in any case it seems that this 
reassessment of the role of mathematics can be considered an view to which he 
came late in his work. However that be, this reconsideration of the role of 




forget that Kuhn was also right in saying that Bacon denied the quasi–
deductive structure of classical (mathematical) sciences. 
 
 
4.4      Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the quantitative approach of Bacon in 
natural history and his attitude to geometrical abstraction should not be 
compared, and that Rees’ approach to quantification blurs Bacon’s attitude 
towards the application of mathematics in natural philosophy. 
 
Quantification in Bacon’s natural historical works cannot be used to refute 
those who criticised him of not appreciating the new role of mathematics. The 
new role of mathematics requires making claims of natural philosophy 
through mathematics, but for Bacon, mathematics cannot be used to make 
claims of natural philosophy. He believed its role was limited to an assistant to 
his inductive experimental method. As mentioned before, the goal of Bacon’s 
natural philosophy was to discover the objects of natural philosophy. 
However, through mathematics or premises of geometry, we are not able to 
discover any of these causes. 
 
There are some scholars who argued that Bacon underestimated the role of 
mathematics in sciences, such as John William Draper and Lynn Thorndike 
(see p. 1). Bacon’s approach towards quantification in natural history can be 
used to refute them, but there are other scholars who argued that Bacon 
underestimated the role of mathematics in sciences. They used Bacon’s 
disapproval of mathematics’ ability in making natural philosophical claims to 
                                                                                                                                       
the strong Kuhnian dichotomy between a mathematical and an experimental 




assert this, for example, Eduard Dijksterhuis: 
 
Bacon lacks all understanding of the importance of the mathematical 
treatment of science, which has already beginning to score such great 
triumphs during his lifetime (Dijksterhuis, 1964, p. 401).74 
 
I can say that the second group of scholars’ claim cannot be refuted by using a 
quantitative approach in natural history. 
 
What Rees does by using the quantitative works of Bacon to refute others who 
claimed that Bacon did not approve of the new role of mathematics in modern 
science can be likened to the following example. Robert Fludd supported the 
Pythagorean application of mystical mathematics, but he was against the 
geometrical abstraction of Kepler. If someone accuses Fludd of not 
appreciating the real significance of mathematics in natural philosophy, 
refuting him by giving an example of Fludd’s attitude towards Pythagorean 
mathematics would be beside the point. 
 
Similarly, I argue that the quantitative approach of Bacon in his natural 
history cannot be used to refute the claims of those who argued that he did 
not approve of the new role of mathematics in sciences, because the new role 
of mathematics was related to the application of geometry to natural 







                                                 










Clarification of the Role of Mathematics in Baconian 




In this chapter, I discuss Bacon’s attitude towards mathematics in relation to 
active and passive matter theories. As you remember, Bacon compared the 
philosophy of the pre-Socratics with Aristotle’s philosophy. He argued that the 
philosophy of the pre-Socratics (see Chapter 2) favoured active matter, and as 
a result of this, their method was experimental (dissection of nature). As to 
Aristotle, Bacon argued Aristotle did not approve of the principles of motion in 
matter (passive matter), so he abstracted matter and used excessive logic in 
his method. 
 
We can see similar ideas in the struggle between mechanistic philosophy, 
which favoured inert or non-self-determined matter, and neo-Platonist 
chemical philosophy, which held to an active matter theory. In the second 
chapter, I discussed Bacon’s comparison of Democritus’ philosophy with 
rationalistic philosophies, especially with Aristotle. The comparison was 
related to active matter and passive matter. We can make a similar comparison 
between mechanical philosophy and neo-Platonist chemical philosophy. Of 
course, I do not mean a complete mutuality between them; however, the main 






I should emphasise that by active (vitalist) matter theories, I mean those 
which approve of the principles of motion in matter, but not beyond matter. 
Here, I should also point out that I limit the definition of ‘mechanical 
philosophy’ to the motion of particles only by touching each other, which 
refers to its conceiving matter as a passive entity, and is a counter-argument of 
a belief in the ability of particles to move without collision, that is, act at a 
distance, which refers to active matter.75 
 
In section 5.1, I will discuss Bacon’s attitude towards mathematics in natural 
philosophy by considering the relation between his active matter theory and 
his rejection of the Aristotelian idea of the unmoved mover. In section 5.2, I 
argue that Bacon’s vitalistic view regarding the motion of smallest particles is 
contrary to a mechanical view regarding the motion of these particles, which 
is more accordant with a mathematical approach to nature.76  
 
 
5.1     The chemical philosophy on the unmoved mover    
            and mathematics 
 
 
The empiricist philosophers who affected the intellectual world of Bacon were 
the chemical and natural magical philosophers of the Renaissance. Even 
though Bacon was an idiosyncratic philosopher, there are some characteristics 
                                                 
  75. Marina Paola Banchetti–Robino expresses the transition between vitalistic and 
mechanical philosophy as follows: 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked a period of transition between 
the vitalistic ontology that had dominated Renaissance natural philosophy and the 
early modern mechanistic paradigm that was endorsed by Cartesian natural 
philosophers, among others. However, even with the dawning of the eighteenth 
century Chemical Revolution, chemistry remained resistant to the mechanical 
philosophy (Banchetti–Robino, 2011, pp. 173–4). 
  76.  For those who also argue that Bacon was not a mechanical philosopher, see Weeks, 




in his philosophy which show impressions left by other philosophies. It is 
widely accepted that the alchemical and natural magical philosophies affected 
his natural philosophy. However, even though he was affected by them in some 
respects, he also criticised them.77 
 
These chemical philosophers agreed partly with Pythagorean mystical 
mathematics, however, they were against the mathematical abstraction of 
Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo. As mentioned in the second chapter, even 
though Bacon was against the mystical mathematics (number mysticism) of 
neo-Platonist philosophers, he did agree with them in his refusal to apply 
mathematical abstraction to natural phenomena; and I should also point out 
that when the neo-Platonist chemical philosophers of the Renaissance used 
the term ‘mathematical abstraction’, they did not only mean what Copernicus 
and Galileo did, but also the syllogistic method of Aristotle used in his physical 
inquiries. Regarding the neo-Platonist chemical philosophers’ attitudes 
towards mathematics, Debus writes: 
 
In contrast with the traditional emphasis on logic, or what they 
frequently termed “mathematical demonstration,” they insisted that 
their chemical philosophy would have its fundamental tenets firmly 
based in the two irrefutable books prepared for us by the Creator–the 
Holy Scripture and the Book of Nature (Debus, 1973, p. 5). 
 
Debus shows that the neo-Platonist chemical philosophers were against the 
application of syllogistic logic to natural philosophical inquiries and they 
accepted a logical demonstration as a mathematical demonstration. As we saw 
in his letter to Father Redemptus Baranzano, Bacon also discusses 
mathematics as a syllogistic discipline that is not suitable for natural inquiries. 
This is because natural inquiries require the inductive experimental method 
                                                 
  77.  For how magic and alchemy affected Bacon’s thoughts, see Henry (2003), Weeks 




(see Chapter 2). Of course, these remarks do not show that Bacon was hostile 
to mathematics in general, but rather that he was opposed to making claims of 
natural philosophy through mathematics and logic. 
 
Debus gives an example from the influential Paracelsist, Petrus Severinus, who 
explained how medicine was damaged in the hands of Galen. The reason for 
this was Galen’s attempt to organise the medicine within, as Debus says, “the 
mathematical or geometrical system of Aristotle.”78 We can see this in the 
following words of Galen: 
 
So in the demonstration regarding the triangle – for there is no need 
for us to resile from the example since we have already expelled the 
uneducated Methodics from the discussion – the proposition itself 
was reached from these two premises: the first is that the area 
enclosed by the five feet and the twelve feet is sixty feet, and the 
second is the claim that the triangle is half that are, and showing that 
it is. However, each of these again requires certain other premises for 
demonstration, then those others again, until we come to those 
premises that are primary, which no longer have their proof from one 
another or from demonstration, but from themselves. The same 
applies too, I think, in the case of demonstrations in the medical craft. 
In all instances, there must be reduction to certain primary and 
undemonstrable premises, and from these all things must draw their 
proof. Indeed, if everyone attempted to say something about the 
therapeutic method in this way, they would be in harmony with each 
other in every respect, just like the arithmeticians, geometers, and 
                                                 
  78.   Debus informs us that he achieved the ideas of Severinus by annotating the following 
source: “Petrus Severinus, Idea medicinae philosophicae (3rd ed., Hagae–Comitis: Adrian 
Vlacq, 1660), pp. 2–3, 21. The first edition of this work appeared in 1571.” (see Debus, 1973, p. 
6, fn. 7). Severinus accepted the writings of Paracelsus as true medicine based on experiment 






These examples show us that, as mentioned in the first chapter, some 
philosophers believed in the equality of geometrical and syllogistic 
demonstration; which is why these chemical philosophers spoke of the 
method of Scholastics as geometrical or mathematical when they put forward 
their contrary ideas towards applying syllogism to natural philosophy or 
medicine. 
 
As to mystical mathematics or number mysticism, while Bacon was against the 
application of this kind of mathematics to natural phenomena (see p. 113), the 
chemical philosophers generally embraced it as a way to comprehend the 
essence of nature, that is, the mathematical structure of it. However, one of 
these chemical philosophers, Jan Baptist van Helmont, was also against 
number mysticism as well as mathematical abstraction, similar to Bacon. 
 
Van Helmont’s view regarding the logical method of Aristotle and Galen is 
similar to Severinus’ ideas about the same subject. According to van Helmont, 
the Aristotelian interpretation of nature “is a Paganish Doctrine drawn from 
Science Mathematical, which necessitates the first Mover to a perpetual 
unmoveablenesse of himself, that without ceasing he may move all things ... 
Therefore let the Schooles know, that the Rules of the Mathematicks, or 
Learning by Demonstration do ill square to Nature. For man doth not measure 
Nature; but she him.”80 
 
                                                 
  79.  Galen (2011, Book One, pp. 53–5). We can also read the following from Ben Morisonto 
regarding how Galen applied logic to medicine: 
Because Galen put heavy emphasis on the use of logic in demonstrating medical 
truths, he had much to criticize in the way other ancient logicians operated. Galen 
thought that logic is primarily a tool for extending our knowledge of medicine, 
geometry, and etc. (Morison, 2008, p. 74). 




Van Helmont believed that the prime mover is a false notion which was drawn 
from mathematics, and when he says ‘Science Mathematical’, he must mean 
mathematics as a syllogistic discipline (on mathematics as syllogistic, see pp. 
12–4). So, if the prime mover, which is the cause of motion in nature, is a false 
idea, then what did van Helmont offer as a cause of motion in nature? He 
answers this question as follows: 
 
there is something in sublunary things which can move it self locally, 
and alteratively, without the Blas of the Heavens, and an unmoveable 
natural mover. The will especially, is the first of that sort of movers, 
and moveth it self; also a seminal Being, as well in seeds, as in the 
things constituted of these. Moreover as God would, so all things were 
made: Therefore from a will they were at first moved: For from hence 
whatsoever unsensitive things are moved, they are moved as it were 
by a certain will and pleasure or precept of nature, and have their 
own natural necessities, and ends even as is seen in the beating of the 
Heart, Arteries, expelling of many superfluities, & C.81 
 
As seen, van Helmont attributed activity to nature by arguing that there is 
something which can move itself locally without an unmoved mover, which is 
‘will’. Van Helmont thought that matter was endowed with the ability to move 
by itself in creation. This contrasts with Aristotle, who attributed passivity or 
potentiality to matter. Also, the unmoved (prime) mover was seen by van 
Helmont as a result of logical and mathematical thinking. The idea of the 
unmoved mover is unacceptable for him because this idea makes the creator 
motionless. As noted below, the ideas of van Helmont regarding the activity of 
matter, the unmoved mover of Aristotle, and Aristotle’s logical approach to 
nature are similar to Bacon’s ideas about the same subjects. 
 
In examining what Bacon thought about the unmoved mover, he states in his 
                                                 




Novum organum (1620): 
 
Idols imposed on the intellect by words are of two kinds: for they are 
either the names of things which do not exist (for just as there are 
objects which through inadvertence lack a name, so there are names 
which through flights of fancy lack an object), or names of things 
which do exist but are muddled, ill–defined, and rashly and roughly 
abstracted from the facts. Of the first sort are fortune, first mover, 
planetary orbs, the element of fire, and fictions of that kind whose 
origins lie in vain and deceitful theories (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book 
One, §. 60, pp. 93–5; underlinings added). 
 
Here, Bacon separates the idols of the human mind into two kinds, and he 
places the concept of the prime (unmoved) mover among the first kind; for 
Bacon, the first mover is the name of a thing which does not exist. 
 
In the second chapter, I mentioned the differences between the views of 
empiricists and rationalists on the activity and passivity of matter and the 
relationship between their views with their methods. Recall that passive 
matter is the result of looking for the principles of motion and form beyond 
matter. As Aristotle did not believe that matter had the principles of motion in 
itself, he created the notion of the prime mover as a source of motion in 
matter, which is pure form. Thus, we can draw a conclusion that the idea of the 
unmoved mover as the cause of motion beyond matter is the result of the 
human mind’s propensity for searching for the principles of motion beyond 
matter; and as you remember for Bacon, the human mind, left to itself, follows 
the same course as logic and mathematics (see p. 46). We can conclude that, 
like chemical philosophers, Bacon believed the prime mover was the result of 








5.2     Active matter as the reason for being against   
            logical and mathematical methods in natural    
            inquiries 
 
 
Similar to the neo-Platonist philosophers such as Giordano Bruno, Paracelsus, 
Marsilio Ficino, Tommaso Campanella and Cornelius Agrippa, Bacon’s matter 
theory was also vitalistic.82 As Banchetti–Robino states, “Vitalism has been 
generally regarded as the view that claims that ‘vital forces’ or ‘vital spirits’ 
are causally operative in nature” (Banchetti–Robino, 2011, p. 174).83 As for 
Bacon, his references to matter’s activity show that for him, matter has the 
principles of motion in itself. As discussed in the second chapter, the activity of 
matter is the basis of Bacon’s experimental method, and the assumption that 
matter is passive and that principles of motion must be found beyond nature 
is, for Bacon, the hallmark of rationalist philosophy or the logical and 
mathematical approach to nature. Such a mistake is the result of the human 
mind‘s tendency to believe there is always something beyond nature.  
 
For Bacon, the unmoved mover of Aristotle’s cosmology was the result of 
seeing matter as passive or as a potential entity; and seeing the unmoved 
                                                 
  82.  On Bacon’s theory of matter, see Rees (1975); Weeks (2007a); Rusu (2012), (2013, pp. 
51–7) and Giglioni (2013a), (2016a), (2016b), (2016c). 
  83.   ‘Vital forces’ or ‘vital spirits’ refer to the principles of motion (or change). According to 
vitalist view, these principles do not stem from something beyond matter, such as forms of 
Aristotle or numbers of Pythagoras. So, what I mean by vitalism is a kind of matter which 
includes the principles of motion, and whether these principles are considered as spirits or 
anything else does not matter. 
Banchetti–Robino states: “Vitalism dominated natural philosophy during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries as a result of the Neoplatonic and hermetic traditions that informed 
Renaissance culture. It infused the work of such thinkers as Marsilio Ficino, Tommaso 
Campanella, Cornelius Agrippa, and Giordano Bruno and continued to dominate natural 




mover as the result of a logical and mathematical approach to nature also 
shows us the relationship established by Bacon between active matter and 
experimentalism, as well as passive matter theory and rationalism. 
 
Bacon compares passive matter or the fantastical matter of Aristotle with the 
active matter of the ancients as follows: 
 
the ancients laid down that primary matter (such as can be a 
principle of things) had form and properties, and was not abstract, 
potential and unformed. Certainly that despoiled and passive matter 
seems to be nothing more than a figment, arising from the fact that as 
far as the human intellect is concerned, those things seem to have 
most reality which the intellect takes in most readily, and which affect 
it most. So it follows that forms (as they call them) seem to have more 
reality than either matter or action, because the former is hidden, and 
the latter fluctuates; the one does not strike so forcibly, the other does 
not fix itself so firmly. Those other images, by contrast, are thought to 
be both manifest and firm, such that primary and common matter 
seems to be like an accessory and substrate; and action of whatever 
kind seems to be little more than an emanation of form, and forms are 
given all the best parts. And it is from here that the reign of forms and 
ideas in essences seems to have originated, namely with the addition 
of a kind of fantasy matter (Bacon, On principles, OFB VI, p. 207). 
 
Clearly, Bacon believed that by designing this kind of fictional matter, Aristotle 
“did proceede in such a Spirit of difference & contradiction towards all 
Antiquitie, vndertaking not only to frame new wordes of Science at pleasure: 
but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisedome” (Bacon, The 
Advancement, OFB IV, p. 81). 
 




look for the principles of matter beyond nature, which means he found the 
principles of matter as they are found in matter. For Bacon then, Democritus 
approved of active matter. Bacon’s idea of Democritus regarding his approval 
of active matter may seem strange when we consider the modern mechanical 
interpretation of Democritean atomism, however, as you remember, Bacon 
mentions Democritus’ name alongside some other pre-Socratics who 
approved of the principles of motion in matter (see p. 30). So, if the principles 
of motion are found in matter but not beyond matter, then we must accept 
that, for Bacon, Democritus’ matter theory is active.84 The important thing is 
that while mechanical philosophers approved of mathematics for natural 
inquiries, neo-Platonist chemical philosophers accepted mathematics as the 
logical method of the Scholastics and rejected it. What they rejected was 
making natural philosophical claims through mathematics, but in contrast to 
Bacon, as we mentioned before, they approved of the mystical mathematics of 
Pythagoras. 
 
We can say, therefore, that the reason for the struggle between vitalistic and 
mechanical philosophy is a result of their conceiving of matter. According to 
mechanical philosophy, as Antonio Clericuzio states, “matter is inert and all 
interactions in nature are produced by the impact of particles” (Clericuzio, 
2000, p. 7). This view is an acceptance that all qualities can be explained 
through shape, size, and motion, which are indeed quantitative properties (see 
Henry, 2002, p. 69).85 The increasing role of mathematics in natural 
philosophy became a tool for mechanical philosophy to support its argument 
                                                 
  84.  For Bacon, Democritus was important because the philosophy of Democritus mostly 
agrees with the ancient wisdom, which is represented in the fable Cupid. On the role of 
Democritus in early modern English philosophy, see Levitin (2015). 
  85.    Paolo Rossi also states that mechanical philosophy had the following assumptions: 
(1) nature is not the manifestation of a living principle but is a system of matter in 
motion that follows laws; (2) the laws of nature are mathematically precise; (3) 
relatively few such laws suffice to explain the universe; and (4) the explanation of 
natural phenomena excludes all reference to vital forces or final causes (Rossi, 




against vitalist philosophy. The term I refer to here as vitalist experimental 
philosophy refers to the philosophy of the above–mentioned neo-Platonist 
chemical philosophers, but not the philosophy of mechanical experimentalist 
philosophers such as John Locke. 
 
As for Bacon, we can see the influence of his vitalistic view of matter in his 
attitude towards the role of mathematics in natural philosophy. For both 
Bacon and the neo-Platonist chemical philosophers, the qualitative properties 
of matter, such as desires or appetites of matter, are properties that cannot be 
represented mathematically. For them, these qualities can only be discovered 
through experiment (see fn. 86). However, mechanical philosophers did not 
favour such qualitative properties of matter and action at a distance; instead, 
they held to motion by collision of particles and assumed that qualities are 
reducible to quantitative properties that can be defined according to the laws 
of geometry (see also p. 125). 
 
Chemical natural philosophers not only tried to discover those appetites of 
matter or vital forces through experiments but also applied their knowledge 
to control or alter natural phenomena. For one of the most important chemical 
philosophers, Paracelsus, nature can be understood as chemical processes are 
understood (see Debus, 2002, p. 87). When we consider neo-Platonist 
chemical philosophers, who saw chemical processes as the key to 
understanding nature; and mechanical philosophers, who saw mathematics as 
the key to understanding it, there is a remarkable difference between them. 
While mechanical philosophers did not favour experiments, they found 
different explanations for how nature works, and what method should be 
mainly applied for the discovery of the truth of natural phenomena. 
 
Mechanical philosophers did not deny the experimental method, but chemical 
philosophers denied the logical and mathematical methods. The reason 




logical and mathematical methods (except the mystical mathematics of 
Pythagoras), was their views regarding the properties of matter. For chemical 
natural philosophers, the appetites and desires of matter, which refer to the 
vital forces in matter, are the proper objects of natural philosophy which can 
be discovered through experimental method.86 Also, for Bacon, “the principles, 
fountains, causes, and forms of motions, that is, the appetites and passions of 
every kind of matter, are the proper objects of philosophy” (Bacon, 
Cogitationes, SEH V, p. 426). So, we can say that as the appetites and desires of 
matter can be discovered empirically, there was a relation between active 
matter and the experimental methods of chemical philosophers and Bacon. 
The aim of the neo-Platonist chemical philosophers was to control nature to 
produce practice, and controlling nature by discovering the hidden powers of 
nature was possible through the experimental method. 
 
In this context, I should also mention ‘natural magic’ and the ‘natural 
magician’. Magic was the violation of natural laws, while natural magic was 
nothing but the application of natural laws to beget practice. According to 
Della Porta, magical operations seem miraculous because the spectators do 
not understand how those operations happen (see Rossi, 2009, p. 19).87 There 
                                                 
  86.  The relation between active matter theory and the experimental method is also well 
stated in the following words of John Henry: 
As soon as Bacon turned to magic he could hardly fail to notice that its principal 
method was experimental (Henry, 2003, p. 53). 
Magic is the operation to produce practice from the discovered (hidden) properties of matter; 
for Bacon, these properties are forms. Henry also states the followings about the same issue: 
Since magic was chiefly concerned with exploiting the sympathies and antipathies 
between corresponding things in the Great Chain of Being, and since the 
assumption was that these powers of agreement and disagreement were hidden 
or occult, the magician could only discover the powers of things empirically 
(Henry, 2003, p.  55). 
On appetites of matter in Baconian natural philosophy, see Giglioni (2010). 
  87.   Cornelius Agrippa’s following words show us the relation of natural magicians with 
natural philosophy. A natural magician was an explorer of these hidden or secret powers of 
nature, as he states: 
Therefore natural magic is that which having contemplated the virtues of all 




is a strong relation between discovering the hidden powers of nature and its 
operations to produce practice. We can also see this well in Bacon’s work. For 
him, magic is placed in the operative part of natural philosophy (see Figure 3 
on p. 19), and it corresponds to formal axioms (causes) in the speculative part 
of natural philosophy. According to Bacon, magic is “the science which applies 
the knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderful operations; 
and by uniting (as they say) actives with passives, displays the wonderful 
works of nature” (Bacon, Cogitationes, SEH V, p. 426).88 
 
I have discussed above the similarities between Baconian natural magic and 
the natural magic of others. We should next ask whether there was a 
difference between Baconian natural magic and traditional natural magic. As I 
mentioned, magic corresponds to forms in Baconian schema, and for Bacon, 
forms are the most important part of natural philosophy to be discovered for 
the advance of sciences: 
                                                                                                                                       
known the hidden and secret powers of nature in such a way that inferior and 
superior things are joined by an interchanging application of each to each; thus 
incredible miracles are often accomplished not so much by art as by nature, to 
whom this art is as a servant when working at these things. For this reason 
magicians are like careful explorers of nature only directing what nature has 
formerly prepared, uniting actives to passives and often succeeding in anticipating 
results so that these things are popularly held to be miracles when they are realy 
no more than anticipations of natural operations; as if someone made roses flower 
in March or grapes ripen, or even more remarkable things such as clouds, rain, 
thunder, various species of animals and an infinite transformations of things … 
therefore those who believe the operations of magic to be above or against nature 
are mistaken because they are only derived from nature and in harmony with it. 
Quoted from Rossi (2009, p. 19). 
On how Francis Bacon use Della Porta’s natural magic, see Rusu (2016). 
  88.   Rossi also  discusses the operative role of magic: 
Campanella writes that the aim of magic is to ‘imitate and assist nature’. For him 
magic is the ruling science for it is a practical activity operating on reality; certain 
inventions had been described as magic until they were understood, when they 
became common knowledge; such were gunpowder, the magnet, and the printing 
press … For Paracelsus alchemy fulfils and perfects nature: ‘the achemist is he who 
helps to develop to the extreme limits intended by nature that which nature 
produces for the benefit of mankind’. Thus the weaver, the baker, the cultivater, are 
alchemists and the difference between the saint and the alchemist is that the 
operations of the one proceed from God whereas the other employs only natural 





For it seems to me there can hardly be discovered any radical or 
fundamental alterations and innovations of nature, either by 
accidents or essays of experiments, or from the light and direction of 
physical causes; but only by the discovery of forms (Bacon, De 
augmentis, SEH IV, p. 366). 
 
Since the discovery that forms are the most important thing for the advance of 
sciences, magic also shares the same importance because it can only be 
applied after the discovery of the forms.89 So, the proper method in 
discovering forms is also important for magic. Then, the difference between 
the traditional natural magic and Baconian natural magic results from the 
methods they had applied. Yes, both methods were experimental, but as you 
remember, Bacon also criticised the experimental method of his day (see p. 
52). For Bacon, the experimental philosophers of his day deduced general 
axioms from just a few experiments. However, he suggested his new inductive 
method which proceeds step by step from particulars to general axioms (see 
Section 2.3 for Baconian inductive method). 
 
 
5.2.1     Action at a distance, motion through the impact of    
               particles, and the role of mathematics in natural    
               philosophy 
 
 
Another aspect of Bacon’s matter theory is his views about the motion of 
                                                 
  89.   Rees also states: 
just as metaphysics provides the most abstract and powerful scientific knowledge 
attainable by human beings, so magic (not to be confused with what Bacon 
regarded as the superstitious impostures sometimes associated with magic) 
endows mankind with mastery over nature, with the power to prolong life almost 
indefinitely, transform base metal into gold, produce new plants and animals, and 




atoms (or seeds or smallest particles). In this section, I want to discuss one 
aspect of these views. My concern, as mentioned in the title, is whether the 
smallest particles can act at a distance or can act only through touching each 
other. Therefore, in this study, I describe mechanical philosophy as a 
philosophy which considers that ‘matter is inert and all interactions in nature 
are produced by the impact of particles’ (see p. 120), and I describe vitalist 
philosophy as a philosophy which attributes vitality to matter. Vitalist 
chemical philosophers accepted the ability of seeds to act at a distance as 
something which shows the activity in matter. 
 
Bacon was a vitalist. He believed that matter is an active entity which is 
different from the passive matter of Aristotle and mechanical philosophy. For 
Bacon, atoms or smallest particles were endowed by God with appetites and 
desires which give them a chance to move intrinsically. This ability of the 
smallest particles or, in Bacon’s own words ‘seeds’, are the reason for action in 
matter. 
 
This active matter is different from the passive matter of mechanical 
philosophy. The important question I want to emphasise is whether motion is 
an innate quality of particles. As to a mechanical account of the motion of 
particles (motion by collision of particles), we can see that it had been used as 
a justification for the explanatory power of mathematics in natural inquiries. 
As Christopher Kaiser rightly says, particles which can move by touching each 
other (an account such as that we have found in Descartes) “meant that matter 
was entirely receptive to the mathematical laws imposed on it by God” (Kaiser, 
1997, pp. 215–6). According to this idea, qualities are reducible to quantitative 
properties of size, shape and motion. The idea that qualities can be reducible 
to quantitative properties is also a justification for the application of 
mathematics to natural phenomena. 
 




Principles and origins according to the fables of Cupid and Coelum is one of 
Bacon’s important texts in which he mentioned his ideas about atoms and 
Democritus. Bacon believed this fable shows the ancient doctrine regarding 
the principles of things, and this doctrine was mainly held by Democritus. As I 
mentioned in the second chapter, Cupid represents primary matter, and 
primary matter was conceived by ancients as owning principles of motion in 
itself, which refers to the activity of matter. 
 
Now, let us read Bacon’s words showing he agrees with Democritus: 
 
Democritus made the admirable claim that atoms or seeds, and their 
virtue, were quite different from anything subject to the senses, but 
that they were remarkable for being things whose nature was entirely 
dark and secret. Therefore he proclaimed concerning them, that 
 
they do not resemble fire or anything else 
besides that which can send bodies 
to our senses or be felt by our sense of touch, 
 
and again concerning their virtue, 
 
But in giving birth to things the first beginnings ought 
to hold to a secret and dark nature, 
lest something should rise up to fight against and oppose them. 
 
Thus atoms are not like fiery sparks, drops of water, bubbles of air, 
specks of dust, not tiny amounts of spirit or ether. Nor is their power 
and form something heavy or light, hot or cold, dense or rare, hard or 
soft, such as are found in larger bodies, since these virtues and others 
of the kind are products of composition and combination (Bacon, On 





However, Bacon thinks differently from Democritus regarding the motion of 
atoms. He states: 
 
Nor, similarly, is the natural motion of the atom either that motion of 
falling bodies which is called natural, or the motion opposite to it 
(percussion), or the motion of expansion and contraction, or of 
impulse and connection, or the motion of expansion and contraction, 
or of impulse and connection, or of the rotation of the heavenly 
bodies, or any of the other motions of larger bodies simply. None the 
less in the atoms’ body exist the elements of all bodies, and in the 
atom’s motion and virtue exist the beginnings of all motions and 
virtues. But yet in this very matter, namely the atom’s motion 
compared with that of larger bodies, the philosophy of parable [the 
fable of Cupid] seems to differ from the philosophy of Democritus. For 
we find that Democritus is not only quite at odds with the parable, but 
also at odds and virtually in contradiction with himself in the other 
things he says on the matter. For he ought to have attributed a 
heterogeneous motion to the atom no less than a heterogeneous body 
and a heterogeneous virtue. But he chose from among the motions of 
larger bodies the two motions of descent of the heavy and ascent of 
the light (which he explained by the striking or percussion of the 
heavier driving the lighter upwards), and attributed them to the atom 
as primitive motions. The parable, however, preserves the 
heterogeneity and exclusion throughout, in both substance and 
motion (Bacon, On principles, OFB VI, p. 203). 
 
Bacon did not accept reducing the motion of atoms into descending and 
ascending, and he agreed with the ancient doctrine of the motion of atoms 
being heterogeneous. I believe the Democritean idea of ascending and 




proof of passive matter or mechanical accounts of the motion of atoms. Bacon 
especially emphasised that Democritus was one of the pre-Socratics who 
attributed the principles of motion (or activity) to matter (see Bacon, On 
principles, OFB VI, p. 209. See also Chapter 2). 
 
As you remember, for Bacon, Plato and Aristotle abstracted nature, that is, 
Plato did not attribute form to matter, and Aristotle did not attribute activity 
to matter. By doing this, they created a fantastical matter which can be seen as 
the end result of their abstractions, as Bacon states in his Novum organum, ‘it 
happens that men do not stop abstracting from nature until they arrive at 
potential and uninformed matter’ (see p. 30). 
 
The other thing which Bacon did not accept was dissecting nature until you 
arrive at atoms: 
 
Hence it happens that men … do not stop dissecting nature until they 
arrive at the atom — ideas which however true they may be, can do 
little for the good of mankind (Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book One, §. 66, 
p. 107). 
 
What Bacon meant by ‘abstracting from nature until they arrive at potential 
and uninformed matter’ was the creation of fantastical matter by finding the 
principles of motion beyond matter. However, dissecting nature until we arrive 
at atoms also does not give us anything, because atoms are beyond our senses 
and we can only speculate about them. What we can do, however, is search for 
the appetite and desires of matter which arises from the motion of atoms or 
seeds. We can only sense the effect of their forces, and from these effects, we 
can deduce causes or axioms of nature. 
 
In the Novum organum, Bacon explains that he does not accept the 





Now this business will not be brought down to the atom, which 
presupposes a vacuum and invariable matter (both false 
assumptions), but to real particles as we actually find them (Bacon, 
Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, §. 8, p. 213). 
 
Bacon believed the doctrine of atoms to be false because the ideas of vacuum 
and invariable matter, which are required by the doctrine, are false 
assumptions.90 However, Bacon still thought that there are particles in matter; 
the real particles, which do not presuppose a vacuum, and invariable matter. 
 
 
5.2.2      Did Bacon think that Democritus’ doctrine of atoms   
                was a mechanical account of motion in matter? 
 
 
In his Cogitationes de Natura Rerum (Thoughts on the Nature of Things – 
1604), Bacon says the following about Democritus and his doctrine of atoms: 
 
THE doctrine of Democritus concerning atoms is either true or useful 
for demonstration. For it is not easy either to grasp in thought or to 
express in words the genuine subtlety of nature, such as it is found in 
things, without supposing an atom. Now the word atom is used in two 
senses, not very different from one another. For it is either taken for 
the last term or smallest portion of the division or fraction of bodies, 
or else for a body without vacuity (Bacon, Cogitationes, SEH V, p. 419). 
 
For Bacon, Democritus’ doctrine of atoms is useful for demonstration. As you 
                                                 
  90.  For further reading regarding atoms and void in Bacon’s natural philosophy, see Kargon 
(1966); Rees (1980) and Manzo (2001). Guido Giglioni has argued more recently that 
Baconian atoms are indeed actual appetitive motions of matter, not forms, atoms and minima 




remember, Bacon’s conception of Democritus was that he was one of the pre-
Socratics who thought matter has the principles of motion in it; that is, he did 
not look for these principles beyond matter. So, by accepting atoms as the 
principles of motion, Democritus did not fall into the error defined by Bacon 
as looking for the principles of motion beyond matter (see Chapter 2). It is 
clear that the reason why Bacon approved of Democritus’ doctrine of atoms 
was that Democritus saw matter as the object of his natural philosophy by 
accepting atoms as the principles of motion in matter. So, the main reason 
Bacon supported the philosophy of Democritus was because of its search for 
the principles of motion in matter, which refers to an agreement with ancients’ 
theory of matter, as told in the fable of Cupid. Even though Bacon was against 
some Democritean ideas regarding atoms, he still approved of Democritus 
because Democritus agreed with ancient wisdom and his theory of atoms was 
the closest philosophy to ancient wisdom. As you remember, the most 
important part of ancient wisdom to Bacon was its ascribing form and the 
principles of motion to matter, which refers to the ability of action in matter 
(see p. 30). 
 
In his ‘Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton’, Robert Kargon separated 
Baconian philosophy into two parts. He thought that in his earlier works, 
Bacon was an atomist and a mechanical philosopher, then later gave up the 
doctrine of atomism and adopted pneumatic matter theory. However, Kargon 
accepted that Bacon’s atom is endowed with form, appetite, and motion (see 
Kargon, 1966, p. 46). Kargon thought that after Bacon adopted pneumatic 
matter theory he gave up atomism and he positioned pneumatism against 
atomism. For Kargon, pneumatism refers to the vitalist character of Bacon’s 
matter theory, while atomism refers to the mechanist character of it. 
 
Related to Kargon’s argument, I agree with him in arguing that Bacon’s atoms 
(or seeds) are endowed with appetite and motion. But Kargon attributed 




pneumatism, not to his atoms. Indeed, because atoms are endowed with 
appetite and motion, we should call Bacon’s atomism ‘vitalist’. 
 
As for Rees, he did not accept that Bacon had accepted the doctrine of atoms in 
any of his works, and for him, Bacon cannot be seen as a mechanical 
philosopher. The main reason for this was explained by Rees as follows: 
 
Bacon’s rejection of the classical atom is all too plain. He explained 
that minute portions of spirit were not the same as the atomists’ 
ultimate particles and since spirit and tangible matter were 
convertible, it must follow that tangible matter did not consist of the 
atomists’ indivisible particles either (Rees, 1980, p. 563). 
 
Rees based this argument on the following words of Bacon: ‘atoms are not like 
fiery sparks, drops of water, bubbles of air, specks of dust, nor tiny amounts of 
spirit or ether’ (see p. 126). As seen, atoms are different from the particles of 
spirit or pneumatic matter. As a result, Rees argues that Bacon never became 
an atomist and a mechanical philosopher and that, for Bacon, atomism was 
only a useful tool to explain the subtlety of nature (see Rees, 1980, p. 562). 
 
However, Silvia Manzo rightly argues that Rees’ argument is problematic 
because it rests on the idea that pneumatic matter and atoms are 
incompatible. As quoted above, Bacon says, ‘Thus atoms are not like fiery 
sparks, drops of water, bubbles of air, specks of dust, not tiny amounts of spirit 
or ether’ (see p. 126). Rees interprets Bacon’s words as an incompatibility 
between atoms and spirits, but, as Manzo rightly argues, we cannot interpret 
these words as such. Manzo explains her argument as follows: 
 
In order to argue for the imperceptibility of atoms, Bacon deals with a 
relation of external similitude (similes), not with a relation of 




Rees’ conclusion would still not follow, because from “A is not 
identical to B,” it does not necessarily follow that A is incompatible 
with B, nor that B is not composed of A (Manzo, 2001, p. 224, fn. 71). 
 
For Manzo, the alchemical and mechanical approaches are interwoven in 
Bacon’s works, especially in his later works. She accepts Bacon’s explanations 
regarding the processes of separation and alteration as mechanical 
explanations, while she accepts the appetites of Cupid as an animistic 
approach. However, while I agree with Manzo that separation and alteration 
can be seen as mechanical explanations in Baconian natural philosophy, I still 
label Bacon as a non–mechanical philosopher because of his belief in activity 
in matter, or particles’ intrinsic ability to move. Bacon’s mechanical 
explanations regarding alteration and separation are not an obstacle in 
labelling him as a non–mechanist philosopher. Also, I do not believe that 
Manzo labels Bacon as a mechanical philosopher, she just rightly argues that 
Bacon’s explanations regarding the processes of separation and alteration are 
mechanical explanations. 
 
To sum up, Kargon’s aforementioned argument is problematic because, as I 
argued in the second chapter, attributing the appetite and motion to atoms 
refers to vitalistic matter theory. Rees’ argument is also problematic because it 
rests on the incompatibility between pneumatic matter and atoms. The 
desires and appetites of Cupid, which refers to the activity of particles 
bestowed by God on them, should be determinative for us because, as 
mentioned above, Bacon defined the difference between rationalist 
philosophies and empiricist philosophies by considering whether they 
attributed activity to matter. Further, the close interest of rationalist 
philosophies to mathematical abstraction in natural philosophy was seen both 
by Bacon and the neo-Platonist chemical philosophers as a result of their 







5.3      Summary 
 
 
It is evident that Bacon accepted there are particles endowed by God in the 
creation, with the ability to move intrinsically. So, for Bacon, ‘the principles, 
fountains, causes, and forms of motions, that is, the appetites and passions of 
every kind of matter, are the proper objects of philosophy’ (see p. 122). These 
appetites and passions of matter are the results of motions of seeds or 
smallest particles, which have the ability to act at a distance. However, when 
we consider mechanical philosophy, it does not attribute any qualitative 
appetite to particles. 
 
Vitalist philosophers had a tendency to consider qualitative changes in natural 
processes, while mechanical philosophers were satisfied to reduce these 
qualitative properties to quantitative properties, such as shape, size and 
motion. As you would appreciate, these quantitative properties justified the 
application of mathematics to natural phenomena in the sense of making 
natural philosophical claims through mathematics. As discussed above, the 
quarrel between chemical and mechanical philosophers regarding the 
application of mathematics to natural phenomena was related to their 
differing beliefs and methods in active or passive matter theory.91 
 
In Chapter 2 I argued that the activity of matter is the basis of Bacon’s 
experimental method, and the assumption that matter is passive and that 
                                                 
  91.   As Debus states: “the Scientific Revolution was not simply the forward march of a new 
experimental method coupled with the powerful tool of mathematical abstraction. For some 
the two were incompatible” (Debus, 1968, p. 32). I should again emphasise that I do not say 
that mechanical philosophers who approved of mathematical abstraction did not pay 
attention to the experimental method, but that those neo-Platonist chemical philosophers did 




principles of motion must be found beyond nature is, for Bacon, the hallmark 
of rationalist philosophy or of the logical and mathematical approach to 
nature. For Bacon, such a mistake is the result of the desire of the human 
mind, because the human mind has a tendency to believe there is always 
something beyond nature. So, for Bacon, there is a correlation between the 
activity of matter and the experimental method and between passive matter 
and rational philosophy (see Chapter 2). 
 
Can we see the same relationship between active matter theory and 
experimental method in neo-Platonist chemical philosophers? In this chapter, 
I have argued that similarly to neo-Platonist chemical philosophers, Bacon 
saw the idea of the unmoved mover as the cause of motion in nature as the 
result of the logical and mathematical method of the Scholastics. So, neo-
Platonist philosophers were against the passive matter of Aristotle because 
they were against the unmoved mover (pure form) as the cause of motion in 
matter, and they argued that it was the result of logical and mathematical 
thinking. So, the relationship which was found by them between passive 
matter and logical and mathematical method requires us to accept that they 
also found a relationship between active matter and the experimental method. 
 
We know that neo-Platonist chemical philosophers approved of active matter 
and they applied the experimental method for their inquiries. They were also 
known as natural magicians, and a natural magician was an explorer of the 
hidden or secret powers of nature. Cornelius Agrippa states: 
 
magicians are like careful explorers of nature only directing what 
nature has formerly prepared, uniting actives to passives and often 
succeeding in anticipating results so that these things are popularly 
held to be miracles when they are realy no more than anticipations of 
natural operations; as if someone made roses flower in March or 




thunder, various species of animals and an infinite transformations of 
things.92 
 
As natural magicians search also for desires and appetites of matter, their 
method had to be experimental. As John Henry states: 
 
Since magic was chiefly concerned with exploiting the sympathies 
and antipathies between corresponding things in the Great Chain of 
Being, and since the assumption was that these powers of agreement 
and disagreement were hidden or occult, the magician could only 
discover the powers of things empirically (Henry, 2003, p.  55). 
 
When we consider Bacon, Henry argues a similar thing and states: “As soon as 
Bacon turned to magic he could hardly fail to notice that its principal method 
was experimental” (Henry, 2003, p.  53). 
 
The neo-Platonist vitalist philosophers were experimental, and they accepted 
mechanical philosophy as a rational philosophy because a mechanical 
philosopher’s application of mathematics to natural phenomena was seen by 
chemical philosophers as the logical and mathematical approach of the 
Scholastics to nature. So, when we consider Bacon, the reason he did not 
approve of making natural philosophical claims through mathematics was that 
he, like chemical (neo-Platonist) philosophers, saw mathematics as a logical 






                                                 










External Mechanics and Mathematics 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bacon was not a mechanical 
philosopher. He used the term ‘mechanics’ in a different sense, and he 
discussed three kinds of mechanics. First, he discussed the mechanics of the 
artisan; a sort of mechanic which does not depend on physics, and which is 
empirical and operative only.93 Bacon places this kind of mechanics in natural 
history. Second, ‘experientia literata’, that is, learned experience; which refers 
to the inventions which are found by intentional experiments and is different 
from the inventions of artisans found by chance (see Bacon, De augmentis, 
SEH IV, p. 366).94 Third, the kind of mechanics which depends on physics and 
is placed by Bacon in natural philosophy (see Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 
366). Sophie Weeks calls this kind of mechanics which depends on physical 
causes ‘philosophical mechanics’ to avoid confusion with the other two types 
of Baconian mechanics (Weeks, 2008, p. 134, fn. 3).95 When we consider 
mathematical sciences, however, I believe we need another kind of mechanics. 
 
                                                 
  93.    As Bacon states: 
I know that there is also a kind of Mechanic often merely empirical and operative, 
which does not depend on Physic; but this I have remitted to Natural History, 
taking it away from Natural Philosophy (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, pp. 365–6). 
  94.    For ‘experientia literata’, see also fn. 45. 





In this chapter, I will argue that Bacon had another type of mechanics which 
can be listed as the fourth type.96 Similar to ‘philosophical mechanics’, the 
fourth kind of mechanics is also based on the axioms of physics, and to avoid 
confusion with the other types of mechanics, I call it ‘external mechanics’.97 
This type of mechanics can be seen in the following words of Bacon: 
“ARISTOTLE has well remarked that Physic and Mathematic produce Practice 
or Mechanic” (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 369; underlining added). What 
Bacon means by mechanics here is different to the three other kinds of 
mechanics attributed to him. As mentioned previously, the operative part of 
Baconian natural philosophy includes mechanics and magic (see Figure 3 on 
p. 19). This mechanics refers to both philosophical mechanics and external 
mechanics, however there are differences between them, and I will discuss 
these below. 
 
In section 6.1, I will discuss the difference between philosophical mechanics 
and external mechanics, and I will argue that external mechanics is also based 
on the axioms of physics which makes it separate from the mechanics of 
mathematicians, that is, the system of machinery. In section 6.2, I will discuss 
the difference between the Baconian labyrinth–like nature and the 
mathematically structured cosmos of mathematicians. This will give us a 
chance to examine the difference between a Baconian definition of external 
mechanics and mathematicians’ systems of machinery. In this section, I will 
also discuss the relation between external mechanics and its role in producing 
practice. 
 
                                                 
  96.   Sophie Weeks discussed this topic with me in correspondence. I thank her for many 
helpful suggestions. 
  97.    The term ‘external mechanics’ is mine; Bacon did not use this term. However, as he used 
the term ‘systems of machinery’ for the geometrical models of mathematicians who developed 
their models by ignoring physics, and as he thought that when “Physic and Mathematic 
produce Practice or Mechanic” (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 369), I argue we can call the 
mathematical models of mathematicians who base their models on physics, such as al-Bitruji, 
‘external mechanics’. It is ‘external’ because it refers to the hide of the ox (for al-Bitruji and the 






6.1     External mechanics and philosophical mechanics 
 
 
External mechanics is based on the axioms of physics, so it is important to 
explain clearly the difference between external and philosophical mechanics. 
First, external mechanics is characterised by mathematical sciences (mixed 
mathematics), while philosophical mechanics is characterised by natural 
philosophy and it refers to the descending part of Baconian natural 
philosophy (see Figure 5 on p. 139). When we inquire into a natural 
phenomenon by applying the Baconian inductive method, we should ascend 
to new axioms until we reach to the highest axiom, that is, the form of the 
phenomenon we search for. This ascending process is possible through 
descending to new experiments or works. New experiments are necessary for 
us to leap up to a higher axiom. However, even though external mechanics 
also depends on the axioms of physics, there are differences between them. 
External mechanics (or mathematical models) should be performed by 
mathematicians, not natural philosophers. External mechanics refers to 
mathematical demonstrations which should be performed after natural 
philosophical inquiries have been done, such as the mathematical models of 
the heavens (see Chapter 3). For example, when we consider optics or sound, 
a natural philosopher should complete her/his inquiries into the axioms of the 
mentioned phenomenon by applying the ascending and descending processes, 
then a mathematician should start her/his mathematical demonstrations, and 
those demonstrations should be in harmony with the discovered axioms of 
physics. So, while inquiries into the axioms of natural philosophy (through 
ascending and descending processes) refers to the internal part of the inquiry 
(internal part of the ox), mathematical demonstrations refer to the external 
part of it, which is why I call it ‘external mechanics’. Philosophical mechanics 




is the external part of natural inquiries for the mathematical sciences. As you 
remember from Chapter 3, Bacon likens natural philosophy to the ox and 
separates the interior and exterior parts of it. The interior part of the ox refers 
to inquiries into the objects of natural philosophy while the exterior part or 
the hide refers to the mathematical demonstrations. For further clarification 
on this concept, please see Figure 5. 
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                                                Axiom2 
                              Axiom1 
 
       
   
                           Experiment   New Experiment      New Experiment     New Experiment 
                                    (New Work)               (New Work)                (New Work) 
 
                                                       Figure 598 
 
Bacon defines the mathematical model of the mathematicians who ignore 
natural philosophy as a ‘system of machinery’ (see p. 63). This definition 
shows us that Bacon sees mathematical models as a kind of mechanics. 
However, mathematical models which were developed by considering 
physics, such as al-Bitrujian’s geometrical model of the heavens (see Chapter 
3), are different from ‘systems of machinery’, and I call them (external) 
mechanics. The difference between them is that while ‘system of machinery’ 
does not depend on the axioms of physics, external mechanics depends on 
these axioms. For example, Copernicus’ mathematical model of the heavens, 
which offers a heliocentric model, is incorrect in Bacon’s view because it 
ignores physics. Copernicus’ and Ptolemaios’ models were established to save 
                                                 
  98.   For Weeks’ similar and detailed figure regarding the ascending and descending parts of 




the apparent motions, and this is why Bacon calls them ‘systems of 
machinery’. However, al-Bitruji’s model reflects the real motions of the 
celestial bodies because he developed his geometrical model by considering 
physics. To emphasise the difference between these two models, I call the 
latter ‘external mechanics’.99 
 
When you look at the above figure, every descending part refers to 
philosophical mechanics. As you see, there are several ascending and 
descending parts which give us a chance to rise to the higher axioms step by 
step without leaping up to the next step. This is the internal part of natural 
philosophy. When we consider mathematical sciences, however, we cannot 
say that every descending part also refers to external mechanics. If every 
descending part included external mechanics or mathematical models, for 
Bacon, a natural philosopher would also be a mathematician.  
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Bacon did not classify mathematical 
sciences and natural philosophy separately, but even though he approved of 
mathematical sciences as a part of natural philosophy, he separated the 
objects of mathematical sciences and natural philosophy, so we cannot say 
that, for Bacon, a natural philosopher must be a mathematician. Bacon never 
said something like this. However, when we consider Copernicus or Galileo, 
they believed that a natural philosopher must be a mathematician. Also, as 
mentioned before, Newton called new inquirers of nature ‘geometrical 
philosophers’ or ‘philosophical geometers’ (see p. 103).100 
 
As I have discussed in the first chapter, Bacon’s loyalty to the disciplinary 
boundary between mathematical sciences and natural philosophy does not 
                                                 
  99.   Please see Chapter 3 for further discussion about Bacon’s conceiving of the al-Bitrujian 
and Copernican models. 
  100.   In her ‘Observation and Mathematics’ (2013) Mary Domski defends an interpretation 
of Newton on which Newton can in fact be understood to follow in the tradition of Bacon. Cf. 




require natural philosophers to be mathematicians. When the objects of 
natural philosophy and mathematics were equated by mathematical 
physicists, being a mathematician became a necessity for a natural 
philosopher. 
 
If we accept that external mechanics should be developed in descending parts 
from the axioms of physics to new experiments during natural inquiries, then 
we must accept that a natural philosopher must also be a mathematician. 
However, mathematicians should use steps to make their demonstrations or to 
develop mathematical models after natural philosophers discover the natural 
philosophical axioms. As I mentioned in the third chapter, Bacon developed a 
physical model for the heavens as a natural philosopher, and he argues that a 
mathematical model (or external mechanics) should be developed by a 
mathematician which is in harmony with the physical model, which means 
that the mathematical model should be derived from the physical model. As 
you remember, this was the priority of physics in natural inquiries. 
 
As mentioned before regarding the celestial motions, Bacon emphasises that 
he ‘shall banish to calculations and tables the fancy mathematics (that 
motions be reduced to perfect circles, either eccentric or concentric), and the 
empty talk (that the Earth is in comparison to the heaven like a point, not like 
a quantity), and many other fictitious devices of the astronomers’ (see p. 76). 
And, indeed, when we consider astronomy, we cannot see any ascending and 
descending processes in Bacon’s explanations regarding the motions of 
celestial bodies. Bacon’s explanations regarding the celestial motions are 
more similar to Aristotle’s explanations. As mentioned in Section 3.5, Bacon 
explains the motions of the celestial bodies according to the materials of these 
bodies. 
 
When we compare inquiries into the axioms of natural philosophy and 




reasons. First, he believed it was the proper order which should be followed in 
natural inquiries, and I have discussed this in Chapter 2. Second, a priority of 
physics stops us reaching the wrong conclusions, such as in Copernican 
astronomy. Mathematicians should consider the results of natural philosophy 
before they make their demonstrations, so these two parts (internal and 
external) can be in harmony with each other to establish one body of science 
(see p. 70). As a result, Bacon saw the priority of physics as a precaution for 
mathematicians to prevent them making natural philosophical claims through 
mathematics. 
 
Before I finish this section, let me requote the following words of Bacon which 
also show us the external status of mathematical models (the last step status 
of mathematics, see pp. 26–7), which covers the inquiries into natural causes; 
these words also show us the auxiliary role of mathematics which refers to its 
inability to make natural philosophical claims: 
 
mathematics … ought to round off natural philosophy and not 
generate or procreate it (see p. 27). 
 
 
6.2  The Baconian labyrinth–like nature, geometrically    
         structured nature, and their relation with  
         external mechanics and the system of machinery 
 
 
In his De Sapientia Veterum (Wisdom of the Ancients) published in 1609, 
Bacon interprets the mythological figure, Daedalus, as ‘the mechanic’. 
Daedalus is a genius, but interestingly he is a bad character. According to 
Bacon, “the ancients drew a picture of mechanical skill and industry, together 
with its unlawful artifices and depraved applications” (Bacon, De sapientia, 




artificial cow for Pasiphae, the wife of King Minos of Crete. In the story, the 
God Poseidon gives a bull to King Minos to sacrifice, but King Minos saves the 
bull for himself, and this makes Poseidon angry. Poseidon takes revenge by 
making Pasiphae desire the bull. To satisfy her desire, the artisan Daedalus 
makes an artificial cow for Pasiphae so she can mate with the bull. This act 
results in Pasiphae giving birth to a strange creature, the Minotaur. Daedalus 
later built a labyrinth to hide this monster. For Bacon, this is “a work wicked 
in its end and destination, but in respect of art and contrivance excellent and 
admirable” (Bacon, De sapientia, SEH VI, p. 734). Bacon believed this story 
reveals two faces of mechanical arts or technology; the fountain of arts can 
produce both the instruments of wellbeing and the instruments of disaster 
and death. 
 
For Bacon, the labyrinth which was made by Daedalus represents nature. To 
find the exit from the labyrinth, Daedalus also designates a clue, and Bacon 
likens the clue to experiment. In his preface to Bacon’s Inquisitio legitima de 
motu, James Spedding defines the clue as the true method for natural 
philosophy (see Spedding, Preface to, SEH III, p. 624). As the essence of the 
true method is experiment, the clue can be defined as both experiment and 
the true method. Daedalus is the same man who designed the labyrinth and 
who invented the clue to find the exit from the labyrinth. What matters most 
in the present context is the analogy of the relationship between the labyrinth 
and the clue on the one hand, and nature and experiment on the other. 
 
It is important to point out that Bacon likened nature to a labyrinth, in 
contrast to others who likened nature to a mathematically designated 
structure. Bacon did so because he wanted to emphasise nature’s subtlety and 
that nature cannot be cast in a rational mould (that is, we cannot understand 
nature through the rules of geometry or logic). As mentioned before, Bacon 
believed there is a tendency of the human mind to suppose ‘that there is more 




mind which makes us think that nature is more explainable through 
mathematics. However, the mentioned supposition of the human mind is not 
real, that is, there is not as much order and equality in nature as we suppose. 
 
Bacon quotes from Democritus the following words which imply nature’s 
obscurity: “That the truth of nature lies hid in certain deep mines and caves” 
(Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 343). Again, in his De Augmentis Scientiarum, 
Bacon says that “For Physic carries men in narrow and restrained ways, 
imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of Nature” (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH 
IV, p. 362). To overcome this obscurity of matter (see also Chapter 2), 
experiment (or mechanics) is seen by Bacon as an important tool (see Bacon, 
De augmentis, SEH IV, pp. 365–366). 
 
We know that Bacon emphasises the difference between ‘nature free’ and 
‘nature constrained’. Nature can only be constrained by mechanics or art to 
reveal its truth.101 This is why mechanics was seen by Bacon as the clue to find 
the way out from the labyrinth. As you remember, Bacon interpreted 
Daedalus as the ‘mechanic’ and the clue, which was invented by Daedalus the 
mechanic, as experiment.102 
 
In the hidden maze of the labyrinth, mathematics is not as strong a tool as the 
inductive experimental method.103 The Baconian labyrinth-like nature is 
                                                 
  101.   On nature which is constrained by experiment (or mechanics) to reveal its truth, see 
Pesic (1999). On Bacon’s theory of experimentation, see Jalobeanu (2013). 
  102.     On mechanics as experiment, see Rossi (1970) and Weeks (2008). 
  103.  Rossi compares a mathematical image of the world with Baconian image that is 
labyrinthical, and says: 
The typically Platonic images of a world of mathematical and rational structures 
created by a geometer God who composed the world out of numero, pondere, 
etmensura doubtlessly were to be more fruitful to the development of modern 
science than the Baconian image of nature as a “forest” and a “labyrinth.” The so-
called Baconian “incomprehension” of mathematics which led Bacon to appreciate 
“mechanics” such as Agricola more than “theorists” such as Copernicus and 
Galileo was deeply bound up with his appraisal of logic as a “labyrinthian thread” 




contrary to the geometrically structured nature of mathematicians. 
 
At this point, the claim that a bronze sphere cannot touch a straight plate at a 
point is important to mention. This is an old claim. According to Aristotle, 
Protagoras used this claim in his rebuttal to geometers (see p. 12, fn. 9). This 
claim was interpreted, especially by the Peripatetics, as one of the reasons 
why mathematics should not be applied to physics. In his Dialogue Concerning 
the Two Chief World System, Galileo made Simplicio — an imaginary 
peripatetic — say that “these mathematical subtleties do very well in the 
abstract, but they do not work out when applied to sensible and physical 
matters” (Galilei, 1967, p. 203). Again, in his other dialogue, Dialogues 
Concerning Two New Sciences, Galileo puts Aristotelian thought about the 
same subject into the mouth of Simplicio as follows: “The arguments and 
demonstrations which you have advanced are mathematical, abstract, and far 
removed from concrete matter; and I do not believe that when applied to the 
physical and natural world these laws will hold” (Galilei, 1914, p. 52). 
 
As the imperfection of matter does not allow mathematics to be applied to 
physics, the Peripatetics believed that, in contrast to geometrical spheres, 
physical spheres cannot touch each other at a point. The reason is explained 
by the Peripatetic spokesman of Galileo, Simplicio, by saying that “it is the 
imperfection of matter which prevents things taken concretely from 
corresponding to those considered in the abstract” (Galilei, 1967, p. 207). 
However, Galileo tried to demonstrate that two physical spheres can touch 
each other at a point. Indeed, if geometrical spheres were not perfect, they 
could not touch each other at a point even in the abstract. In a similar way, if 
physical spheres were perfect enough, then they could touch each other at a 
point. Galileo’s writings show us that things work both in the abstract and in 
                                                                                                                                       
We cannot say that Copernicus or Galileo believed in Platonian kinds of abstract forms, but 





the concrete, in the same way. The errors, according to Galileo, come from the 
calculator, not from abstractness or concreteness or from physics or 
geometry. The important thing in Galileo’s words is his belief that, both in the 
abstract and in the concrete, mathematics works in the same way. This idea 
must depend on his idea of the unchangeability of matter; because instead of 
the belief of Aristotle and the Peripatetics in changeability and perishability of 
matter, Galileo assumes that matter is unchangeable. His spokesman Salviati 
says that “Since I assume matter to be unchangeable and always the same, it is 
clear that we are no less able to treat this constant and invariable property in 
a rigid manner than if it belonged to simple and pure mathematics” (Galilei, 
1914, p. 3). 
 
As one at the frontier of mathematical physics,104 and probably the best in the 
early modern period, Galileo was against the idea that the abstractness of 
mathematical objects causes mathematics to fall into error in physics, and this 
idea is related to the unchangeability of matter. We know that Aristotle 
thought that only heavenly bodies have perfect geometrical shapes (see fn. 9). 
Accordingly, the superlunar realm of the cosmos has the advantage of 
unchangeableness and imperishableness, because this part of the cosmos is 
composed of aether. However, what Galileo means is that matter can be 
defined mathematically, and the abstractness of mathematical objects does 
not cause any errors in mathematical demonstration related to physics, so 
motion and change in matter can mathematically be defined. 
 
We can see that those who thought mathematics could be used to make 
natural philosophical claims had a propensity to interpret the cosmos as 
something geometrically structured.105 However, when we consider the 
                                                 
  104.   On the birth of mathematical physics, see Zvi (2008, pp. 9–11). 
  105.   Rossi discusses this relation between mechanics and mathematics well: 
 
The assumption of the model machine, the integral explanation of physical and 




labyrinth–like universe of Bacon, which has so many ambiguous ways, the 
difference between it and a geometrically structured universe can be easily 
seen. 
 
The labyrinth-like nature of Bacon refers to the subtlety of matter, and as you 
remember from the second chapter, the subtlety of matter requires the 
experimental method, not logical or mathematical methods. So, Bacon likening 
experiment to the clue which helps us to find the exit from the labyrinth is 
understandable. 
 
As to the relationship a labyrinth-like nature and a geometrically structured 
one between external mechanics and the system of machinery, even though 
experiment was seen by Bacon as the clue to find out the truth of nature, we 
also need mathematical demonstrations, especially when we consider 
mathematical sciences. As mentioned, physics and mathematics should form 
one body of science. Bacon gives the ox as an example to explain what he 
means by one body of science formed out of physics and mathematics. The 
interior part of the ox represents the inquiries into the objects of natural 
philosophy, and the exterior part of it or the hide of the ox represents 
mathematical demonstrations or external mechanics. Then, we can mention a 
difference between the mathematical demonstrations of mathematicians who 
ignored natural philosophy and those who considered the axioms of natural 
philosophy, as mentioned above, such as the geometrical model of al-Bitruji. 
Bacon calls the former ‘system of machinery’, and I call the latter ‘external 
                                                                                                                                       
modification of the concept of nature. Nature no longer appeared as a context of 
forms and essences in which “qualities” inhere, but of phenomena which are 
quantitatively measurable. All qualities not translatable in mathematical and 
quantitative terms were excluded from the world of physics. It was declared that 
there were no “hierarchies” in nature and the world no longer appeared as 
constructed for man or to the measure of man. All phenomena, like all the 
component parts of a machine, were declared to have the same value. Knowledge 
of reality implied an awareness of how the machine of the world functions, and 
that machine (at least theoretically) could be broken down into its single 






External mechanics should cover the labyrinth-like nature of Bacon, like the 
hide of the ox covers the interior part of it, that is, mathematical 
demonstrations (mathematical models or external mechanics) should follow 
the inquiries into the axioms of natural philosophy because the main method 
for a labyrinth-like nature is experiment, however those who thought nature 
is geometrically structured gave the main role for their natural inquiries to 
mathematics, and for Bacon, they ignored natural philosophy. So, Bacon 
defined their mathematical demonstrations as ‘systems of machinery’ to 
emphasise their lack of natural philosophy. When we consider astronomy, 
mathematical demonstrations regarding the motions of the heavenly bodies 
indicate a ‘system of machinery’ which is established on apparent motions 
only, that is, a system which is devised to produce apparent motions only, not 
the causes of things (see Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, pp. 348–9). 
 
It should also be considered that without external mechanics, mathematical 
sciences cannot be put into practice. For mathematical sciences, putting 
theory into practice is mostly possible through external mechanics 
(mathematical models). For Bacon, we can use a geometrical model (external 
mechanics) of the heavens, for example, to navigate our ships on the open 
seas; or we can use the external mechanics of projectile motion, for instance, 
to design cannons which can hit their targets with a better approximation.106 
External mechanics (mathematical models) is not a study regarding the 
causes of nature but rather descriptive studies which should be developed out 
                                                 
  106.   For further reading on the application of geometry to develop instruments such as 
devices for the art of warfare, see Bennett (2002) and (2011). On a discussion in sixteenth 
century on whether astronomical instruments could represent the cosmos, see Mosley 
(2006). Thomas Tenison (1636–1705) informs us in his Baconiana that Bacon also made a 
mechanical device representing the planetary motions, see Tenison (1679, pp. 17–8). I thank 
Sophie Weeks for letting me know about this invention of Bacon. On the status of the 
mechanical arts in sixteenth century, see Heikki (1999). On mathematical practitioners and 




of physics. For example, we can say that Galileo should have made causal 
explanations regarding natural and violent motions before he made his 
descriptive explanations. Bacon gave some causal explanations regarding the 
motions of the celestial bodies by considering their substance (see Section 
3.5). For Bacon, the causal knowledge of the motions of the celestial bodies 
cannot produce practice unless it meets mathematics. Bacon thought that 
sciences could advance if we work on the axioms (causes) of natural 
philosophy. Working on mathematical demonstrations and ignoring natural 
philosophy was an obstacle for the advancement of sciences because, as 
mentioned before, Bacon thought new works could be deduced from the 
axioms of natural philosophy. 
 
 
6.3      Summary 
 
 
I want to point out that unlike philosophical mechanics and the other two 
mentioned mechanics, external mechanics itself is not an experiment but a 
mathematical model based on the axioms of physics, which should be 
developed by mathematicians. Exterior mechanics is exclusively for 
mathematically characterised sciences (mixed mathematics); and while 
philosophical mechanics is the descending from the axioms of physics to new 
experiments, we should wait until we discover the axioms of a certain 
phenomenon through ascending and descending processes to develop the 
mathematical model (external mechanics). Al-Bitrujian’s geometrical model 
for the celestial motions is a good example of external mechanics (see also 
Chapter 3). 
 
Bacon calls the mathematical models of mathematicians who ignore physics in 
developing their model ‘systems of machinery’. For Bacon, Copernicus’ or 




the mechanisms involved. However, I should emphasise that this is Bacon’s 
point of view. For Copernicus and Galileo, their mathematical model reflects 
the physical model. Bacon thought that Copernicus’ model ignores physics 
because it is in conflict with, for example, the stability of the earth at the 
centre of the universe. So, we can say that while al-Bitruji’s exterior mechanics 
regarding the motions of the celestial bodies is an example of a mathematical 
model which is based on physics, Copernicus’ model is an example of a 
mathematical model (system of machinery) which was not derived from a 
































In this study, I have argued that Bacon did not approve of the new role of 
mathematics, which can be defined as making natural philosophical claims 
through mathematics. I have argued that Bacon had two fundamental 
commitments which caused him to disapprove of the new role of mathematics. 
First, the inconsistency between the course of nature (matter) and the course 
of logic and mathematics. Second, the consistency between human 
understanding and the course of logic and mathematics. 
 
The inductive experimental method of Bacon consists of the instruments of 
the human mind and senses, which make them more able to deal with the 
subtlety of matter. So, Bacon defined the role of mathematics in natural 
philosophy as an assistant his inductive experimental method, and this 
subsidiary role refers to mathematics’ inability to be used to make natural 
philosophical claims. For Bacon, those who used mathematics to make natural 
philosophical claims tried to make mathematics dominant over physics. 
 
The idea of not making natural philosophical claims through mathematics was 
an Aristotelian notion and was the result of Aristotle’s disciplinary division 
between mathematical sciences and natural philosophy. When we consider 
this aspect of disciplinary division, I have argued that Bacon remained an 
Aristotelian. However, I have also argued that Bacon rejected a disciplinary 
division between mathematical sciences and natural philosophy because he 
took the mathematical sciences to be a branch of metaphysics, which in turn, 




mentioned in the first chapter, Aristotle’s disciplinary division rests on the 
separation of mathematical sciences and natural philosophy, so we cannot 
make natural philosophical claims through mathematics. In contrast to 
Aristotle, Bacon placed mathematical sciences as a branch of natural 
philosophy, but agrees with Aristotle on the rejection of making natural 
philosophical claims through mathematics. We can say that placing 
mathematical sciences in natural philosophy was a revolutionary act, but 
rejecting the ability of mathematics in making natural philosophical claims 
was a counter–revolutionary attitude. These two attitudes of Bacon should not 
be confused with each other. 
 
Bacon’s attitude towards mathematics is similar to the attitudes of the neo-
Platonic chemical philosophers. They both accepted that making natural 
philosophical claims through mathematics was the logical and mathematical 
approach of the Scholastics to nature, and they also both accepted the idea of 
the unmoved mover as an unwelcome result of the logical and mathematical 
approach to nature. While these chemical philosophers applied an 
experimental method, Aristotle and Scholastics chose to use excessive logic in 
natural inquiries. I have argued that these similarities between chemical 
philosophers and Bacon resulted from their belief in active matter, which was 
contrary to the Aristotelian and scholastic view of passive or potential matter. 
For Bacon, those who did not approve of the active properties of matter must 
search for them beyond matter, and finding these principles beyond matter 
forces them to apply excessive logic and mathematics in natural inquiries. For 
Bacon, when the human mind is unaided, it follows the same route as logic and 
mathematics.  
 
What Bacon held true for the role of mathematics for natural inquiries can be 
well seen in his attitude towards designing a mathematical model of the 
heavens. For him, such a model should be established by considering the 




physical claims through mathematics. Bacon believed the axioms of natural 
philosophy should be discovered through his inductive method. Mathematical 
models (external mechanics) of the heavens or any mathematical models for 
any natural phenomena should be established by considering axioms of 
natural philosophy. 
 
Now, let me make an analogy by comparing the relationship between 
mathematics and natural philosophy in the early modern period with social 
sciences in the twentieth century. Eugene Wigner tells a story between two 
friends in his famous paper, ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in 
the Natural Sciences’, written in 1960: 
 
There is a story about two friends, who were classmates in high 
school, talking about their jobs. One of them became a statistician and 
was working on population trends. He showed a reprint to his former 
classmate. The reprint started, as usual, with the Gaussian 
distribution and the statistician explained to his former classmate the 
meaning of the symbols for the actual population, for the average 
population, and so on. His classmate was a bit incredulous and was 
not quite sure whether the statistician was pulling his leg. “How can 
you know that?” was his query. “And what is this symbol here?” “Oh,” 
said the statistician, “this is π.” “What is that?” “The ratio of the 
circumference of the circle to its diameter.” “Well, now you are 
pushing your joke too far,” said the classmate, “surely the population 
has nothing to do with the circumference of the circle” (Wigner, 1960, 
p. 1). 
 
As we can see, the statistician’s classmate objects to the idea that the 
population can be represented by the ratio of the circumference of the circle to 
its diameter. Now, I want to remind the readers of Bacon’s objection to the 




the heavens (see p. 76). 
 
The following words of Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger make the above 
analogy clearer: 
 
Over the years, mathematics and statistics have become increasingly 
important in the social sciences. A look at the history quickly confirms 
this claim. At the beginning of the 20th century most theories in the 
social sciences were formulated in qualitative terms while 
quantitative methods did not play a substantial role in the 
formulation and establishment of them. Moreover, many practitioners 
considered mathematical methods to be inappropriate and simply not 
suited to foster our understanding of the social domain … All this 
changed by the end of the century. By then, mathematical and 
especially statistical methods were standardly used and it became 
relatively uncontested that they are of much value in the social 
sciences (Hartmann and Sprenger, 2011, p. 594).107 
 
The possibility of making natural philosophical claims through 
mathematics is related to the idea that mathematics, as a creation of the 
human mind, can explain the objects of natural philosophy.108 Bacon’s 
answer to this is ‘no’, and in this thesis, I have attempted to show two 
reasons why he disagreed with this statement (see Chapter 2).  
 
The Baconian labyrinth–like nature cannot be cast into a logical or 
mathematical mould. This does not mean that Bacon was against the 
application of mathematics, but that he had no trust in mathematics for 
                                                 
  107.   I should point out that the definition of social science in Hartmann and Sprenger’s 
paper includes anthropology, political science, sociology, economics, and parts of linguistics 
and psychology. See Hartmann and Sprenger (2011, p. 609, fn. 1). 
  108.  In a more recent paper, physicist Max Tegmark argues that our physical world is an 




the explanation of the objects of natural philosophy. He believed it is 
useful as an assistant, and being an assistant for natural philosophy 
means that we should not make natural philosophical claims through 
mathematics. As long as we do not make natural philosophical claims 
through mathematics, Bacon had no issue with the application of 
mathematics to natural philosophy, and as mentioned before, we should 
not fail to notice that making natural philosophical claims through 
mathematics was the new role for mathematics. The new role of 
mathematics was a violation of the disciplinary boundary between 
mathematical sciences and natural philosophy by equating the objects of 
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